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Research on the links between regional economics and banking comprises many problems that
aect spatial patterns of economic activity in various ways. In economics, capital is frequently
supposed to be completely mobile across dierent regions, hence geographical dimensions in -
nance have produced a rather small body of literature compared to other elds of research. This
thesis analyzes several links of regional factors to banking, namely the impacts of regional indus-
trial clustering and distance on bank relationships as well as the eects of local real estate price
growth on banks' risk-taking. A common factor of all of these issues is the impact of distance
on the transmission of information, which applies to knowledge transfers within industrially spe-
cialized rm clusters, potential information asymmetries between distant borrower and lenders,
and the ability to produce reliable predictions for price changes on local markets. Therefore, the
thesis oers an insight whether distance is still a constraint of the transport of all relevant infor-
mation in the age of strong development of digital techniques and whether being in proximity to
a market changes rms' funding or banks' lending.
The rst two chapters of this thesis introduce the topics and show how the dierent aspects that
are analyzed in the following are connected to each other. Furthermore, I discuss some of the
relevant concepts that are the basis of the following analyses.
Local industrial specialization plays a crucial role in chapter 3, where the eects of potential
industry externalities and competition on rms' external funding are analyzed. A special focus
is placed on innovative rms, which might on the one hand benet from industry externalities
but on the other hand suer under harsher competition and incur more problems when it comes
to gaining access to external funding. The analysis nds that local competition robustly aects
rms' number of bank relationships negatively, while local industry specialization only has robust
eects if the analyzed rm sample is split up w.r.t. industrial sectors.
Distance, which is highly relevant for the existence of industrial externalities, is a key component
of chapter 4, where I analyze the eect of spatial distance between borrowing rms and lending
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banks in single bank relationships. As distance could increase loan rates either due to information
asymmetries or higher transport costs, I expect interest rates of loans to increase with distance
as compensation. Analyzing a cross-section of 8,200 German rms, I nd that borrower-lender-
distance has a signicant eect on the interest rates paid in single bank relationships.
Besides using higher risk premia for loans, collateral is a frequent method of overcoming risk in
lending that is caused by information asymmetries. The impacts of real estate - which is one
of the assets most commonly used as collateral - on banks' loan portfolio risk is investigated in
chapter 5. This chapter analyzes whether information on local real estate price growth, which
captures a variety of economic conditions, can explain changes in banks' risk-taking in lending. If
banks have a good knowledge about local real estate market development, they should b able to
recognize whether price increases are fundamentally driven and therefore adapt their risk-taking.
Analyzing a panel data of 390 German savings banks, which have a strong aliation with local
economies as well as with local real estate markets, I nd that changes in local real estate price
levels do not alter their risk-taking.
The key results of the thesis are summarized in chapter 6.
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The way economic mechanisms shape spatial patterns of settlement, industries, trade, prices
and allocation of input factors has always been of special interest to researchers. This is not
surprising; regional disparities and dierences between urban and rural conditions of life have
had a prominent role for all kinds of aspects of human living, including inequalities in culture,
technical progress, and wealth. For economic subjects, these issues are not only more visible
and less abstract than national or even global economic developments, they shape their lives in
a more immediate and often quicker way.
Research has posed a focus on the impact of the quality, quantity and (spatial) distribution
of the sources of local productivity growth. The latter include economic forces that promote
agglomerations as e.g. knowledge spillovers and centrifugal forces, i.e. economic conditions that
counteract innite growth of a single location, e.g. transport costs or rents. These factors can
reinforce themselves and determine the location of production factors and therefore centers of
productivity and growth (s. a. Cook et al. 2007, p. 1338, Palivos and Wang 1996).
There are at least some reasons for a lack of research in regional nance. A variety of economic
theories (except Post-Keynesian economics) assume that monetary supply is determined endoge-
nously in a regional context and that capital is perfectly mobile and nancial ows only are
reections of real ows (Dow and Rodríguez-Fuentes 1997, 904). Furthermore, data availability
is scarce when it comes to data on loans or even specic data on locations of lenders and bor-
rowers.
Research furthermore has barely gured connections between nance and issues from regional
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16 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
economics. Although there have been attachment points like investigations on loan portfolio
specialization (Berger et al. 2010, Böve 2009, Degryse and Ongena 2004, Paravisini et al. 2014,
Winton 1999) this has not been investigated in the light of regional economic theories.
Forces that promote the agglomeration of economic activity, such as prevention of market power,
reduction of information asymmetries and knowledge spillovers (Bröcker and Fritsch 2012, 93)
are not only relevant to banks as enterprises, but also for their relationships with their costumers.
Especially personal contacts as a means of sharing information, thus creating knowledge spillovers
and symmetry of information in regional economic markets and rm bank relationships, play a
prominent role (s. Deyoung et al. 2012; Storper and Venables 2004, 352f): This link between
local economy and nance has gained special relevance since the emergence and development of
impersonal ways to do business in nance has accelerated.
This `new' ability of getting access to funds from banks allows rms to develop dierent nanc-
ing strategies in the presence of higher competitive pressure. As we will learn from chapter 3,
competition and spatial distribution of a rm's industry seem to aect its choice of banking
relationship.
Yet in many cases, the choice of the bank relationship type is not solely determined by a rm's
industry or its position within competitive hierarchy. First, it should be clear whether the desired
relationship type is available, i.e. whether there are banks located in the vicinity of the rm to
engage in relationship banking or whether the rm has access to a multitude of banks and would
rather rely on transaction based banking. Which of those is chosen ultimately depends on the
costs and benets caused by a variety of factors.
One of those is the spatial distance between borrower and lender, as will be shown in chapter 4.
Distance causes transport costs in credit relationships in order to reduce either information
asymmetries or avoid (or exert) some kind of market power by the lender (s. e.g. Agarwal and
Hauswald 2010, Bellucci et al. 2013, Degryse and Ongena 2005). Close bank relationships to
regional banks have a high relevance for the German economy which is highly dependent on
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which are often opaque w.r.t. available corporate
information (Stiroh 2004, p. 136). Small regional banks play a special role for SMEs and are
commonly regarded as having an advantage when analyzing and processing information on those
rms as well as the local economy.
As can be seen from gure 1.1, banks with a local basis still have an important and even growing
relevance for loan origination. Thus, the relevance of local banks for external funding has even
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Figure 1.1: Lending activity of German regionally based banks.
Monthly share of loans originated by locally based banks (savings, cooperative, and regional banks) in
percent of all loans originated to non-MFIs. Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank.
increased during the last decades, besides an increase of globalization or a constant augmentation
of the ways of external funding. A number of reasons therefore can be found in literature; most
of all, regional operating banks are spatially closer to their costumers, which includes not only a
common background (Alessandrini et al. 2010, p. 846), but also lower transport costs and higher
frequency of interaction, which is especially important for inexperienced rms.
Yet, although proclaiming to have strong bonds to their aliated region, banks of all kinds have
steadily reduced the number of their branch oces. On the one hand, this again increases spatial
distances towards their lenders and lowers their accessibility for individual and rm clients as
well. On the other hand, branch reduction decreases bank ocers' knowledge and sense of local
economy, shrinking their informative advantage to commercial banks (Alessandrini et al. 2016,
p. 546).
But as their relevance at loan origination still rises (s. gure 1.1), doubting the relevance of
distance in lending seems to be justied (perhaps mostly recognized by Petersen and Rajan
2002) and if rms rather rely on impersonal relationships with their banks, information asymme-
tries can be overcome by a variety of techniques. Prominent examples include scoring methods,
enabling banks to transmit the riskiness of a borrower over long distances and detached from
knowledge of the local economic background of the borrower.
One of the most known ways of inuencing borrowers' behavior (besides the setting of interest
rates) are collateral requirements (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, p. 394). Real estate as collateral has
a long tradition and is commonly used to secure long term debt (s.a. Niinimäki 2009). As its
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Figure 1.2: Local economic factors and lending techniques
value depends on the local economy, regional banks, being more in touch with the former, could
have a comparative advantage when lending under collateral in terms of forecasting real estate
values. Thus, being a local bank could even pay o when it comes to lending techniques that
initially do not require being close to a borrower. As we will see in chapter 5, this could induce
those banks to extend credit to riskier costumers.
As a result of the analysis, regionally based banks do not seem to engage in riskier loans if real
estate prices rise; rather, these banks' loan portfolio risk is connected to overall local economic
condition. This clearly indicates the strong interdependency of a well working nancial sys-
tem in the vicinity of on-site rm clusters and underlines the relevance of further studying the
connection of regional economics and informative asymmetries in bank relationships.
1.2 Structure of thesis
The focus of this thesis is the analysis of borrower-lender relationships and how locally specic
factors aect the perception of mutual trust and the assessment of the counterparty's reliability.
The main investigated components that shape this relationship are presented in gure 1.2.
While competition has a major stake at determining the kind of borrower-lender relationship
between rms and banks, the relationship itself can either be rather close or impersonal. The dif-
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ference between the two types mainly is made up by the way how informational asymmetries are
handled: while relationship banking tries to overcome those asymmetries using personal contact
and frequent (personal) exchange, transaction based lending uses hard information techniques.
The latter describe a lending relationship that is based on quantiable economic data that is
used to gauge a borrower's creditworthiness or to mitigate default risks using securities. Com-
mon types of hard information techniques include credit scoring, which uses economic gures
to estimate a borrower's default risk or reducing the loss given default of a loan by demanding
collateral. Either relationship type aects rms' and banks' behavior dierently, depending also
on the local economical setting surrounding them.
The rst part of the thesis oers an overview of the intersection of regional economics and nance
and identies topics that have already been examined and missing links between those. In order
to present the economic context in which the following chapters are embedded, I focus on an
overview of basic regional economic concepts.
The second part investigates the relationship between local industry specialization and innova-
tion and rms' choice of the number of bank relationships, which is closely related to rms' ways
of external funding. After a short literature review, theories on how local industry specialization
aects competition and innovation in the rst place and consequently rms' number of bank
relationships and ways of external funding are developed. Afterwards, several empirical inves-
tigations, including Maximum Likelihood, Spatial Two Stage Least Square and Ordinary Least
Square analyses nd that innovative rms do not engage in c.p. less bank contacts, while there
is at least some overall eect for local industry specialization on rms' nancial relationships.
Using the term structure of debt as proxy for the duration of a relationship, there is evidence
that innovative rms rather engage in transaction based bank relationships.
After the investigation of the choice of the closeness of borrower-lender-relationships, the follow-
ing part of the thesis focuses on an organizational aspect of external funding, that comes into
being in relationship lending: I investigate whether spatial distance between borrower and lender
plays a role for the determination of interest rates due to potential informational asymmetries
that aggravate with increasing distance and transport costs. After a literature review and dis-
cussion of theories and results of other studies, I present the methodology and the results of
the empirical analysis. As a result, I nd that increased spatial distance between borrowers and
lenders comes along with on average higher interest rates that have to be borne by the borrower.
Switching to lenders' point of view and transaction based banking the nal part of the thesis
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discusses the eects of real estate value on lending. Real estate plays a crucial part for collat-
eralizing debt, and its price development is highly relevant for transaction based banking. As
collateralization of debt relaxes banks' necessity for monitoring, growth of real estate prices could
induce banks to increase the nominal risk of their lending. After a short introduction, theoretical
arguments are presented in the second subsection, and data are presented in the third subsec-
tion. The fourth subchapter consists of empirical investigations, which comprise an analysis of
causality between real estate and loan growth, as well as several dynamic panel analyses on the
relationship between real estate price growth and German locally based savings banks' overall
lending risk. Additional insights compared to previous studies come from the fact that micro
data on local bank lending and real estate price development are included as well as regional
economic data. As a result of the study, there is no robust impact of real estate price growth on
the risk-taking of German savings-banks. This result is an indicator that if local banks rely on
transaction based lending, their information concerning local markets enables them to identify
the risk of the loan and borrower's risk.
Thus, considering the results listed above, the main nding of the thesis is that rms' environ-
ment plays a minor role for its choice between relationship and transaction based borrowing,
whereas it has a signicant impact if rms decide for relationship banking: potential informa-
tional asymmetries (due to higher distances) are translated into higher risk premia by banks.
This is conrmed in parts by lending behavior of locally operating savings banks: local economic
development, expressed by unemployment gures, has an eect on the risk of banks' loan portfo-
lio, with banks reducing their loan portfolio risk, when local economic downturns are observed.
On the contrary, banks do not seem to rely promptly on the development of collateral values.
This indicates that banks do not fully separate borrower from loan risk, but could rather use
transaction based lending techniques to gauge borrowers' ability to pay, i.e. their whether their
nancial condition allows them to repay their debt. Soft information obtained in relationship
lending can additionally be used to grasp the willingness to pay, describing borrowers' disposition
to abstain from consumption in order to repay their loans.
Chapter 2
Regional economic conditions and
banking
21
22 CHAPTER 2. REGIONAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND BANKING
2.1 Local economy, industry specialization and concentration
As local economy forms the basis of the latter investigation, we will briey have a closer look
on a few economic variables that will be used in the subsequent sections. On the one hand, this
section discusses essential properties and implications of dierent industrial patterns that are
to some extent essential for the comprehension of the following arguments. On the other hand,
denitions are introduced for terms that are often used synonymously and thus could lead to
misunderstandings (e.g. the dierence between specialization and concentration).
The spatial distribution of economic activity can either be explained exogenously or endoge-
nously; while the former approach considers input factors (such as land) as spatially xed and
the the settlement of production dependent on it, the latter considers relevant productive input
- such as labor and capital - as mobile. Forces that shape geographical patterns can loosely
be grouped into factors that promote agglomeration of production (centripetal forces) and those
that foster dispersion (centrifugal forces) (Bröcker and Fritsch 2012). One of the main centripetal
forces is sharing knowledge and input markets, which enhances productivity and promotes re-
gional economic and population growth (s. Duranton and Puga 2004). The most notable eect
of sharing local input markets is achieved if rms of the same industry settle in geographically
close areas.
Commonly, local industry specialization describes the composition of industries within a dened
area. The size of a respective industry is commonly measured using employees within an industry
rater than the number of rms. Thus, while we keep specialization as attributed towards a place,
concentration describes the spatial distribution of an industry within one dened area (Möller
2012, p. 21). Thus concentration is a measure that varies with each industry, but is constant for
that spatial entity (usually on a country level).
Figure 2.1 oers a rst glimpse on how these variables might aect banking conditions. Com-
paring gure 2.1a to 2.1b, we can see that there is some negative correlation between the degree
of industry diversication and lending diversication by bank types with a stronger industrial
specialization going in hand with a stronger diversication by bank types. Reasons therefore
could include various rm sizes within industrial clusters or externalities, whose eects on rm
funding are thoroughly examined in chapter 3. Contrarily, trying to explain funding patterns by
economic conditions could be misleading: looking at population growth, which can be considered
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a more comprehensive indicator of overall local economic activity1, there is no clear correlation
with concentration of lender type on the level of German countries (s. gures 2.1c and 2.1d).
Thus, the mechanisms between local economy and rm funding seem to be more complicated
than just adapting to an overall economic state.
For regional economics, there is a history of over 100 years of research concerning benecial ef-
fects of industry specialization on productivity and innovation. Before turning to aspects of rm
nancing and the integration of nancial institutions in the local economic framework, the next
section briey introduces eects of industry clusters and urban structures on local economies.
2.1.1 Economies of localization and urbanization
Turning to aforementioned local industry composition, the immediate question arises whether
high regional industry specialization is benecial for rms or exposes them to stronger competi-
tion, reducing their prots and possibilities of expansion. Positive externalities of local clustering
of industrial sectors are commonly described by economies of localization. These describe posi-
tive eects of local industry specialization on rms' productivity growth, while positive inuences
of local industry diversication are known as economies of urbanization, i.e. productivity gains
which are achieved by maintaining sites among rms of other industries in a densely inhabited
area (Henderson 1997). Henderson 1997 separates economies of localization and urbanization as
static concepts fromMarshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) and Jacobs externalities, describing the ben-
ets of local industry specialization and diversication respectively in a dynamic environment.
MAR externalities are gains in productivity (i.e. more output and less average costs) that do
not arise from rm specic factors, but from an industrial specialization in the periphery of the
rm. This specialization includes sharing of common infrastructure, suppliers and labor markets,
with the latter being essential for the transmission of industry-specic non-ubiquitous knowledge.
This information is often not codied, i.e. can only be transferred between persons, which is
why these knowledge externalities have a geographically limited scope and require spatially close
settlement of rms (i.e. industry clusters) (van der Panne 2004, p. 594). In contrast, Jacobs
externalities describe knowledge externalities that occur between dierent industries, i.e. stimuli
across industries. With the variety of industries being largest in urban areas (which is closely
related to the availability of services and goods in urban centers), these knowledge spillovers are
1On average, more people living within a certain space share a broader knowledge basis, promoting spillovers
and increasing productivity, which in turn increases wages and thus attracts more workers (Palivos and Wang
1996).
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(a) Industry specialization
in 2017 (employees)
(b) Firm lending concentration
in 2017 (bank types)
(c) Population growth 2000-2017
(d) Growth of rm lending
concentration 2000-2017 (bank types)
Figure 2.1: Economic gures of German countries
Concentration is measured by Herndahl Indices; own graphic representation based on data of German
Federal Oce of Statistics, Deutsche Bundesbank, and the German Federal Agency for Cartography
and Geodesy
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most likely to happen there. Thus, according to this theory, economic growth is independent of
exact industry composition, but rather of the size of the urban location which is closely related
to the variety of inherited industries (Feldman and Audretsch 1999, p. 412).
Research has not come to a nal result which externality nally drives productivity growth. E.g.
Shuai 2013, p. 11 argues that established industries might rather be in need for new ideas from
other industries and benet from Jacobs externalities and Duranton and Puga 2004, p. 2100
suggest that it is rather young rms who are in need of a diversied environment.
The prevalence of either externality could depend on cities' sizes (Beaudry and Schiauerova
2009, Henderson 1997) or initial endowment: E.g. Kluge and Lehmann 2012 nd that the exis-
tence of MAR or Jacobs externalities depends on local initial industry specialization.
The eects are not mutually exclusive, though. For example, besides of rms of the same indus-
try, rms beneting from a specialized industry environment can be in need of other industries,
that are supplementary for rms' production, as e.g. banks, law rms, etc. Hence those rms
benet from diversication of industries in that part of rms that do not belong to their own
industry (Kluge and Lehmann 2012).
A common feature of both eects is the common use of infrastructure and sharing input markets
(Duranton and Puga 2004; e.g. labor market pools, s. Beaudry and Schiauerova 2009, p. 319).
Along with common input markets , spatial proximity between rms is a promoter of growth:
Storper and Venables 2004, 352f argue that personal contact plays a crucial role for the existence
of MAR and Jacobs externalities, which leads to a prominent role of urban areas when it comes
to productivity growth. Furthermore, personal contact allows for the transmission of specic,
non-codiable knowledge (s.a. Cook et al. 2007, p. 1327), which can be considered locally bound
or `sticky' (s.a. Einem 2011, p. 134).
Proximity thus enhances rms' exchange of knowledge, with distance and intensity of exchange
being negatively correlated (Beaudry and Schiauerova 2009, p. 320, Kluge and Lehmann 2012).
Yet, although the capacity of spatial exchange can comprise a variety of regional entities, spillover
eects between rms are not spatially unlimited (Paci and Usai 1999, p. 389). E.g. Rosenthal
and Strange 2003, p. 386 nd that economies of localization rather decline quickly with increasing
distance to neighbor rms (e.g. due to reduction of personal interaction, including the recogni-
tion of non-verbal signals, Cook et al. 2007, p. 1334), while distance has an ambiguous eect for
economies of urbanization; whereas one the hand, higher distance to rms impedes exchange, it
reduces rms' congestion costs on the other hand.
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Both externalities are closely related to rm level competition, which is another externality that
possibly fosters innovation (s. e.g. Beaudry and Schiauerova 2009, Carlino 2001, and van der
Panne 2004) and will be introduced in the next section.
2.1.2 Local rm competition
Local specialization of course can aect competition between rms and vice versa (Aghion et al.
2005, 708f): Spatial proximity to other rms not only includes sharing input factors, but also
higher comparability between rms (Cook et al. 2007, p. 132). Regarding competition itself,
local industry composition is less essential for the direction of competition than for the type
of competition: while MAR externalities are closely linked to product market competition, the
notion of rivalry in the context of Jacobs externalities rather describes competition for ideas (van
der Panne 2004, p. 595).
The interplay between industry composition and competition is as dierent as the benets of
specialization and diversication w.r.t. rm sizes: while MAR based theories think of monopoly
as advantageous to prevent innovations from foreign exploitation (there are less rivals that can
imitate innovators and thereby lower their returns), Jacobs externalities are rather based on the
idea that competitive markets in urban areas foster the sprawl of ideas and inventions (s. Beaudry
and Schiauerova 2009, p. 319; Carlino 2001, p. 19). Empirical evidence comes from Rosenthal
and Strange 2003: strong competition within an industry is benecial for rm establishments
while a strong competition in all other industries rather deters the foundation of new rms.
The choice of rm location not only depends on industry specialization: As it is often small
innovative rms that are credit constrained (Alessandrini et al. 2010, p. 851), the choice of
location is crucial for those rms and linked to a trade-o: on the one hand, settling in a
specialized environment can promote productivity and the probability of inventions, on the other
hand, if the number of banks is limited, credit constraints can thwart rms' innovative activities.
Therefore, rms' access to funding and the geographical distribution of nancial services are
closely related to rm competition.
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2.2 Firms' locations and external funding
2.2.1 Location of banks and access to nance
MAR and Jacobs externalities not only impact rms' growth and policies, they also shape the de-
velopment of service and nancial centers, as in Frankfurt and Dusseldorf (Gehring 2000, p. 428,
Kluge and Lehmann 2012, p. 17). E.g., analyzing a sample of data of Chinese cities, Liang et al.
2014 nd, that an accumulation of nancial services goes in hand with higher spillovers, which
indicates that nancial services have a tendency for local concentration.
First evidence for Germany as presented in gure 2.2 seems to conrm the suggested spatial
clustering of nancial services industries; using the share of employees in nancial services as
indicator for the relevance of a nancial center (s. Porteous 1999), there clearly exist core areas
around Frankfurt, Munich and Dusseldorf.
This stronger concentration of (nancial) services goes in hand with a higher distance of rms
towards external funding, while rms located in those centers can obtain more information and
easier access to funding than other rms (Klagge 1995). Yet the direction of causality is not
clear: while rms have an incentive to locate close to nancial institutions, the latter might set-
tle close to rms. Thus, locations also depends on who came rst and the existence of nancial
centers also has some path dependency (Porteous 1999). Concerning industry specialization,
higher proximity towards nancial centers would for at least a high fraction of rms come along
with localization eects of their own industries.
As the oered services are not uniform for all branches, dierentiation in the spatial distribution
of banking services can be found even if branch/population measures would suggest otherwise.
Klagge 1995 predicted, that branches with standardized services would be located in peripheral
areas, while there would be an emphasis of bank clerks in the headquarters.
Consequently, banks following this strategy of centralization can lose touch with local economy
in smaller political entities in their area when geographically focusing their (personnel) activity
on urban areas. Banks then are hardly embedded in a local economic framework which can have
severe consequences: while there is a high probability that locally operating banks will continue
lending to rms, even if they might be in trouble, as they try to maintain relationships to retail
customers (Jackson and Thomas 1995), being spatially more separated to the latter reduces this
incentive. While this can probably not be applied to large rms - as they can employ hard lend-
ing techniques or are located rather in urban centers anyway - SMEs could encounter problems
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Figure 2.2: Share of employees in nance of all employees
Representation by counties. As can be seen, there are regional clusters of nancial services, with a focus
on large agglomerations. Own graphic representation based on data of German Federal Oce of
Statistics, Deutsche Bundesbank, and the German Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy
if banks withdraw from rm lending in peripheral areas.
SMEs furthermore often have to spend much eort on obtaining long term funding not having
sucient equity or collateral (Paul 2007, p. 369). This lack of securities is another reason why
they cannot engage in multiple lending, especially if they are young innovative rms that cannot
fulll prospective lenders' collateral requirements. Concluding, the location of rms not only has
an impact on their innovative activity, but also on their access to funding, which is also endoge-
nous to their innovative activity itself (s. chapter 3) and on the distance to their nancing bank
(s. chapter 4).
Higher functional distance towards sources of external founding can be a problem for innovative
rms (Alessandrini et al. 2010, p. 847). That is, rms that depend to some degree on secrecy
of their competitive advantage and personal ways of communication to obtain external funding
when introducing their innovations as will come under scrutiny in chapter 3.
In fact, rms depending on the exchange of soft information between borrower and lender can
encounter problems in borrowing if located far from nancial centers or facing centralized struc-
tures within the nancing institution (Alessandrini et al. 2010, p. 875). For small rms, an
increase in distance to a correspondent branch of their lending bank (possibly due to a closure of
a former branch oce) can thus have an ambiguous eect: on the one hand, banks' availability
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of soft information decreases and might cause extra costs that are transferred to the rm. On
the other hand, the market power of the bank decreases and enforcement of banks' desired loan
conditions becomes more dicult (Alessandrini et al. 2009, 174f; s.a. Bellucci et al. 2013).
Additionally, banks tend to fund only innovations that build up on existing assets, which is
an additional diculty for young start ups (Handke 2011, p. 74). Consequently, this impacts
location choice of innovative start-up rms and leads to an uneven geographical distribution of
innovative activities (Klagge and Martin 2005, p. 388). This not only underlines the relevance of
local industry specialization and national industry concentration, but also the high importance
of spatial proximity between innovative rms and their funding institutions.
2.2.2 Local knowledge and loan portfolio specialization
Loan portfolio specialization2 could arise if locally operating banks benchmark their industry
specialization on the surrounding economy. An obvious shortcoming of loan portfolio special-
ization is being threatened by sector-specic shocks (Hayden et al. 2007). Locally operating
banks in industry-specialized areas could be hit harshly by sector-specic economic downturns,
leading to downward-spirals for the whole local economy. Thus, banks face a trade-o between
monitoring eorts and default risks (Winton 1999, p. 2): On the one hand, one of banks' main
features is diversication, so one could expect rewards for highly diversied banks (Morgan and
Samolyk 2003, p. 5). On the other hand, local industry specialization allows banks to build up
a stock of industry specic knowledge which could lead to better monitoring abilities (s. Jahn
et al. 2013) and as a consequence better investment decisions.
This specic knowledge could e.g. enable specialized banks to handle loans more ecient and to
realize securities quicker, such that banks face lower write-os than diversied banks lending to
borrowers with the same aggregate risk level (Böve 2009, p. 261).
One problem of higher loan portfolio industry diversication is that it can hardly be achieved
by small banks with either geographically limited business areas or limited input, leading to
ineciencies when handling wider geographic borrower distribution (Emmons et al. 2004, 263f)
on the one hand. On the other hand, evidence on the advantages of geographically larger market
areas is mixed anyway; while there are several studies which nd that larger business areas have
a positive eect on banks' risk-return-proles (Berger and Deyoung 2006, p. 1487), Morgan and
2In what follows, loan portfolio specialization describes a high concentration of industries within a portfolio of
business loans. For closely related concentration w.r.t. spatial proximity of borrowers, see Barro and Basso 2006.
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Samolyk 2003, p. 15 do not nd signicant advantages for small banks only by increasing their
degrees of geographical diversication.
Empirical insights on this topic are in favor of loan portfolio specialization: Marquez and
Hauswald 2002, 24f nd that loan portfolios' industry diversication increases their risk. Simi-
larly, Hayden et al. 2007 nds that loan portfolio specialization is benecial for German banks in
terms of return, as long as banks engage in low risk loans, while it has negative eects for banks
that engage in risky lending. Jahn et al. 2013 nd that specialized banks on average bear lower
credit risks.
Yet, Kamp et al. 2005 nd that on average German bank types have decreased loan portfolio
specialization, which is mainly due to greater diversication of savings banks and credit cooper-
atives. This result indicates that either those banks tried to minimize the danger to be awed in
economic downturns of their local lead industry, as those banks only have geographically limited
business areas or lost market shares within specialized locations.
Thus, local economy has a large impact on banks' strategical decisions and risk which will be
shown in chapter 5. This is indirectly and directly aected by the degree of local industry con-
centration: as industry specic knowledge is embodied in persons, conducting banking that is
focused on one industrial sector, requires a large pool of employees - which is a positive externality
that can be used by rival banks.
2.2.3 Regional impacts on bank lending and banking competition
Competition in banking and advantages caused by spatial proximity to rival banks are closely
related, as MAR externalities are a common explanation for the existence of nancial centers
(Grote 2003, p. 201). Higher degrees of banking competition come along with higher costs: on
the one hand, the availability of external funding is limited or only can be achieved by increasing
deposit rates (Jackson and Thomas 1995, p. 330). On the other hand, stronger competition can
decrease the quality of screening and monitoring processes in order to gain market shares and
thus increase average risks of banks' loan portfolios (Forssbaeck and Shehzad 2015, p. 2015).
In fact, empirical results indicate that it is easier for rms to obtain credit in less competitive
banking markets (Handke 2011, p. 88).
Forssbaeck and Shehzad 2015, p. 2016 nd that banks' market power has a positive impact on
their risk, with the eect being especially pronounced in concentrated loan markets. This is
conrmed by the results of Kick et al. 2015, p. 19 for German savings and cooperative banks.
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The latter are locally based and strongly depend on the economic well-being of their business area
and are closer connected to it. Following Neo-Keynesian literature, asymmetrical information
between borrowers and lenders is responsible for the competitive advantage of local banks when
it comes to information, local market power and lower monitoring costs (s. Rodriguez-Fuentes
1998, p. 65, Dow and Rodríguez-Fuentes 1997, p. 914).
Information on local conditions therefore can be a competitive advantage and have a signicant
impact on banks' performance. Some empirical evidence on regional factors' impact on savings
banks comes from Conrad 2008: Analyzing German savings banks, he nds that local purchase
power has a positive eect on savings banks' earnings, while they reduce the density of branches
within their business area in the presence of stronger competition.3 This indicates the increasing
relevance of savings and cooperative banks for peripheral areas as suggested by (Klagge 1995).
Reichling and Schulze 2018 nd environmental variables make up a large part of German savings
banks' eciency. They nd that savings banks in wealthier regions are more ecient, possibly
due to economies of scale that arise when dealing with higher amounts. Similarly, Cyree and
Morris 2018 nd that U.S. single county banks in high income areas outperform those in low
income areas. Additionally, the authors nd that returns on assets are higher for banks in low
population counties. Local wealth also determines banks' deposits and hence their ability to
expand their credit business (Dow and Rodríguez-Fuentes 1997, p. 916).
Turning to a borrower's point of view, less bank competition promotes hold-up problems, while
strong banking competition impedes long lasting relationships between borrower and lender, as
it is targeted by rival banks (Handke 2011, p. 152).
2.3 Firms' bank relationships
The kind of relationship between rms and their banks has been of high interest to researchers.
This holds especially true in Germany, where the term Hausbank was coined, describing an
intensive partnership between rm and a nancial institute. These banks play a prominent role
for rms that are unable to achieve external funding in capital markets (Gischer and Herz 2016,
p. 179), which is the case for most small rms (Deyoung et al. 2008, p. 116).
There are not only dierences in the role of banks for external rm funding between Germany
and other countries in the world: The strength of (local) bank relationships is on average higher
in Europe than in the US (Alessandrini et al. 2009, p. 180). As Ongena and Smith 2000, 30
3A similar study analyzing cooperative banks was published by Maurer and Thieÿen 2016.
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nd, German rms value their bank relationships strongly, having on average about eight bank
relationships.
The quantity of bank relationships and their intensity is determined by a variety of factors, as
already addressed in previous sections. This also includes how transparent a rm acts and how
easy it can communicate relevant information credibly to outside investors in order to reduce
information asymmetries. Therefore, we will focus on the latter and its connection to bank
relationships and rms' missing informational transparency (opacity) in the following chapter.
2.3.1 Soft information and its use in nance
Non-codiable or soft information and personal contact not only play a vital role in generating
externalities of specialization and urbanization as discussed above, but also when establishing
relationships, including borrower-lender-relationships between rms and banks. This kind of in-
formation comprises a variety of factors that cannot be transmitted objectively between dierent
persons or even be codied, e.g. subjective knowledge about the rm (Berger and Black 2011,
p. 725) or the quality of rms' management or strategical orientation (Degryse and Ongena 2004,
p. 573). Although there has been great technical progress during the last decades, the relevance
of these issues still cannot be denied as this information type yet cannot ultimately be `hardened'.
Hard information on the other hand commonly describes quantiable information (as e.g. ac-
counting reports or nancial ratios) that can easily be transmitted via dierent communication
techniques (Deyoung et al. 2008, p. 117). Besides economic data that is used to create credit
scorings or other ways to estimate borrowers' default probabilities, lending using loss mitigating
techniques such as collateral are frequently subsumed by credit relationships using hard informa-
tion. Both types of information are applied in lending: while credit analysis based on borrowers
quantiable information that could grasp the borrower's capacity to repay her obligations and
allow for lending over wide distance, the willingness of the lender to pay must be inferred by
qualitative information and face-to-face meetings with the loan applicant (Golin and Delhaise
2013, p. 9).
As the ratio of the quantity and quality of hard to soft information somewhat determines the de-
gree of opacity of rms and thus (again) the relevance of soft information when obtaining credit,
the eld of application of soft information in lending is narrowed: Using rm size as indicator of
the availability of soft information (e.g. Berger et al. 2005, p. 243), soft information has a high
relevance for those rms that are too large or specialized for the use of standardized products or
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enterprises that are too small to be fully evaluated by hard information techniques: Soft informa-
tion is important for loans with individual characteristics, while for standardized products, hard
facts dominate the loan assigning process (Dou et al. 2018, p. 1199). This dierence on the one
hand applies to loan market competition and on the other hand to costumer bases: While retail
and SME loans are often standardized products (s. Agarwal and Hauswald 2010, p. 6, Altman
et al. 2008, p. 7), large volume loans of enterprises have many individual components. This
illustrates the relevance of soft information in lending in industrially specialized areas, where
rms albeit their small size are in need of non-standard loans.
Commonly, the use of soft information lending techniques is considered as determinant of rela-
tionship lending, which relies on the collection and gain of information during the connection of
borrower and lender (Berger and Black 2011, p. 725).
2.3.2 Relationship and transaction based lending
There are two ways to handle informational asymmetries in borrower lender relationships: being
close to the counterparty and observing its economic state by frequent personal exchange or
creating credit contracts in a more restrictive way for the business partner and `relying on facts
rather than on feelings'.
A prominent feature that separates relationship lending from transaction based banking is that
banks try to build up a relationship with the borrower and plan to engage in multiple (i.e. repet-
itive) transactions with her. Therefore, banks collect information about borrowers, including
especially private information that gives them some advantage over competitors. This enables
banks to reduce loan rates in the beginning of the relationship in order to prevent rms from
taking too risky projects. After the relationship has been stabilized, a lock-in situation arises
in which rms cannot credibly switch lenders. Therefore, the relationship bank can increase the
rates on loans (Hartmann-Wendels et al. 2019, 145f). This can be continued up to a state of full
information, in which banks can resign from (costly) collateral and adjust loan rates not only to
a borrower's or loan's risk, but to expected prots of the borrower (Besanko and Thakor 1987,
673f).
In order to achieve such a degree of monitoring, soft information requires spatial proximity, as it
cannot be sent in codied ways and - due to its frequency - personal exchange would become too
costly over a relevant period of time. Proximity yet not only has a spatial dimension, but also
a cultural and personal in the sense of a common background of borrower and lender (Handke
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2011, p. 151).
E.g., rural areas might be dierent from urban when it comes to the ability of employing rela-
tionship lending: banks might have easier access to soft information and have a closer aliation
with local business. Analyzing this hypothesis, Deyoung et al. 2012 nd that rural banks lend-
ing to rural borrowers have more ecient monitoring, which signicantly lower defaults in this
constellation.
Also, Stein 2015 mentions two strands of literature: one that predicts a reduction of rms'
lending costs due to lower information asymmetries and another predicting higher interest rates
on loans due to lock-in eects and better knowledge of future prots of the rm. Her analysis
considers time and space as dimensions of bank relationships and she nds that interest rates
on average decrease with the proximity between rm and bank, while they moderately increase
with the duration of the relationship.
In contrast, ways of screening in transaction based banking are limited to the use of hard in-
formation and the determination of credit conditions in the spirit of Stiglitz and Weiss 1981,
393f. Transaction based banking comprises nancial statement lending, credit scoring, real es-
tate or asset based lending and leasing. These techniques initially were thought to be suited best
for transparent small rms, which could oer enough information for making a credit decision.
But further studies put an emphasis on the separation of loan and borrower risk, which can be
found in transaction based lending techniques, especially those relying on collateral. Therefore,
these lending techniques could be applied when lending to small opaque rms (Udell 2009, p. 17).
2.3.3 Determination of relationship type
Which rms ultimately relies on close concentrated banking relationships is not only dependent
on rm location, but also rms' nancial characteristics; rms with higher leverage and lower
cash holdings rather engage in concentrated borrowing relationships, as those rms do not have a
strong credit growth and cannot use their cash ow as covenant for additional borrowing (Gobbi
and Sette 2014).
Furthermore, rms which are dependent on stable external funding could benet from relation-
ship banking: Gobbi and Sette 2014 nd that concentrated borrowing went along with higher
credit availability for rms after the nancial crisis of 2008, while it hindered credit growth be-
fore it. Therefore, although not being ultimately determined by it, relationship and transaction
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based banking are closely linked to the number of bank relationships of the rm (s.a. Neuberger
et al. 2008, p. 102). This especially holds true for small rms, whose credit availability is often
linked to maintaining a long term relationship towards their lenders (Agarwal and Hauswald
2010, p. 2).
On the contrary, the increasing use of transaction based banking, and along with it, sinking costs
of lending has made it possible for formerly rationed rms to obtain credit (Udell 2009, 18f).
This includes not only per se opaque borrowers, but also those that remained opaque due to
missing geographical proximity to the lender: Due to higher costs of transport and communica-
tion, monitoring distant rms becomes expensive (Degryse and Ongena 2004, p. 575), impeding
their credit availability.
Thus, a bank relationship is also inuenced by spatial distance. In line with this, Brevoort and
Hannan 2004 using US Data nd that the probability of granting credit decreases with spatial
distance to the borrower, with the eect being more pronounced for small than medium sized
banks. Relationship type is also determined by local banking competition, which is closely con-
nected to location type: as it becomes harder for market entrants to beat incumbent banks if soft
information has a high relevance (Dou et al. 2018), mergers and acquisitions can be an ecient
way of entering such markets (Degryse and Ongena 2004, p. 573).
Which type of lending relationship will be in place also depends on the characteristics of the
bank: As relationship lending demands the transmission of borrower related information within
the nancial institution, information could vanish between a multitude of layers between loan
ocer and decision making persons (s. Berger et al. 2014; Berger et al. 2015, p. 1966). There-
fore, small banks and community banks will have advantages in relationship lending relative to
large institutions, virtually only by their smaller organizational structure (Deyoung et al. 2012,
Emmons et al. 2004, Felici and Pagnini 2008, p. 519, Meyer and Yeager 2001).
This applies to German savings banks and credit cooperatives, which have always been important
funding partners for SMEs, and meanwhile have extended their borrowing to large enterprises
(Handke 2011, 85f). In fact, Stein 2015 nds that the strength of a bank relationships is strongly
negatively correlated with rm size, underlining the relevance of strong bank relationships for
German SMEs. Locally based banks' relevance for small rm lending in Germany was virtually
reinforced by the onset of the Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis: Prots
from traditional borrowing and lending business of banks eroded and locally operating savings
banks and credit cooperatives often did not have a statutory opportunity of investing in capi-
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Figure 2.3: Long term loans by bank type
Origination of corporate long term loans (term>5 yrs.) by bank type (to all originated long term
loans). Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank.
tal markets. Relying on a normal term structure, extending long term credit was one of their
possibilities to counteract a reduction of earnings (s. gure 2.3).4. On the other hand, the long
term of the loans plotted in gure 2.3 (> 5 years) comes at a cost: if interest rates are xed
in the years after 2010 for e.g. ten years, increases of interest rates cannot be transferred to
acitve positions, but will be demanded from depositors. Therefore, the relevance of interest rate
management increases with the extension of long term loans.
For rms, loans with long duration have two major advantages: First, they ensure a long lasting
supply of capital and second, a higher share of long term debt goes in hand with a lower proba-
bility of liquidation when distressed (Carmignani and Omiccioli 2007, p. 15).
Yet, taking a look at table 2.1, it becomes clear that German rms, although not having in-
creased their capital market funding signicantly, reduced the amount of bank debt expressed in
weighted means of balance sheets. Although the gures are notably higher when only considering
small (about 29% in 2017) and medium sized (22% in 2017) rms, the overall trend of reduction
of bank based nance in favor of other funding sources is also visible there. This raises the ques-
tion, how long intermediation in nancial markets will endure and whether disintermediation of
rms in the spirit of Schmidt et al. 1999 nally is going to be pushed ahead.
Banks' organization type and business area not only impact the use of soft information in lend-
ing, but also the use of collateral in lending: Jiménez et al. 2009 not only nd that duration
4Yet, credit growth is limited to banks' equity reserves.
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Table 2.1: German enterprises' liability structure
Weighted means (excluding activities of holding companies); gures repre-
sent percentages of balance sheets. Data source: BACH (Banque de France)
year Bonds and Amounts owed to Other Trade Total Liabilities
similar obligations credit institutions creditors payables
2000 2.52 12.75 24.72 5.49 68.14
2001 2.31 12.31 25.64 4.9 67.52
2002 2.06 11.71 27.9 4.56 67.57
2003 2 10.62 29.21 4.24 67.1
2004 1.49 10.87 28.19 4.57 66.8
2005 1.81 9.94 27.8 4.53 65.46
2006 1.82 9.56 29.79 4.39 65.67
2007 1.7 9.74 29.25 4.31 64.46
2008 1.77 10.97 29.27 4.09 65.54
2009 1.91 11.02 29.39 3.9 66.37
2010 2.15 10.03 30.83 4.18 65.35
2011 2.1 9.47 31.14 4.26 65.57
2012 2.38 9.25 30.74 4.26 64.45
2013 2.55 8.9 30.72 4.12 63.84
2014 2.73 8.79 30.18 4 62.77
2015 2.91 9.09 29.66 3.97 63.76
2016 3.19 8.99 27.36 4 61.13
2017 3.32 8.6 29.77 3.87 61.43
of borrower-lender relationships aects the probability of using securities in lending negatively,
but also higher distances between bank branches and their headquarters - which indicates the
aforementioned diculty of transmission of soft information between organizational layers.
2.4 Collateral
Collateral in lending is a common way of reducing agency costs of borrower-lender relationships;
yet, literature has not come to an ultimate conclusion whether collateral based lending is rather
employed for risky or safe borrowers (Berger et al. 2016, 29f). On the one hand, banks could
rather demand collateral from riskier borrowers, while on the other hand safer borrowers rather
pledge collateral in situations of unknown borrower risk, as borrowers themselves know their
higher probability of repayment (s. Besanko and Thakor 1987, Berger and Udell 1990, 21).
Thus, for interest rates, there is also an optimal amount of collateral to be demanded by lenders,
as too high requirements would deter safe borrowers or lead to moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss
1981, p. 394).
From the viewpoint of banks, screening and collateral are substitutes, with banks reducing
screening eort in the presence of collateral with high value (Manove et al. 2001). Lending using
collateral is also considered as most ecient hard information lending technique by Berger and
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Black 2011, as it enables lenders to reserve some recovery before other lenders. This benet can
have an impact on loans' required interest rates, as risk and monitoring costs are reduced (Bester
1985, p. 850). Using this circumstance, banks can estimate borrowers' risk by oering dierent
contracts that adjust dierent marginal rates of substitution between interest and collateral re-
quirement (Bester 1985, 852).
Without going in too much detail, borrower distance and local rm level industry allocation are
closely related to collateral: On the one hand, banks' request for collateral can depend on their
knowledge of the industry (e.g. if prospective borrower does not belong to leading industry) and
rm sizes and duration of bank relationship, i.e. severity of information symmetry (s.a. Jiménez
et al. 2009), which are closely related to industries. On the other hand, rms' industry plays
a role for obtaining credit, as some industries are rather able to pose collateral (Handke 2011,
p. 147). This could allow larger rms operating in capital intensive sectors to nance more re-
search and development activities in order to promote growth (s.a. Pagano and Schivardi 2003)
without disclosing too much private information.
Higher spatial borrower lender distance increases information asymmetries, which is an argument
for the use of collateral. 5 Another way to compensate for this higher risk is by demanding higher
interest rates from remote borrowers. This trade-o between interest and collateral requirements
for locally based lenders with informative advantage and transaction based lenders is also illus-
trated in Inderst and Mueller 2006. Here, local lenders will demand reduced interest rates than
distant transaction based lenders in order to attract more costumers and compensate this lower
rate by higher collateral requirements.
Collateral demand of course has a direct impact on banks' loan portfolios, as e.g. low risk aver-
sion or expectation of increasing value of collateral, i.e. wrong estimation of ex post risk, impact
banks' stability (s. Niinimäki 2009). This can create feedback eects6 that aect local banks
with informational advantages, and cause credit crunches for local borrowers.
Thus, local nancial infrastructures are clearly determined endogenously, as well as the local
economic and industry framework they are operating in. This mutual interference of local banks
and enterprises requires disentangling the factors and eects in smaller parts and analyzing and
discussing the processes that substantially constitute regional economy and nance.
5In fact, Bellucci et al. 2019 nd a negative relationship between borrower-lender-distance and collateral
requirement for Italian SMEs.
6s.a. Constantinescu and Lastauskas 2018 for an analysis of feedback eects of increasing real estate prices,
higher collateral requirements and credit availability.
Chapter 3
Local competition, innovation, and
bank relationships of rms
7
7This chapter is accepted for publication at the Journal of Banking and Financial Economics. Due to the
requirements of the journal, the language here is held in British English.
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3.1 Introduction
With banks being a major source of external funding for most rms in continental Europe, the
choice of the number of banking relationships is crucial for enterprises' existence.
At the early stage of a rm's life, there might be obstacles to engaging in a large variety of lend-
ing relationships, such as informational opacity or lack of collateral. Often, maintaining a single
close banking connection is the only option for rms to gain external funding. While a single
close bank relationship creates a familiar atmosphere between creditor and borrower on the one
hand, it submits the rm to bank's interest rate policy and hold-up problems on the other hand
(Foglia et al. 1998)).8 Links to a single bank are commonly regarded as indicator of relationship
lending, whereas a multitude of relationships is seen as sign of transaction-based banking. The
choice on which relationship type a rm should engage in is inuenced by a variety of factors,
such as rm's size, solvency or banking competition, and is thus hard to determine ex ante.
Additionally, the number of bank relationships may not be stable over time. Firm growth might
require additional external funding that cannot be provided by the initially aliated institute.
The composition of the local industries and resulting rm level competition is a feature that
might help at explaining banking relationships. On the one hand, more local industry specializa-
tion could result in stronger competition and recoverability of ideas and innovations, thus higher
need for secrecy. This could scare o innovative rms to disclose their information to a multitude
of banks, aware of the danger that private information might as well be accessed by rivals. With
private information being highly relevant for external nance, rms' bank relationships are likely
to be aected. On the other hand, banks located in specialized areas could try to diversify their
portfolio, thereby credit-constraining rms of the lead industry. Furthermore, specialized envi-
ronments could help banks to better assess rms' projects and to customize their products for
high quality rms only. This in turn would induce rms to engage in multiple bank relationships.
The quantity of rms' banking relationships could thus point to whether competitive aspects of
local specialization outweigh potential benets of externalities and concluding strategies in ex-
ternal funding in the eyes of an average enterprise. As a consequence, there might be a trade-o
between transaction-based banking, i.e. not sharing private information and avoiding hold-up
costs versus forming close ties with one bank only and thus reducing coordination costs on the
one hand and easing the access to funding for small and opaque rms on the other hand.
8Yet, e.g. Harho and Körting 1998 did not nd the number of banking relationships to matter for the interest
paid in data on German rms.
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The paper contributes to existing research in several ways: Although there is a large body of
research of the implications of banking competition on rm nancing and rm establishments
or innovations (e.g. Aghion et al. 2005; Boot and Thakor 2000; Cornaggia et al. 2015; Petersen
and Rajan 1995; Rice and Strahan 2010), potential eects of rm level competition on bank-
ing relationships have been neglected so far. Hence, there is no empirical evidence on whether
the benets and disadvantages of sharing information and knowledge in specialized areas aect
rms' choice of bank relationships. Using evidence form German rms, I nd local industry
level specialization as measure of relative competition does not aect rms' number of bank-
ing relationships signicantly, while the distribution if industries and rm sizes, competition as
embodied by new established rms and industries' concentration have a negative impact on the
number of bank relationships.
Considering nancing of innovative rms, the paper contributes to existing studies as e.g. Ben-
fratello et al. 2006, Cornaggia et al. 2015 or Micucci and Rossi 2013. Besides analysing the
impact of innovative activity on rms' bank relationships, I also provide evidence on the impact
of specialized and competitive environments on innovative rms' funding. Furthermore, to the
best of my knowledge, previous studies have not analysed neighbourhood eects in external fund-
ing, i.e. the impact of competing rms' bank relationship quantity on rms' external funding.
This yields additional evidence on the impact of spatially close competitors' bank relationships
on rms' external funding.
There are several potential implications for the economy: If rms in competitive environments
prefer relationship banking over a multitude of banking relationships, the vanishing of small
banks and the reduction of bank branches9 that enable banks to process soft information ade-
quately, has a great impact on rm nancing. Small innovative rms might either no longer be
able to gain external funds or locate in areas with a higher prevalence of small banks, mostly
rural areas. Contrarily, banking competition will be aected in competitive areas if rms are
more prone to relationship banking. Local banks' attempts to diversify could cause rms to
engage in more bank relationships in specialized locations.
The paper proceeds as follows: The second part of the paper will discuss several factors aecting
the number of banking relationships, which have already been identied in literature. Theoretical
arguments for trade-o eects of local industry specialization and its eects on rms' choice of
its number of banking relationships are laid out in that section as well. Section three introduces
9According to the Deutsche Bundesbank, the number of banks in Germany has reduced from 2,912 to 1,783
between 2000 and 2018 while the number of branch oces has decreased from 56,936 to 27,887 within this period.
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the data and summary statistics. Empirical analyses are performed in section four. Section ve
concludes.
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses
Several studies investigate the number of rms' bank relationships under a variety of aspects,
as e.g. lending: Ongena et al. 2012 nd that the number of banking relationships and creditor
concentration are not determined by the same factors. The higher the share of total loan amount
granted by a rm's most important lender, the larger is the creditor's informational advantage
over other lenders. Also, the strength of relationships (Neuberger et al. 2006) has been con-
sidered, where an increase in the number of bank connections can be interpreted as decrease
of relationship lending of a rm (Gianetti 2009). Although a linear relationship between the
strength and the number of banking relationships is supposed, many of the existing studies only
distinguish between a single and some banking relationships but not as many as observed em-
pirically (Cosci and Meliciani 2002).
Theoretical predictions are mixed: While borrowers engaging in multiple banking relationships
must coordinate the concentration of loan amounts between creditors on the one hand, they can
avoid hold-up problems on the other hand (Gianetti 2009; Guiso and Minetti 2010; see also Stein
2015 for empirical evidence). Besides avoiding hold-up costs, multiple banking relationships also
allow rms to lend from one bank when payments towards another bank are due (Foglia et al.
1998), decrease credit crunches, especially for small rms (Detragiache et al. 2000), and oer
access to a variety of nancial services (Neuberger et al. 2008).
Several empirical investigations nd that the number of banking relationships increases along
with rm size and age (Farinha and Santos 2002; Neuberger et al. 2006; Neuberger et al. 2008;
Ongena and Smith 2000; Ongena et al. 2012). The former might impact the number of banking
relationships in various ways: As larger rms tend to choose larger banks Berger et al. 2005, the
number of banking relationships cannot be expected to grow steadily with rm size. Instead,
one could expect rms to switch banks when the desired loan amounts become too high for small
initial banks. As costs to found a new banking relationship are constant, they are lower for large
rms Detragiache et al. 2000, which might favour new bank connections over replacement of
existing ones.
Furthermore, small rms are rather in need of bank based nancing due to a lack of alternative
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 43
external funding Prantl et al. 2008. Therefore, especially small rms might seek to decrease
their probabilities of nancial distress by multiple lending Carmignani and Omiccioli 2007. Ad-
ditionally, rms' creditworthiness can impact the number of bank relationships (see e.g. Cosci
and Meliciani 2002): Farinha and Santos 2002 argue that low quality borrowers might want to
establish multiple banking relationships in the beginning of their funding, as those rms are
granted only lower loan amounts and hence are in need of additional funding sources. Indeed,
the authors nd that rms of low creditworthiness establish multiple banking relationships to
avoid credit crunches, while good quality borrowers do so to avoid a hold-up by their bank. A
similar result was obtained by Ongena et al. 2012 and Foglia et al. 1998.
Besides low quality rms demanding for credit from multiple institutions, banks themselves might
be interested in not acting as single lender towards riskier enterprises. Harho and Körting 1998
suspect that high quality rms have long lasting relationships with few lenders while rms of mi-
nor quality engage in multiple relationships as banks do not want to bear the borrower's default
risk alone.
Highly related to the creditworthiness is the impact of collateral: According to soft budget con-
straint, rms with a high liquidation value of their assets will decide on less lenders (Guiso and
Minetti 2010). There is a body of literature on the number of rms' bank relationships in the
light of coordination in case of default, e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein 1996, Foglia et al. 1998,
Guiso and Minetti 2010, and Harho and Körting 1998. The results of these studies suggest a
high relevance of controlling for industry specic eects, especially, since specic assets in case
of liquidation often can only be sold to competitors.
The duration of a banking relationship is one of the most commonly used measures for assess-
ing its strength and indicates besides exclusivity, whether the rm relies on relationship lend-
ing (Gianetti 2009). Long-lasting rm-bank relationships foster the reduction of informational
asymmetries between rms and banks (Cenni et al. 2015; Harho and Körting 1998), leading to
potential benets for the rm, as e.g. reduction of banks' demand for collateral (Jiménez et al.
2009). Furthermore, they enable banks to customize products for the rm (Berger and Udell
1995). Yet, such long lasting relationships give some power to the bank and can threaten the rm
to stop loan payments or demand hold-up related extra costs from the rm. Thus, rms have
to pay additional premia to new outside creditors, with the hold-up problem aggravating with
the duration of the relationship. As the informational asymmetry between lending and outside
banks is especially large for small and opaque rms, the latter should try to establish multiple
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banking relationships quickly (Farinha and Santos 2002).
The number of banking relationships might increase with the intensity of local banking com-
petition, as well as the spatial coverage of the local banking market. This holds true as long
as relationship lending is not completely substituted by transaction-based lending and banks
located farther away are of minor importance (Neuberger et al. 2008). Besides avoiding hold-up
costs, a multitude of banking relationships due to stronger banking competition might include
c.p. lower interest rates compared to less competitive markets (Rheinbaben and Ruckes 2004).
Thus, besides being enabled to compare loan conditions between banks, rms might be exposed
to lower pressure to disclose private information in the presence of stronger banking competition
(Foglia et al. 1998).
3.2.1 Local industry specialization and competition
Additionally to banking competition, rm level competition supposedly has a high impact on
rms' ability to obtain stable external funding. Besides the establishment of new rms, local
industry composition often is a highly relevant factor when assessing rm level competition and
innovative activity.10 It might on the one hand contribute to rms' innovations and increase their
productivity, and on the other hand also increase banks' industry-specic knowledge and thus
improve banks' oer of industry-specic products as well as its ability to assess rms' success.
Considering rm-level competition, a common motivation for the existence of industrially spe-
cialized areas are location advantages for rms which are reected in rms' higher productivity.
These so called Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) Externalities include sharing of knowledge (in-
cluding involuntary access to secret rm information), labour markets and infrastructure and
should thus ease availability to and quality of a variety of production factors.11 Regarding in-
novative activity besides productivity eects of specialization are not clear: Strong competition
will reduce innovation according to MAR-theory, as neighbouring rms could copy innovations
very quickly (Carlino 2001). As a consequence, monopolist competition will maximize prots
from innovations most (Feldman and Audretsch 1999). Contrarily, Fritsch and Slavtchev 2010
argue that innovations could rather take place in specialized areas, as there is more infrastruc-
10Note, that we distinguish between industry concentration and local specialization in order to gauge eects
of industry localization on the number of banking relationships appropriately. While concentration describes the
geographical settlement pattern of a single industry within multiple locations (e.g. within a country), specialization
applies to the industry mix of a single location.
11A review of empirical insights into the eects of specialization in Europe can be found in Fritsch and Slavtchev
2010.
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ture that is customized for the industry and locally bound knowledge, i.e. more workers with
industry-specic abilities.
If an environment of diversied industries fosters rms' innovations and growth, Jacobs-Externalities
are present (Shuai 2013). Thus, local diversication externalities can be described as gains in
productivity by a more diverse surrounding, where ideas from dierent industries come together.
This competition among rms and industries enables market entries of new rms (Feldman and
Audretsch 1999).
With analyses having dierent focuses, there are no nal results, which of the two externalities
ultimately fosters innovation. On the one hand, rms that are still in a development phase
might rather be in need of a industry-diversied environment while elder and more established
rms could favour a specialized surrounding (Duranton and Puga 2004). But on the other hand,
established industries might rather be in need of impulses and input for innovations from di-
versied environments. MAR externalities have a high importance when transferring industry
specic knowledge. Firms willing to innovate should have such industry specic knowledge as
new information is easier to gain for persons having already some experience and knowledge
(Einem 2011; Shuai 2013). Thus, innovations of competitors could be absorbed more easily.
This is aggravated by rm size: due to their better access to external funds, large rms can
produce innovations easier than small rivals (Rogers 2004). Turning to dierent industries, re-
search has often documented dierent impacts of specialization on high and low tech industries.
There is empirical evidence that MAR externalities are more frequent for non-technology-intense
industries whereas high-tech and service industries rms benet from a diversied environment
(Beaudry and Schiauerova 2009; Paci and Usai 1999).
Yet, an unlimited ow of knowledge, as it is often assumed in studies, must be doubted, as
knowledge only is advantageous, as long as it is not shared (Einem 2011). Thus, as secrecy
and non-disclosure of rm specic knowledge between rms is crucial for their existence, similar
information asymmetries could occur or even be requested between rms and external funders.
3.2.2 Competition and funding of innovative rms
For externally funded rms, long-term access to funds frequently is a substantial prerequisite for
innovations. This holds not only true for purchasing xed and working assets, but also creative
personnel, who could switch jobs from credit constrained employers to non-credit constrained
(Hombert and Matray 2017). Similarly, Mina et al. 2013 point out that long-term capital is
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needed in order to 'smooth' investments in research and development and to be able to retain
key employees. Thus, stronger competition among rms, implying high turnover of management
and key employees, will decrease the possibility of forming close long-term relationships with
banks.
While banking competition might not impact rms' propensity to innovate (as in Gianetti 2009),
it might be relevant when it comes to local banking conditions: If banking competition eases
access to nance, corporate innovative output should increase c.p. (Cornaggia et al. 2015).
Empirical results with mixed evidence have been provided by Benfratello et al. 2006, Cornaggia
et al. 2015, Farinha and Santos 2002, and Neuberger et al. 2008.
Trade credit is another possibility to obtain external funding, but is not a perfect substitute of
bank based nancing. Firms with higher market power can on the hand demand more trade
credit and can even demand higher rates than those paid by themselves for bank based funding
(Shenoy and Williams 2017). Additionally, trade credit is an even higher threat for rms' private
information (Petersen and Rajan 1997). This has a high relevance for innovative rms looking
for access to nance and secrecy of their private information at the same time. The protection of
innovations can be be dicult if rms maintain close relationships to other rms, as Hussinger
2004 points out: The protection of innovations using patents requires the initial publication
of the new technology or product, which allows rival rms for reverse engineering. Hussinger
2004 nds that rms rather tend to protect their ideas by patents if their innovations will have
a dominant position within markets, while early stage innovations are secured by secrecy (see
also Bittelmeyer 2007). As rms relying on trade credit will have close relationships to their
suppliers and recipients, keeping information completely secret is dicult and a fragile method
of protecting powerful inventions from being adopted. Therefore, we can assume that rms in
specialized areas, where rival rms can adopt inventions easily and innovative rms in general
will rely c.p. less on trade credit. Concluding, we can build the following hypotheses:
H1: a) Innovative rms have a c.p. higher share of long-term nancial debt.
b) Innovative rms and those located in specialized areas have a c.p. lower share of trade credit.
c) As competition hinders rms from building up close relationships with external funders that
provide such debt, stronger competition among rms will aect their long-term nancial debt
negatively.
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 47
3.2.3 Competition and bank relationships
A frequently named way of getting access to long-term funding by banks is relationship lending,
i.e. forming a close and long lasting relationship with the lending bank. Gianetti 2009 argues
that relationship lending is benecial for innovative rms as it allows individual features of loan
contracts, access to long-term external funding and a higher level of secrecy of rms' ideas. The
key feature of long lasting bank relationships that allow for these benets is the resulting re-
duction of information asymmetries. If a rm engages in research and development processes,
whose outcome is not clear ex ante and cannot be assessed robustly by outside investors, lend-
ing to those rms is considered risky. Especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which
frequently are informationally opaque, might rather be in need of forming close ties to related
banks, as future returns from projects can only be estimated by outside investors with some
diculties (Gianetti 2009). Ways of overcoming the opacity of rms, as e.g. patents, where
innovations are laid down for record, allow rms to become more transparent (Mina et al. 2013).
Mann 2018 provides empirical evidence that the employment of patents as collateral facilitates
external funding for innovative rms and that higher collateral patent values increased rms'
external funding. Therefore, the use of relationship lending or exclusive banking relationships
could decline with an increase in the use of patents.
Empirical studies found that besides long lasting rm-bank relationships, banking competition
promotes innovative output of rms as well (Micucci and Rossi 2013). Besides more favourable
loan conditions, banking market competition might foster innovation by banking market en-
trants nancing riskier projects to gain market shares (Benfratello et al. 2006). Additionally to
banking competition, local rm level competition could determine the quantity of rms' bank
relationships. Local competition and industry specialization could foster banks' acquisition of
industry-specic knowledge, which enables local banks to oer tailored products to rms of the
lead industry. Thus, multiple bank relationships not only include higher transaction costs for
rms, but also their broader variety of nancial services and products (see Aristei and Gallo 2017)
could be a lower competitive advantage in industrially specialized areas. Therefore, in order to
obtain all desired nancial services, rms are possibly not in need of seeking additional bank
relationships, but stick to less and possibly local banks. This could be reinforced by stronger
competition for funds. As banks have industry specic knowledge and can compare competitors
to each other, they could try to optimize and diversify their portfolio by lending only to high
quality rms of the lead industry. Obtaining funds hence could depend on relationship banking
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with a lender who is interest in a long lasting relationship with a borrower. Funding of competi-
tors thus only can be considered as diversication strategy to a limited degree.
Furthermore, thorough screening and monitoring of loan applicants and borrowers should rather
take place if rms act in a competitive environment. Incentives to put a lot of eort into screening
are reduced if an enterprise is funded by multiple lenders (Aristei and Gallo 2017). This favours
relationship lending in competitive areas where rms have on average lower market power. There-
fore, hypothesis two is
H2: Local competition and industry specialization have a negative impact on rms' probability to
engage in transaction-based banking.
The above considerations are expected to hold even more for innovative rms in competitive and
specialized areas where information asymmetries between rms and banks are greater. In line
with theoretical predictions, Gianetti 2009 nds the number of banking relationships to have
a negative impact on the probability to innovate for rms that strongly rely on external fund-
ing. This is closely related to Hypothesis 1b): Innovative rms that depend on external funding
should rather stick to relationship banking. Thus, less bank relationships could c.p. enable them
to obtain the funds needed to become notably innovative. Cornaggia et al. 2015 nd that the
number and quality of rms' patents of U.S. rms is positively aected by state-level specializa-
tion, thus strongly indicating MAR-externalities, aecting innovation.
Yet, banks' expertise and the quality of its nancial advice have high relevance to German in-
novative rms with most of them being externally funded to a high degree (Bittelmeyer 2007,
p. 313). Hence,
H3: Firms located in competitive areas will maintain signicantly less bank relationships if they
are innovative.
3.2.4 Eects of competitors' bank relationships
Local industry specialization and the use of multiple banks seems to be benecial for rms,
as industry specic knowledge can increase banks' service and consulting quality. Yet, from
borrowers' perspective, banks' industry expertise might come at a cost, as it is mostly gained
by consulting competitors (Rheinbaben and Ruckes 2004). This could impede close aliations
with a variety of banks in a competitive area, as rms might be unwilling to disclose private
information to a multitude of banks with a large number of (regionally) competing rms being
aliated with the same banks. If a rm discloses information more often to a bank, the proba-
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bility increases that it is obtained by a competitor (Rheinbaben and Ruckes 2004). Therefore,
(innovative) rms must disclose private information very deliberately. Although bank-nanced
rms are not confronted with sharing information with capital markets, disclosing private infor-
mation with only a few outside investors could harm rms nevertheless severely: Banks could
use rms' private information, obtained e.g. in a lending relationship, to increase its own prots,
possibly in opposition to the borrower. Unless they cannot determine the intensity of their bank-
ing relationships, innovative rms thus should avoid engaging in multiple banking relationships
(Guiso and Minetti 2010), which then again exposes them to hold-up problems.
A way to overcome this problem is the use of lending techniques that reduce information asymme-
tries between borrower and lender or allow external funders to assess the protability of projects
without disclosing private information. Using e.g. collateral (including patents), allows rms to
disclose only non-sensitive information to outside investors or banks and enables them to engage
in multiple banking relationships (Rheinbaben and Ruckes 2004). Thus we should not only con-
sider dierent methods of keeping information secret, but also when which kind of protection of
ideas will be applied (e.g. use of secrecy vs. patents, see Hussinger 2004. Therefore, qualities
of rm innovations matter as well for bank relationships: According to Rheinbaben and Ruckes
2004, rms only disclose information to more than one bank if the loss of innovative advantage
and the loss resulting from the reaction of competitors having obtained private information is
outweighed by better loan conditions. Contrarily, if the innovative lead of the new rm is large,
private information will not be disclosed. As a consequence, new rms rst decide on the amount
of private information they share with banks and on a second stage, how many banking relations
they desire.
Furthermore, the distribution of rm sizes could contribute signicantly to the problems asso-
ciated with a loss of secrecy of private information: E.g., if local competitors' sizes vary sub-
stantially, large rms might buy small enterprises to sell their innovations (Almeida and Kogut
1997).
A multitude of bank relationships therefore is not a clear indicator of a low level of private infor-
mation, as rms might use techniques associated with transaction-based banking, thus withhold-
ing private information. However, those techniques are rarely employed by small rms, which
often are unable to provide sucient collateral (e.g. Paul 2007). Innovative rms thus could
disclose private information in relationship banking, with the latter reducing information asym-
metries and banks' demand for collateral (Jiménez et al. 2009).
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Additionally, the number of chosen banking relationships is publicly observable by rival rms,
enabling them to conclude whether rm has a high innovative potential. If competitors observe
a rival's engagement in a single-bank relationship, this could lead the former to assume that
the rm tries to hide a good innovation as illustrated by Yosha 1995. Therefore, the fourth
hypothesis to be analysed is
H4: Firms' number of bank relationships is aected by neighbour rms' bank relationship quan-
tity.
3.3 Data and variables
3.3.1 Data sources
Firm level data are obtained from Bureau van Dijk's Amadeus database. The data contain the
names of banks rms are aliated with, i.e. similar to Neuberger et al. 2008 all types of bank
relationships are included. Firm information includes balance sheet data, patent quantity, trade-
marks and information on management. As e.g. Neuberger et al. 2008 nd rm level variables to
have more explanatory power on rms' decision on single or multiple banking relationship than
bank characteristics, I focus on the former.
After correcting for missing values, the initial sample of about 90,000 rm observations is reduced
to 25,031 rm specic observations in 2015 (summary statistics can be found in table 3.1).
Data for industry specialization as a measure of rm competition on county level is obtained from
the German Federal Oce of Statistics (destatis). As in most regional studies and as suggested
by e.g. Cetorelli and Strahan 2006, industry composition is measured using data on employment.
A mere use of the number of rms in a region, as employed in Benfratello et al. 2006 as a proxy
of measuring the possibility for externalities, is not regarded as appropriate.
Data on rms' locations from Amadeus was matched with the denomination of communities
in German counties of the Federal Statistical Oce to assign county-specic information on
local industries to each rm. Data on bank addresses was obtained by the Yellow Pages by
TVG; distance calculation was conducted by converting bank branches' ZIP Codes into decimal
coordinates using OpenGeoDB, and then calculating (non-spherical) distances of each branch
towards the investigated rms. This information is used in the following empirical investigation
to calculate a measure of local banking competition.
Data on patents is provided by Bureau van Dijk based on European Patent Oce's PATSTAT
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Database. 1,119 rms can be identied as innovative using patent applications as basis for the
resulting variable (see Cornaggia et al. 2015).
3.3.2 Variables denition
Besides local specialization, measured as Herndahl-index of county employment of eleven in-
dustries, spatial industry concentration (as Herndahl-index over all German counties) was cal-
culated as well.12 Industry concentration thus grasps industry specic competition rather than
local competition and might be well suited to explain eects, that have been subsumed by cur-
rent research using dummy variables on industries. This concentration also controls for asset
specicity: Higher concentration on average decreases asset heterogeneity due to less dierent
locations and as rms with assets that can be redeployed easily will prefer a single lender (Bolton
and Scharfstein 1996), a negative coecient is expected from the concentration variable. Inno-
vative ideas fostering competition are embodied by people rather than spaces (see Feldman and
Audretsch 1999). In line with that, Hombert and Matray 2017 link funding of rms to their
workers, as credit-constrained rms' inventors might be hired by competitors, who face only lit-
tle nancial constraints. As the opportunity of innovative workers to switch employees could be
higher in specialized areas13, rms there might be more in need to guarantee external funding.
This is another hint for the necessity of rms located in specialized areas to engage in multiple
bank relationships.
For each rm I calculate the share of the local employment in its own main industry. E.g. Ce-
torelli and Strahan 2006 use the employment share to control for the importance of an industry
for a region when investigating the eects of increased banking competition. Additionally, fol-
lowing Paci and Usai 1999 as well as van der van der Panne 2004, the specialization index PSij ,











where Eij is employment in industry i in county j. Thus, the more elaborate measurement of
specialization adjusts the above mentioned regional share of employees in a rm's industry to
industry size.
Besides the aforementioned Herndahl-Index on local industry composition, the competition
12An overview with all variables used and their description can be found in the appendix
13Hombert and Matray 2017 nd only weak evidence of inter-industry mobility of inventors.
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of rms within a certain industry within a also country is captured by the variable COMPij











where firmsij is the number of rms in county j in industry i. Although the variable was
initially designed to grasp rm level competition on employees, it is used as competition measure
for all input factors.
Overall industry structure can be used, on the other hand, to grasp Jacobs externalities. The
variable employed thus resembles the Herndahl-index.
PDj =
2








nj is the number of rms residing in county j and E is employment ordered ascendingly by
industry size.Thus, the cumulative sum of employment is used, similar to a Gini-Index. The
Lerner-Index as used e.g. in Aghion et al. 2005 would not be appropriate here, as the competi-
tion of industries would be reected only by rms in the sample and thus might be biased. In
contrast, the introduced measures allow for specication of competition using data of the whole
population.
As Almeida and Kogut 1997 notice, not only rm sizes are relevant in a location when investi-
gating the nancial situation of innovative rms, but also their distribution in terms of size. If
rm sizes are distributed unequally, large rms might buy innovative small rms, incorporating
and selling the innovations of the latter. Therefore, a Herndahl-index on rm sizes was calcu-
lated. As rm size data by employee number on county level are only provided in categories, the
Herndahl was calculated using the latter. The categories indicate the numbers of rms with
0-9, 10-49, 50-249 and 250 or more employees.
Additionally, the number of rms' establishments and close-downs within a county can be ob-
tained from data of the German Federal Oce of Statistics. Firm foundations relative to all
existing rms within the county are used to grasp the attractiveness of the location towards rm
founders. If the opportunities of positive location externalities outweigh the negative impact
of higher diculties to maintain secrecy, we should observe a positive coecient in the latter
estimations.
Rather than rm close-downs, I use a ratio of acquisitions to newly registered rms to grasp the
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prevalence of established rms obtaining new innovations by buying other enterprises. A higher
share of acquisitions thus presents a higher risk for innovative rms to be integrated into large
companies, what could be the consequence of loss of secrecy on their innovations. A positive coef-
cient could indicate that large rms acquired small rms that have more widespread distribution
of banking relationships and thus possibly lower secrecy. The ratio between the number of actual
and former managers was included to grasp eects of frequent turnover of managers and hence
the ability of building up long lasting (personal) relationships. Innovation is frequently measured
as rms' numbers of patents. While previous studies used rms' number of patents to quantify
their innovative power14, the outcome here is not clear ex ante. On the one hand, rms having
more patents can be considered more innovative and thus rather sensitive to new ideas. On the
other hand, if rms are able to protect their innovations with patents, they might be less prone
to a loss of secrecy and not be as careful about their number of banking relationships. There-
fore, patents are not perfectly reliable to describe rms' innovations (see Carlino 2001; Hombert
and Matray 2017). To have yet an indicator of whether rms are innovative or not, rms with
patent applications between 2010 and 2015 are considered as innovative. Furthermore, the qual-
ity of innovations is included in additional regressions similar to Cornaggia et al. 2015 as the
average number of patent citations received for patents that were granted between 2010 and 2015.
Ongena et al. 2012 dene asset specicity as the share of the rms' illiquid assets (Fixed+IntangibleAssetsTotalAssets ).
This might play a major role when rms default and creditors cannot rely on liquid stocks of the
rm but have to sell a number of assets to a limited number of rms (e.g. it is not reasonable to
assume that a retailer could have use of a steel rm's machines).
Firms with a higher share of intangible assets (as proxy for asset opacity) could try to estab-
lish multiple banking relationships at an early stage of their life to avoid lock-in (Farinha and
Santos 2002). Additionally to asset opacity, Intangible is employed to consider rms' ability to
oer collateral. As banks could have diculties when estimating the actual and future value of
intangible assets, relationship lending might be rather in use when the portion of intangibles is
high for xed assets.
To additionally control for the eects collateral, dummies for rms' legal forms and industries
(1-digit) are employed15, which might as well grasp overall industry-specic eects, as e.g. the
need for external funding (Gianetti 2009). Besides, as e.g. Neuberger et al. 2006 nd legal form
14e.g. Cornaggia et al. 2015 propose the number of patent applications of a rm per year as measure of innovative
activity and gauge the quality of the patents by the number of their citations, as in Aghion et al. 2005.
15German classication system (WZ 2008).
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only to approximate rms' credit risk for small rms, the expected eects of the inclusion is thus
mixed. Loosely following Rheinbaben and Ruckes 2004, I include the number of bank branches
within a distance of 25 km from the rm in the analyses to control for local banking competition.
As (Alessandrini et al. 2010) nd the probability of product innovations to be lower for SMEs
in the presence of a high density of bank branches, the results on the coecient could have a
positive sign.
3.4 Empirical investigation
3.4.1 Empirical strategy and summary statistics
Due to the dierent research questions formulated in the hypotheses, I employ various empirical
methods. First, multiple regressions will be in use as to determine the impact of innovative
activity and local competition on rm nancing.
The determination of which banking type will be in use is done by using exclusive bank rela-
tionships as indicator for relationship lending. First, I will use Probit analyses to investigate
the impacts on the probability whether relationship lending is in use. Additionally, I will gauge
the number of bank relationships after separating relationship borrowers from transaction-based
borrowers using Heckman sample selection estimation (similar to Aristei and Gallo 2017), which
takes into account that the sample of rms engaged in multiple bank relationships is not ran-
domly drawn from the population.
As the number of bank relationships is discrete, I use Poisson estimations to analyse hypoth-
esis three, i.e. the impact of local competition on the number of bank relationships. Turning
to the relevance of disclosure of private information and the danger of rivals obtaining access to
it, I check whether the number of other rms' bank relationships in the vicinity of the rm has
an additional impact on rms' choice of its number of bank relationships besides rm-level and
local variables.
As can be seen from the summary statistics in table 3.1, it is rm specic variables that are un-
evenly distributed, while the gaps between mean and median for the local variables are smaller.
They as well span between wide numbers, e.g. between zero and 829 when it comes to the
number of bank branches in a circumference of 25 km from the rm's location.
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Min Median Mean Max
Trademarks 0 0 3.153 3890
Age 0 3.219 3.248 6.405
Manageract/form 0.05556 2 2.77943 54
Equityratio 0 0.3678 0.3885 1
Patents 0 0 31.47 187286
Locations 0 0 2.404 283
Tradecredit 0 0.073906 0.134246 1
ActManagers 0 7 9.198 394
Intangible 0 0.002659 0.023446 5.553051
Totalassets 4.32 9.601 9.85 19.761
Banks25 0 203 261 829
HHIFirmSize 0.6984 0.8113 0.8088 0.8825
COMP 0.01632 1.36054 1.68858 41.23486
PS 0.03522 1.06823 1.17036 10.25425
PD 0.08466 0.14229 0.14 0.19942
HHIConcentration 0.005346 0.008075 0.009549 0.025377
ShareIndustryi -0.002961 0.201992 0.188091 0.57668
HHISpecialization 0.1566 0.1933 0.1992 0.3766
Firmsest. 0.7714 0.9845 0.9927 1.2209
Firmsacq. 0.01069 0.07612 0.07685 0.33857
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for explanatory variables
Sources: Author's calculation based on data from the German Federal oce of Statistics, Yellow Pages,
and Amadeus.
3.4.2 Funding of innovative rms
Analysing hypothesis one, I test whether rms' innovative activity and local competition have
eects on funding. As dependent variables, I use long-term debt and trade credit with the latter
as indicator for lower relevance for banks and higher reliance on other enterprises. Both variables
are set in relation to all liabilities and total assets respectively. The results are displayed in table
3.2.
Regressions (3)-(6) yield that the use of trade credit decreases with an increase in local own
industry specialization as well as in patents' quality gauged by the number of citations. The
importance of protection of private information's secrecy might increase with its value and the
opportunities of others to obtain and classify this information. Thus, relationships towards
other rms are reduced. H1 b) thus can be conrmed to some extent: Firms having high quality
innovations that could provide some market power to rms (s. Hussinger 2004) seem to avoid
close contact to other rms.
The use of long-term nancial debt (estimations (1), (2) and (5)) increases with local industry
specialization, rm size competition and the share of intangible assets. Yet, there is a signicant
negative eect of innovative activity on rms' share of long-term nancial debt. Therefore,
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Hypothesis 1 a) must be rejected. This partly is in line with Gianetti 2009, who nds banks to
play a crucial role in the early stages of innovations for technology-intense working rms, while
small rms and those with high leverage have problems at funding innovations. This could be
evidence that innovative rms are e.g. funded by equity, thus relying on bank based nance to
a lower degree.
Using long-term nancial debt as indicator for relationship lending, the results suggest that
forming close bank relationships is important for opaque (measured by Intangible) rms which
are not able to engage in transaction-based banking and those that are confronted with a more
unequal rm size distribution. Concluding, rms could rather engage in close bank relationships
to avoid loss of secrecy and secure long-term access to external funding in the presence of high
competition and credit constraints, while closer relationships to other rms can be found in
more diversied areas. Stronger overall diversication has a positive eect on the share of trade
credit as well as industry specic competition and competition measured by market entrants
(Firmsest.). This suggests that rms in diversied areas have less private information, allowing
them to replace bank relationships with nancial relationships to other rms.
Thus, we must be consider that rms rather replace bank relationships with trade credit in the
presence of a diversied industrial environment, higher competitive pressure by market entrants
and more unequally distributed rm sizes. High quality innovative rms seem to refrain from
external funding by other rms, while innovative rms have c.p. less long-term nancial debt.
With respect to hypotheses two and three, this would suggest that innovative rms fund by
engaging in transaction-based banking, possibly protecting their ideas by means of patents or
not disclosing private information to banks. Considering long-term nancial debt as indicator for
close bank relationships, rms in specialized areas rather seem to engage in relationship lending.
A more detailed analysis of relationship vs. transaction-based banking will be performed in the
next section.
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3.4.3 Type and number of bank relationships
Innovative rms seem to make less use of long-term funding and means of obtaining external
funds depend on the quality of their innovations. Although the coecients in the previous sec-
tion are small in value, they are consistent with the coecient of the diversication variable and
throughout dierent denitions of dependent variables.
To investigate rms' propensity of forming close bank relationships, probit models are presented
in estimations (7)-(9), where estimation (9) is the selection equation for a Heckman estimation,
where Innovative was used as exclusionary variable. Single bank relationships are a common
indicator of relationship banking (e.g. Berger and Black 2011) and are used as in the following
as proxy for relationship lending. The results are displayed in table 3.3.16 The Inverse Mill's
Ratio in estimation (10) is insignicant, thus not suggesting any sample selection issues, which
could arise due to e.g. rms facing lock-in situations with single bank relationships.
Firm size concentration, local overall industry specialization and establishment of new rms have
strong inuences on the choice whether to engage in relationship banking. Those variables, espe-
cially rm size distribution, are strong indicators of competition, thus suggesting that hypothesis
two cannot be rejected: Competition, measured by rm size distribution and higher overall in-
dustry specialization decrease the probability of multiple bank relationships as suggested.
Banking competition, grasped by the number of bank branches in a circumference of 25 km from
the rm, increases the probability of relationship banking, while the coecient of the outcome
equation is negative, indicating less bank relationships in the presence of a higher number of bank
branches in the vicinity of the rm. This is unexpected: stronger bank-level competition could
lead on average to more banking relationships, as e.g. found by Neuberger et al. 2008. Conse-
quently, rms might face lower credit constraints from their own bank, reducing the probability
of lock-in situations. The result obtained here, together with the coecient on PD suggests that
not only rm competition, but the location itself matters. A higher number of bank branches
frequently prevails in an urban location and a higher level of diversication suggests economies
of urbanization rather than localization. Carlino 2001 suggests that rms located in urban areas
tend to use more patents as for them the maintenance of private information secrecy is more
expensive. More patents therefore might not reect higher innovative activity but rather higher
eort to keep private information secret. This could additionally allow for transaction-based
banking, using e.g. patents as collateral (Mann 2018). To check this, population density was
16Firm level controls correspond to the variables as shown in table 3.1
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included additionally in unreported regressions to capture eects associated with urbanization,
the centrality of the location and other related properties. Though being highly statistically
signicant, the coecient on inhabitants per square-kilometre was not economically signicant
and did not alter virtually any of the other coecients in magnitude or signicance.
In line with those ndings, the positive coecients on COMPij and local share of rm's own
industry indicate a lower probability for rms under industry specic competitive pressure to
engage in relationship banking.
This reects previous results from estimations (1)  (6) that showed c.p. lower shares of long-term
external funding for rms in competitive areas. The result thus could be a consequence of a local
industry specic competition for funds or less innovative activity due the distribution of local
market power. In fact, ShareIndustryi and the number of patents have no statistically signicant
correlation, Long Term LiabilitiesTotal Assets and industry share have a statistically signicant negative corre-
lation of about -0.1 similar to the share of intangible xed assets (about -0.06). The correlations
of COMPij towards these variables are about -0.01 with very low signicance, insignicant and
negative (about -0.02), thus only roughly in line with the correlations of ShareIndustryi . Al-
though the correlations are not too high in magnitude, they point to a use of transaction-based
banking in the presence of local industry specialization, thus enabling rms to engage in multiple
bank relationships without having to fear a loss of secrecy.
The ratio between actual and former managers proved to have a highly signicant impact and to
be positive throughout the regressions. This could be due to size eects, as a higher coecient
suggests rm growth, thereby creating additional demand for nancial services or products.
The coecient on industry concentration in estimation (8) is highly signicant and negative.
Firms of concentrated industries might choose less banking relationships, as the redistribution
of collateral in case of default might be facilitated for industries that are not geographically dis-
perse. Yet, the coecient could also capture other rm specic preferences for external nancing,
which are grasped by industry dummies in other estimations (see Cetorelli and Strahan 2006).
Overall local specialization has a highly signicant correlation of about -0.05 towards intangible
xed assets, which might further explain the higher probability of engaging in single bank rela-
tionships for rms located in industrially diversied areas.
Along with theoretical arguments, rms with on average highest share of intangible xed assets
maintain no banking relationship. This indicates the shortcomings of a lack of collateral. The
availability of tangible assets might thus indicate the degree of how strongly rms are credit
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constrained (see Hombert and Matray 2017, p. 2427; Farinha and Santos 2002, p. 140 use the
ratio of TangibleAssetsDebt to assume rms' ability to grant securities to lenders).
The results here show that the rejection of hypothesis two, i.e. stronger competition and industry
specialization decrease c.p. a rm's probability to engage in transaction-based banking, depends
on competition indicators. While we nd that industry-specic competition and industry share
increase a rm's probability to engage in multiple bank relationships, unequal rm size distribu-
tion, more foundations of new rms and higher overall industry concentration robustly decrease
its probability of engaging in relationship lending.
In line with this, there is slight evidence that diversication, measured by PD, decreases rms'
probability of using multiple bank relationships as well as the number of bank relationships. The
coecient on innovative activity is positive, which is in line with the previously found negative
coecient in estimation (1), indicating a more frequent use of transaction-based banking for
innovative rms. This contradicts hypothesis three at a rst glance, hence a more dierentiated
analysis could shed light on the relation between innovation, competition and bank relationships.
The empirical distribution of the number of bank relationships does not match the Poisson dis-
tribution with equal mean. Overdispersion tests reveal deviation of the sample variance from
the mean and further investigations indicate underdispersion, which is due to a higher number
of single bank relationships than suggested by a Poisson distribution, possibly due to lock-in
eects.
As the dependent variable's mean and variance do not coincide in all samples, a maximum
likelihood (ML) poisson approach might not be suited best (see e.g. Ronning 1991; Zeileis et al.
2008). Therefore, sandwich errors are used rather than Quasi Maximum Likelihood estimation,
with the former having preferable properties (see Cameron and Trivedi 2013). The results of the
estimations can be found in table 3.4 (Average mean eects can be found in the Appendix).
To begin with, most of the results of the previous estimations are conrmed in signicance and
sign with some adaptions in magnitude. Firm age, number of current managers, rm size (Total
assets) and number of locations are mostly signicant and have the expected positive sign. The
positive coecient on the Herndahl-Index on local specialization indicates more bank relation-
ships for rms as the local industry composition becomes more uniform, which is in line with the
previous results on long-term nancial debt. The coecient on the more elaborate diversication
measure PD is negative and signicant, conrming the aforementioned result. The coecient on
the Innovative dummy variable in estimation (14) again is positive, indicating that rms with
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Table 3.3: Probit and sample selection estimation on multiple banks dummy
Dependent variable:
Multiple Banks Bank Relations No.
Probit Selection Outcome
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.574 0.498 6.313 6.040∗∗∗
(1.067) (1.150) (146.955) (0.452)
Banks25 −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
HHIFirmsize −1.312∗∗∗ −1.161∗∗∗ −1.645∗∗∗ −1.773∗∗∗
(0.400) (0.398) (0.408) (0.424)
COMP 0.006 0.011∗∗ 0.005 −0.005
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
PS −0.001 0.0003 0.015
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)










Firmsest. −0.914∗∗∗ −0.943∗∗∗ −0.920∗∗∗ −0.575∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.150) (0.153) (0.178)
Firmsacq. −0.527 −0.551 −0.443 −0.601∗





Inverse Mill′s Ratio 0.179
(0.188)
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal Form Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 25,031 25,031 23,869 15,279 (uncensored)
Log Likelihood −14,307.590 −14,482.910 −13,699.130
Akaike Inf. Crit. 28,733.170 29,051.820 27,512.260
Pseudo-R2 (McFadden) 0.12617 0.11546 0.16333
Adj. R2 0.1143
Signicance levels are based on robust standard errors and are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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a high innovative activity tend to engage in multiple bank relationships instead of securing long-
term access to funding or rm secrecy by relationship banking as suggested (e.g. Jiménez et al.
2009; Rheinbaben and Ruckes 2004). With innovation being measured via patent applications,
the need for secrecy might be represented insuciently. Similarly, the quantity of patents does
not seem to impact rms' decisions on nancing partners, possibly as the procedure of protecting
new innovations by patent applications, grasped by the Innovative dummy variable, could allow
for a multitude of external funding partners.
The coecient on Firmsacq. is signicant throughout estimations (12) to (14) indicating that
rms engage in less bank relationships in places, where a large share of rms is acquired. Ad-
ditionally, the portion of newly established rms within the county has a signicant negative
impact on the number of banking relationships with an average mean eect ranging between
-0.87 and -0.91. This result seems to conrm that positive location eects do not outweigh
increasing competition and rather point to a higher ambition for relationship banking in the
presence of strong competition embodied by new rms and rm takeovers, which is in line with
hypotheses two and three. This could secure long-term external funding in the presence of high
competitive pressure and include a more thorough monitoring and higher disclosure of rm level
information.
As the coecient on the interaction term between Innovative and PD is very high in mag-
nitude, potential interdependencies between the coecient and industry specialization must be
considered. The impact of local diversication is notably higher for innovative rms, which could
be evidence that innovative rms in diversied areas try to reduce information asymmetries and
obtain long-term funding by engaging in relationship banking. Furthermore, Jae et al. 1993
nd citations of patents within patents often to originate from dierent industry elds. Thus,
diversication might benet innovation which would be evidence for Jacobs externalities, in line
with Feldman and Audretsch 1999 who found that less competition benets the innovative ac-
tivity of an area. This suggests that competition is stronger in diversied areas, which could
be due to smaller pools of labour force or infrastructure. Therefore, more local diversication
represents stronger competition for innovative rms and induces them  in line with hypothesis
three - to maintain closer banking relationships.
This result could as well point to credit constrains of rms in specialized areas. Banks, trying to
limit their dependency on one industry, might restrict their business in terms of loan amounts. As
a result, rms would have to engage in additional bank relationships. But the industry-specic
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measures of specialization and competition are still very small and insignicant.
While competition seems to increase the number of bank relationships, consistent with our
Table 3.4: Results of Poisson estimation
Signicance levels are based on sandwich errors and are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Dependent variable:
Number of Bank Relationships
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept −0.006 1.223 1.162 2.175∗∗∗
Trademarks 0.0001 0.00005 0.0001 0.00003
Age 0.223∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
Manageract/form 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
Equityratio 0.026∗ 0.014 −0.016 0.012
Patents −0.00001 −0.00001 −0.00001 −0.00001
Locations 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
Tradecredit −0.004 −0.005 0.026 −0.011
ActManagers 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
Intangible −0.116∗ −0.102 −0.123∗ −0.103
Totalassets 0.030∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
Banks25 −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗
Avg. Citations2010−2015 −0.011








Firmsest. −0.396∗∗∗ −0.404∗∗∗ −0.413∗∗∗
Firmsacq. −0.379∗∗∗ −0.379∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗
Innovative 0.377∗∗
Innovative ∗ COMP 0.017
Innovative ∗ PS 0.014
Innovative ∗ PD −2.568∗∗
Legal Form Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 25,031 25,031 25,031 23,869
Akaike Inf. Crit. 78,867 78,744 78,964 75,110
Pseudo-R2 (McFadden) 0.04705 0.04871 0.04566 0.048742
previous ndings, the eect is not robust and small in number. Thus, local industry specic
specialization does not have signicant eects on the number of bank relationships, which un-
dermines the previously found weak relevance of local specialization in rms' industries for their
number of bank relationships. Considering the ndings of the highly signicant and negative
coecients on rm establishment, rms might rather tend to engage in relationship banking in
areas where new competition prevails rather than merely industry specic competition. Also,
the negative sign of the coecient on size concentration indicates less bank relationships if rm
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sizes are more unequally distributed.
Overall, the results suggest that rms' choice on its number of bank relationship is strongly
negatively inuenced by local overall industry specialization, local rm size distribution, and es-
tablishments and acquisitions of new rms rather than industry specic competition as measured
by PSij , rms' own industry share and COMPij , . This is surprising, as one would expect rms
located in areas with industry specic competition to have a higher demand for secrecy of their
innovation.
Focusing on innovative rms, the quantity and quality of patents does not seem to impact rms'
decisions on nancing partners, whereas the Innovative dummy variable, again suggests a mul-
titude of external funding partners. The previously found negative impacts of overall industry
diversication and competition embodied by changes in local rm entities can be conrmed for
innovative rms. Thus, hypothesis three must be accepted with a caveat: Innovative rms have
c.p. less bank relationships when located in diversied environments with strong changes in lo-
cal corporate landscape. Industry specic competition or specialization in rms' own industries
does neither seem to impact local rms' choice on their number of bank relationships, nor that
of innovative rms.
While local industry specic specialization does not have clear eects on the number of bank re-
lationships, a tendency for secrecy in those areas cannot be detected. As industry specialization
in a location might even drive o non-competitive rms, the probability for banks to have a good
borrower from such a market could be even higher. To evaluate this, the bank relationships of
neighbouring rms are taken into account.
3.4.4 Eects of neighbours' bank relationships
Data selection and spatial weight matrix
Considering the possibility of spillover eects due to rms adjusting to the number of their
neighbour rms' banking relationships, spatial dependence is additionally taken into account.
The eects of spatial autocorrelation are grasped using a k-nearest-neighbour's matrix as spatial
weight matrix. The additional consideration of spatially close competitors' bank relationships
accounts for the observability of bank relationships by other rms and strategic choice of its
quantity as proposed by Yosha 1995. Furthermore, being an additional empirical test for the
relevance of informative secrecy in competitive environments, rms might try to avoid cross-
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banking-relations with competitors. The spatial component thus includes all eects that have
an impact on a rm's choice of bank relationships and estimate whether those have an impact
on the bank relationship quantity of its neighbours.
As Moran's-I-Tests indicate the presence of spatial autocorrelation, I used spatial autoregressive
(SAR) models, including the spatially lagged dependent variable to grasp the impact of the
number of banking relationships of competitors in the vicinity. Unreported spatial expansion
models had a bad overall t and only few spatially weighted variables were signicant.17 The
estimated equation has the basic form of
y = Xβ + λWy + ε (3.4)
where Wy is the spatial weight matrix multiplied with the vector of endogenous variables. In
order to be able to infer a company's closest neighbours, data on rm's location (i.e. addresses)
must be converted into operable measurement. Therefore, geo-coordinates in the form of decimal
degrees of longitude and latitude were used. Decimal coordinates were obtained from Google
Maps via reverse geocoding, with exact addresses of ZIP-code communities and the street names
of rms' addresses. As a number of rm locations were missing detailed information on street
name, zip code or town, they had to be removed from the dataset, leaving 16,642 observations.
Using this information, k-nearest neighbour spatial weight matrices were calculated with k=10,
k=25, and k=50. The weight matrix is row standardized, but, due to the nature of rms' spatial
properties, asymmetrical. Lower distance between a rm and its closest competitor increases the
spill over eects and thus has more impact on rm's nancing decisions. Therefore, it is assigned
higher relevance by the spatial weight matrix.
Estimation results
Due to limited computational capacities, calculation of eigenvalues of the spatial weight matrix,
which would have been necessary to calculate the Jacobian ln|I−λW | could not be pursued. As
furthermore the calculation of the eigenvalues encounters some diculties for non-symmetrical
weight matrices, the maximum likelihood approach was not taken into further account.
Instead, a two-stage approach as described in Land and Deane 1992 and Bivand and Piras 2015
was applied. This procedure also enhances the use of robust standard errors and provides supe-
17As other characteristics of neighbour rms are not assumed to aect the number of rms' banking relationships
directly, the use of e.g. Spatial Durbin Models was not pursued.
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rior estimates compared to the maximum-likelihood approach in the presence of non-normality
(Arbia 2014).
Controlling for local factors, the coecient λ represents the spatial autocorrelation of the de-
pendent variable. As can be seen from table 3.5, λ remains positive and signicant throughout
all estimations. Thus, an increase of the quantity of bank connections of rms' k nearest neigh-
bours, has a positive impact on rms' own number of bank relationships. This is an indicator
that rms do not try to strengthen secrecy of their private information by engaging in less bank-
ing relationships than their neighbours in order to avoid common links to banks. Firms rather
seem to adapt to local situations and engage in a similar number of bank relationships as their
neighbours. This could be a consequence of less trade credit prevailing in some areas, aecting
the bank relationships of neighbouring rms as well. The impact, nevertheless, is rather small
and increasing with k: if e.g. k=50 rms increase the number of their banking relationships, the
spillover eect on the own eect increases to 0.40.
Taking the observability of the bank relationship quantity into account, rms might as well try
to strengthen (allow to decrease) their external funding after observing an increase (shrinkage) of
the number of bank relationships of their closest competitors. This could either be due to reect
perceived nancial strength or due to other external events as e.g. regional liquidity shocks.
While the coecients on the quantity of bank branches and local overall diversication have
the same signs and similar magnitudes compared to the initial estimations, the coecient on
local industry specialization becomes signicant and positive when taking neighbour rms into
account. The result was robust when replacing PS with the industry share: The coecient
increased by the factor 10, while the mean of PS is about 6.5 times the size of industry share.
The other coecients did not change notably in size or signicance. The consideration of the
spatial autoregressive term might reveal the eect of rms in the vicinity who also face strong
industry specialization, reinforcing the eects of PS.
The positive coecient for PS as well as the positive coecient of the spatial autoregressive
term in estimations (15)-(17) might thus conrm that the number of bank relationships has a
minor role in rms' nancing decision w.r.t. secrecy. These decisions are rather made consider-
ing dierent forms of external funding. Therefore, the results suggest a rejection of hypothesis
four. Yet, the mere existence of neighbouring rms does not necessarily impose a constraint
to keep private information secret. Neighbours from dierent industries are neither industry
specic competitors nor do they have a high likelihood of taking advantage of other rms' pri-
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Table 3.5: Results of spatial two-stage autoregression
Dependent variable:
Number of Bank Relationships
(15) (16) (17)
λ 0.33113*** 0.2028*** 0.40432***
(0.045913) (0.038272) (0.049499)
Intercept 0.29701 1.2607** -0.31188
(0.61559) (0.57726) (0.63829)
Trademarks 0.00056** 0.000525** 0.000558**
(0.000256) (0.000256) (0.000259)
Age 0.50019*** 0.50122*** 0.49802***
(0.014127) (0.014175) (0.014115)
Manageract/form 0.026733*** 0.026371*** 0.026494***
(0.004441) (0.004435) (0.004441)
Equityratio 0.015228 0.012755 0.022397
(0.039211) (0.039145) (0.039193)
Patents -0.000025** -0.000025** -0.000025**
(0.000012) (0.000012) (0.000012)
Locations 0.004109*** 0.004157*** 0.00425***
(0.00146) (0.001439) (0.001461)
Tradecredit -0.075528 -0.078864 -0.082352
(0.056259) (0.056222) (0.056234)
actManagers 0.011493*** 0.011624*** 0.011462***
(0.002166) (0.0022) (0.002169)
Intangible -0.018828 -0.012958 -0.007398
(0.10442) (0.10515) (0.10479)
Total assets 0.066915*** 0.067286*** 0.065563***
(0.009774) (0.00981) (0.00978)
Banks25 -0.000289*** -0.000352*** -0.000258***
(0.000063) (0.000062) (0.000063)
HHIFirmsize -0.99759** -1.4497*** -0.58586
(0.48748) (0.47624) (0.50079)
COMP -0.003193 -0.001157 -0.003815
(0.00725) (0.007279) (0.007233)
PD -2.0001** -2.4615** -1.8463*
(0.98291) (0.9762) (0.98059)
PS 0.047033** 0.049526** 0.050002**
(0.020818) (0.020811) (0.02082)
Firmsest. -0.46003** -0.70393*** -0.33647*
(0.19009) (0.18133) (0.19245)
Firmsacq. -0.62874 -0.76593* -0.57988
(0.41161) (0.41054) (0.41233)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
n 16,642 16,642 16,642
Number of nearest neighbours
25 10 50
Signicance levels were calculated based on robust standard errors
and are indicated by * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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vate information. Furthermore, the use of trade credit and thus its eects on bank relationships
might dier between industry groups (see e.g. Petersen and Rajan 1997). Therefore, the spatial
estimations are repeated, splitting the sample into subsamples, grouped rms by industry clas-
sication (agriculture and mining, manufacturers, and service industries). Coecients are split
up into direct and indirect eects. The latter indicate feedback eects resulting from changes
of explanatory variables of neighbouring regions, aecting the dependent variable, of course, of
that rm and thereby aecting its neighbours (see Elhorst 2014, 22 for detailed explanations).
The results are displayed in table 3.6. λ is signicant in the two latter estimations and has a pos-
itive sign, conrming the above mentioned results now within dierent industry classications.
The coecient for manufacturing is larger in size suggesting a stronger impact of neighbouring
rms' funding decisions. This could be a result of higher concentration in the service industry
sample which is weighted about 0.012 and thus about twice as high as weighted concentration
in the manufacturing industry subsample. The ratio between indirect and direct explanatory
variables is 0.5521 in estimation (19) and 0.3545 in estimation (20), i.e. there are more spillover
eects, pointing to stronger links among rms. As a majority of rms can be grouped into man-
ufacturing and service industries, I will focus on the results of those.
As most interesting result, the coecients of industry specic specialization PS vary both in sign
and magnitude. This nding could support the ndings of Beaudry and Schiauerova 2009 and
Paci and Usai 1999, mentioned above. A nearby explanation for this nding, closely in line with
the result of Neuberger et al. 2008 that service industries engage in less banking relationships,
is the ability to engage in transaction-based bank relationships. While manufacturing rms sup-
posedly own more xed assets that can be pledged as collateral, rms from service industries
benet from close bank relationships. This is aggravated in specialized service industries ar-
eas, where high competitive pressure could put additional credit constraints on rms. On the
contrary, higher local specialization of manufacturing industries and competition could increase
manufacturing rms' demand for nance. Thus, due to the rm-level competition transferring
into a competition for funds, rms will engage in more bank relationships in order to maintain
stable external funding. Additional evidence w.r.t. protection of innovations comes from the
average (mean) number of patents, which, in the manufacturing subsample, is about 15 times
the number of the mean in the service industries subsample.
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While there are no other signicant competition variables in the manufacturing subsample,
most of the local coecients for service industries have the same signs and are similar in magni-
tude to estimation (12). As the service industries subsample is twice the size of the manufacturing
industries, the results of the full sample could be driven by the former. Investigating the coe-
cients on industry dummy variables in estimation (12), the coecients for the four manufacturing
industries are highly signicant and positive.
Again, the results indicate that higher specialization in a rm's local environment is rather as-
sociated with an increase in bank relations if certain requirements like collateral can be met.
Therefore, the demand for a diversication of external funding sources could be higher than
avoiding multiple bank relationships due to potential losses in rm level secrecy. Consistent with
all of the previous estimations, the number of bank relationships decreases with an increase in lo-
cation based competitive measures, except for local industry specic specialization. Therefore, a
reduction in bank relationships can be assigned to increased overall competition, while a smaller
number of aliated banks does not seem to take place in order to maintain rm level secrecy.
Hypothesis four thus has to be rejected.
3.5 Conclusions
With rm level competition being one of the major drivers of innovation and market prices, a
highly relevant aspect has been neglected so far when it comes to banking relationships. Besides
demand side competition, rms especially try to maintain secrecy regarding private information.
Such private information can comprise innovative activity, but also relevant non-public infor-
mation concerning rms' prots, planned activities, or other information. Thus, focusing solely
on the impact of lending relationships and innovative activities could neglect a relevant part of
internal information which should be kept secret.
To promote the secrecy of private information in competitive markets, rms might try to reduce
their banking relationships, as the revelation of information towards a multitude of external
lenders and deposit takers could have serious drawbacks. Private information could be obtained
by rms' competitors when shared with too many banks (Rheinbaben and Ruckes 2004), which
would be aggravated in environments, where its usability was high, as in industrially specialized
areas.
Another aspect concerning the number of bank relationships is their intensity. Firms could try
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to ensure a multitude of bank relationships to avoid credit crunches while not disclosing private
information to banks. If rms lack collateral for transaction-based banking, they will have to
disclose more private information with higher probability. Yet, relationship banking could oer
more long-term external funding to those rms.
To analyse the potential outcomes concerning rm nancing and number of bank relationships,
several variables measuring local competition are employed. Investigating a sample of data of
about 25,000 German rms, there is robust evidence that local competition in part has a negative
impact on rms' number of bank relationships. This partially can be reconciled with theories on
innovation, predicting less innovation in the presence of stronger competition.
This holds true but for local industry specic specialization. While there is some statistical but
low economical signicance in estimations (1)-(6), the choice on the number of bank relationships
is not robustly aected by a rm's local industry specialization. Including spatially lagged terms
and splitting up the sample by industry categories, there are positive eects of industry specic
specialization on the number of bank relationships for manufacturing rms and negative eects
for service rms. These results point to an existence of MAR externalities for manufacturing
rms regarding external funding; spill-over eects might induce rms to engage in c.p. more bank
relationships if their competitors do so. This could e.g. be a result of new ways of conducting
business within that particular industry or new policies of banks. Another implication of the
results is that market entrant banks in areas specialized in manufacturing industries could have
an advantage in gaining market shares.
Overall, the results suggest that rms do not try to protect private information by engaging in
less bank relationships. The Innovative dummy variable is positive in Probit (Poisson) estima-
tions on use of multiple (number of) bank relationships. Yet it is negative when determining
long-term nancial debt of rms. This indicates that innovative rms engage in a multitude of
bank relationships, where probably most of them are transaction-based due to less long-term
nancing. Trade credit on the other hand is reduced in specialized environments and for high
quality inventors. This indicates that rms consider protection of private information as more
relevant when dealing with other rms than with banks.
The results illustrate the relevance of transaction-based banking for innovative rms. This can
only take place if those rms have sucient possibilities of protecting their innovations from
disclosure and sucient collateral. As it is especially rms from service industries that have only
little xed assets, innovative rms from this industrial areas probably could incur diculties
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at nding ways of external funding. Furthermore, access to a multitude of banks could require
plants or oces close to nancial services. Thus, innovations are not only bound locally by
human resources' but also nancial input. Disparities in regional innovative capacity thus could
strongly drift apart.
The results could furthermore be the starting point for another approach to nd MAR or Ja-
cobs externalities by reuniting (local) knowledge and nancial input, where the latter could be
expressed by availability of funds in terms of loan applications or other ways of funding than
bank loans. Further research additionally could cover not only the number of rms' bank re-
lationships, but - if data are available - also frequency and ways of communication, length of
bank relationships and additional loan data as interest rates, duration, and covenants, to get
additional evidence on the closeness of bank relationships to gauge their relevance for rms'
nancial strategy. E.g. data on loan applications could help to answer the question whether the
number of bank relationships is chosen or the result of credit constraints. Additionally using





Table 3.7: Variables and their denitions
Variable Description
Trademarks Firm's number of trademarks
Age Log (1+Firm Age in years)
Manageract/form number of current managersnumber of former managers
Equityratio Equity/Total Assets
Patents Firm's number of patents
Locations Number of documented rm locations
Tradecredit Trade credit in thsd. EUR
ActManagers Trade credit in thsd. EUR
Intangible Intangible fixed assetsTotal assets
Totalassets Log (1+Total Assets in thsd. EUR)
Banks25 Number of bank branches in a circumference of 25 km
HHIFirmSize Herndahl index of local rm size categories
(0-9, 10-49, 50-249 and more than 250 employees)
COMP see equation (3.2)
PS see equation (3.1)
PD see equation (3.3)
HHIConcentration Herndahl index over industries' spatial concentration,
calculated using counties
ShareIndustryi Share of employees in a rm's industry
relative to all employees in the county
HHISpecialization Herndahl index of local industries, categorized by WZ 2008
Firmsest. new firm establishmentsestablished firms




Innovative Dummy variable; equals 1 if rm had at least one patent application
between 2010 and 2015
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3.6.2 Average mean eects of Poisson estimation
(11) (12) (13) (14)
Trademarks 0.00013 0.000103 0.00019 0.000075
Age 0.488227 0.479346 0.508465 0.480784
Manageract/form 0.038677 0.036277 0.036918 0.036953
Equityratio 0.057229 0.030521 -0.035227 0.027296
Patents -0.000024 -0.000023 -0.000025 -0.000021
Locations 0.002578 0.003137 0.002408 0.003221
Tradecredit -0.008617 -0.010608 0.057763 -0.023485
actManagers 0.005937 0.006074 0.006731 0.005608
Intangible fixed assets -0.253929 -0.223917 -0.26915 -0.226831
Totalassets 0.065932 0.07294 0.062654 0.074048
Banks25 -0.000382 -0.000339 -0.000385
Avg. Citations2010−2015 -0.023195







Firmsest. -0.868405 -0.885654 -0.906758
Firmsacq. -0.830876 -0.830449 -0.724315
Innovative 0.827701
Innovative ∗ COMP 0.03753
Innovative ∗ PS 0.031756
Innovative ∗ PD -5.635223
Table 3.8: Average mean eects of Poisson MLE
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3.6.3 Two stage procedure applied for spatial estimation
The two stage procedure to estimate (3.4) is based on rearranging the initial equation:
y(I − λW) = Xβ + ε (3.5)
The expectation therefore is
E(y) = (I − λW)−1Xβ = Xβ +XWβλ+XW2βλ2 + ... (3.6)
For H = [X,XW,XW2], M = [X,Wy] and γ = [λ, β], the rst stage of the estimation is
M = Hδ + η (3.7)
Thus, M̂ = H(H'H)−1H'M = [M,H(H'H)−1H'Wy]
The second stage is estimated using OLS:
y = M̂γ + u (3.8)
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Chapter 4
The Eects of Spatial Distance on Loan
Pricing in Relationship Lending -
Evidence from Germany
18
18This chapter has been published as The Eects of Spatial Distance on Loan Pricing in Relationship Lending
- Evidence from Germany in Die Unternehmung, Vol. 72, No. 3, p. 212-228
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4.1 Introduction
The literature on rm-bank relationships, mainly focusing on credit relations has often considered
large distances between debtors and creditors to aggravate the diculties and costs of transferring
non-codiable information from borrowers to lenders. This type of information might be relevant
for estimating data such as the probability of default or the loss given default. Less hard facts
provided by the borrower thus should result in increasing monitoring and screening costs which
will be borne by the borrower, when being charged higher interest rates by the lender (s. e.g.
Cenni et al. 2015, p. 251; Knyazeva and Knyazeva 2012, p. 1195; Degryse and Ongena 2005,
p. 234; Petersen and Rajan 2002, 2543f). The increase in interest rates on the other hand is only
supposed to happen up to a certain location. At some point in space, other banks, located closer
to the borrowing rm, are able to assign a loan to the borrower with lower interest rates due to
lower incurring costs.
Furthermore, it is commonly assumed that enterprises' opacity decreases with rm size due to
a larger stock of employees, more reporting (obligations) and especially a longer history of the
rm resulting in a better availability of rm specic data. Hence, large rms are able to provide
hard facts as reliable information to their lenders when applying for credit and thus, in theory,
ruling out distance to some high degree.
Empirical Evidence on this topic is mixed. While e.g. Bellucci et al. 2013 and Knyazeva and
Knyazeva 2012 nd loan interest rates to increase with borrower-lender-distance, Agarwal and
Hauswald 2010 and Degryse and Ongena 2005 nd borrowers located closer to their lenders to be
charged on average higher loan rates, due to local market power of the lending bank. This paper
seeks to address whether geographical distances between banks and rms manifest in interest
rates on rms' liabilities as lenders allocate their transport and information costs to debtors. The
verication of the theoretical argumentation cannot be done without incorporating characteristics
of the lending bank. Banks of dierent types and sizes might use varying techniques to cope with
larger distances. As the relevance of distance is assumed to be more pronounced for relationship
lending, only exclusive banking relationships are analyzed. With the initial sample consisting of
rms with no or multiple banking relationships as well, Heckman's two stage procedure is used
to correct for possible sample selection. While I nd strong evidence for the relevance of location
in determining whether a rm engages in relationship lending, distance on average has a high
positive eect on rms' loan rates in the outcome equation. Therefore, higher costs of monitoring
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seem to be borne by borrowers. On the other hand, local market power as well has an impact on
interest rates, with the number of banks in the vicinity of rms on average decreasing interest
rates.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the following section, I'll give a short review on the theoretical
argumentation on bank and rm relationship, which will rely on bank and rm size and introduce
geographical distance between enterprises and banks. The data used in the analysis will be
introduced in section three. Empirical investigations will be performed in section four, using
German individual rm level data. Section ve concludes.
4.2 Firm-bank relationships and distance
While some time ago, a well working bank relationship was crucial for external funding, nowadays
many, especially large multinational rms, can participate at capital markets without intermedi-
ation. In Germany, as a bank-based system of nancing, enterprises have relatively long-lasting
and often exclusive bank relationships, with bank loans being by far the most important source
of external funding (Handke 2011, 77f).
The exclusiveness of a bank relation could have dierent possible outcomes: Harho and
Körting 1998 did not nd the number of banking relationships to matter for the interest paid in
data on German rms. In contrast, Stein 2015 nds interest rates paid by enterprises to increase
over time, if the bank owns a large share of the rm's debt, thus exhibiting a hold-up in their
relationship. This nding is reasoned with rm growth during the relationship and thus the need
for larger loan amounts. The resulting higher concentration risks of the bank might be prized
with higher interest rates. Focusing on distance and market power, it is commonly assumed that
borrowers located in the geographical vicinity of the lending bank are priced higher loan rates
due to the local market power of the lending bank, whereas loan rates decline as rms' location
approaches towards competing banks (s. Bellucci et al. 2013, Degryse and Ongena 2004, Degryse
et al. 2009).
The ability of banks to augment loan rates even increases when the rm is relatively opaque
and the bank has a long lasting relationship with the rm and thus an informational advantage
compared to competitors. On the one hand, due to resulting lock-in situations, the borrower is
stuck with the same lender (s. Slotty 2009, 2f). On the other hand, with the bank exercising
some control over the rm, due to its exclusive status and intense relationship, the lender might
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inuence the borrower to act as 'lender-friendly' as possible and reward her with constant access
to external funding (s. Agarwal and Elston 2001, p. 230). Therefore, besides the increasing
diculty of transferring soft information over a larger distance, also the (geographical) structure
of the banking market and banks' competition should be considered, as the latter might mitigate
the rm's costs associated with transportation and hence the interest rate increasing eect of
distance.
Due to their small size and/or young age small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) do neither
own large divisions to communicate or quantify their business plans and results, nor is there a
documentation of former rm performance or frequent new information. Thus, due to missing
possibility to assess the riskiness of the borrower or high costs of monitoring and screening, it
is either impossible or too costly for outside investors to engage in borrowing towards opaque
SMEs. To assess such rms' creditworthiness and future returns, it is crucial to be capable of
processing soft information. Such could include the personality of the manager or owner, being
a 'key' person of a small enterprise (Berger et al. 2014, p. 266), her 'business vision', her social
behavior. Furthermore, soft information could include the mood and the attitude of the workers
within the rm as well as relations toward costumers or suppliers.19 Therefore, to gather and
process soft information in order to complete or build the (risk) prole of a rm, high costs arise
when relying on relationship banking, enabling the use of personal contacts for credit assessment
beyond hard facts.20
Borrower lender distance thus has a high relevance to loan transactions in situations, when soft
information, that cannot be transported over large distances is essential for assessing a borrower's
creditworthiness. Therefore, distance correlate positively with loan costs. On the one hand, the
borrower has to visit the lender at least once when applying for a loan (Agarwal and Hauswald
2010, p. 5). On the other hand, a more remote lender incurs distance related costs for monitoring
and screening the borrower, e.g. higher travel costs (Brevoort and Hannan 2004, p. 5); (Cenni et
al. 2015, p. 251); (Brevoort and Wolken 2009, 29f). Furthermore, monitoring activities including
personal interaction are directly related with the possibility of processing soft information which
is therefore dependent on frequent mutual encounters.
Several studies nd soft information to improve the predictions of banks' risk models on default,
when used additionally to hard facts.21
19A detailed overview over informational aspects that can be considered as soft can be found in Ahnert et al.
2005
20S. Berger and Black 2011 for a discussion of hard vs. soft lending techniques
21S. Altman and Sabato 2007 and Deyoung et al. 2008 argue that the reduction to quantiable informa-
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Nevertheless, the use of soft information can be misleading, too, and hence a sole focus on hard
facts could reduce the chance of granting loans that are riskier than expected (Emmons et al.
2004).22
Banks' organizational layers also matter when processing soft information through those layers
with resulting lter eects. Therefore, one must dierentiate between the place where the bor-
rower contacts the lender (e.g. branch oce of a bank) and the place where decisions on the loan
approval and/or conditions are made (e.g. head oce of a bank). Alessandrini et al. 2009 term
the former operational distance and the latter functional distance. According to the above argu-
mentation, transport costs for soft information rise with a higher operational distance, whereas
functional distance between branch oce loan ocers and the decision-making manager in the
head oce can result in agency costs (Jiménez et al. 2009).
Considering this, the fewer hierarchical layers of savings and cooperative banks relative to com-
mercial banks might leave the former with some comparative advantage in terms of using soft
information (Prantl et al. 2008, p. 12). Furthermore, their denser net of branch oces, spread
over a small geographical area might allow them more opportunities to let soft information im-
prove their credit assessment, as the transfer of those data would occur over a short distance.
Such small lenders are especially benecial for small rms, which are less able to provide hard
information and therefore depend more on soft information. Additionally, those small lenders
often can rely on knowledge of the local market area (Stiroh 2004). Furthermore, with higher
monitoring costs being charged in form of higher loan rates, and the necessary intense monitor-
ing, small rms do not have access to more distant nancial centers and are therefore dependent
on local operating lenders (Alessandrini and Zazzaro 1999, p. 75).
Berger and Black 2011 nd that lending to small rms including the use of collateral or scorings
seems to replace also the importance of soft information, whereas soft information still is rele-
vant for larger enterprises. Furthermore, established rms might be forced to oer collateral to
a lower extend, as they had time to build up reputation (Harho and Körting 1998, p. 1336).
Scorings and additional securities23 of the borrower thus can be seen as a way to overcome the
tion(scoring) might lead to riskier lending. Ahnert et al. 2005 propose that soft information related to large rms
can be used to detect (nancial) problems before a crisis would be notied in quantitative ratios. For instance,
soft information could have an increased value between two dates of publication of new quantied facts.
22Note, however, that a mere use of soft facts in lending is not possible from a regulatory point of view (KWG
 18 (1) and CRR, Art. 179 (1a)).
23Berger and Black 2011, p. 727 argue that lending under the use of collateral has a higher eciency than
lending e.g. solely on a basis of quantitative nancial information, as banks, whose loan agreement includes a
declaration of a xed asset as collateral, have a higher probability of receiving some kind of repayment in case of
the borrower's bankruptcy.
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informational disparity between large banks and small opaque rms (s. Berger and Deyoung
2006).
Brevoort and Wolken 2009 nd distance between rm and bank to be on average closer when
the bank provides asset or nancial management services rather than loans and that loans were
rather operated in person when there was no/less valuable asset the lender could rely on in case
of default. Their analysis of the NSSBFs of 1993/1998/2003 has a similar result: of all services
oered by nancial institutions, banks and rms have by far the highest median distances when
it comes to 'leases'. This supports the nding of the aforementioned decrease of importance of
distance in the presence of scorings or collateral.
For those reasons, the eect of rm size on the loan rate in the context of borrower-lender-distance
is hard to determine, as its impact on the loan rate not only seems to depend on distance, but
as well on the loan pricing policy and lending technique employed by the lending bank.
4.3 Data
The data used was obtained from Bureau van Dijk's enterprise database Amadeus, Bisnode's
Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank für Hochschulen, the INKAR database of the German Federal
Institute for Research on Building, Urban Aairs and Spatial Development (BBSR) and coordi-
nates of zip code areas are obtained from the OpenGeoDB-project. Data on bank branch loca-
tions was obtained from Gelbe Seiten, a German provider of telephone directories. As Amadeus
only provides the names of the aliated banks but neither balance sheet data nor their (postal)
address, those data have to be looked up in the Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank für Hochschulen
providing information on employees and turnover for banks' head oces. The addresses, streets
and postal-codes (ZIP-Code) of the banks' head oces and branches are provided by Gelbe
Seiten. Amadeus contains nancial and accounting information on European enterprises as well
as the names of the banks the enterprise is aliated with in 2014 as well as their locations. As
information on the nature of the relationship is not provided, i.e. it is not known whether the
enterprise is a borrower or depositor of the bank.24 To cope with the problem of unknown type
of banking relationship and to restrict the investigation to relationship lending, only data of Ger-
man enterprises having an exclusive bank-relationship is used. First, using only data on German
nancially indebted enterprises with complete data for 2013 and 2014 reduces the initial sam-
24E.g. Shikimi 2005, using similar data, assumes the loan interest rates to be equal among banks and each rm
to have established a lending relationship with the banks named, which possibly assigns lending relationships to
deposit or other relationships.
4.3. DATA 83
Figure 4.1: Firm and bank locations
Geographical representation of rms (yellow triangles) and bank branches (blue dots)





Figure 4.2: Dierences between German countries. w.r.t. interest rates and borrower-lender-
distances
Lighter areas indicate lower values. Shape data provided by the German Federal Agency for Cartography
and Geodesy
ple size of about 90,000 rms to about 8,200 observations. Selecting nancially indebted rms
with exclusive banking relationships, where data on banks could be matched with the data of
the Hoppenstedt database yielded 2,185 single bank-rm-relationships. Matching the ZIP-Codes
with the decimal degrees obtained from the OpenGeoDB-project, borrowerlender-distances were
calculated. Hence, borrower-lender-distance is measured as actual distance between the bank's
branch, the rm is aliated to, and rm's headquarter-location. Assuming banks' headquarters
to be the relevant point for calculating borrower-lender-distance does not seem reasonable, as
results would probably be biased by nation-wide operating banks, yielding a large variety of dis-
tances. The distances were calculated as euclidean distances in kilometers using decimal degrees
(Distance). Note, that the total number of banks' addresses does equal neither the number of
rms nor the number of banks that are aliated to a enterprise but is 22,932. Therefore, the
quantities of the locations in Figure 4.1 dier. The resulting dataset is unique, as most analyses
of bank-rm relationships using German data do not have information on rm-level bank rela-
tions or locations. Furthermore, research until now has not considered the use of data describing
rms' locations in order to assess their probabilities to conduct relationship banking. Thus, until
now, an important aspect possibly contributing to banking relationships and loan pricing has
been neglected so far.
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4.4 Empirical analysis
4.4.1 Variables and descriptive statistics
Before turning to the econometric analyses, I give a description of the employed variables as well
as summary statistics in table 4.1.
Amadeus provides data on total interest payments on loans and data on rms' long and short-
term nancial debt. To infer the eects of geographical distance on the costs rms are charged
by banks for loans, rms' total interest payments on loans are set into relation with the sum
of short and long-term loans to calculate an average interest rate over all loans a rm owes to
its bank (s. also Shikimi 2005). To avoid impact of few extreme outliers, the resulting variable
Interest rate was winsorized at the 95% level. The resulting vector contains rms with average
interest rates of close to zero and 14.35%, whereas the mean interest rate is about 7.5% in the
full sample as well as in the subsample containing only rms engaged in relationship lending.
Instead of using the actual distance measured in kilometers, the natural logarithm of 1+ borrower-
lender-distance is used to grasp operational distance. The logarithmic trend is employed, as one
unit of additional distance should matter more when the distance has not reached a high level
(s. eg. Felici and Pagnini 2008, p. 508). The number of bank branches within a circumference
of 25 km from the rms' location could indicate higher banking competition in the surrounding
of the rm. Lower interest rates due to competition induced higher eciency of banks could be
inferred by this variable (s. Chen et al. 2001, p. 14, Conrad et al. 2014, p. 559). Logarithmized
total assets (in thsd. e) not only controls for more available hard information on the rm (s.a.
Berger et al. 2005, p. 243, Illueca et al. 2014, p. 1228), thus including its ability of transaction
banking, but also indicates its need of external nancing sources. Large rms on average have
more locations and a higher need for varying services and higher loan amounts. The sample has
a high variation with total assets ranging between about 0.25 mio. e up to 351.247 mio. e,
with the maximum of total assets being considerably smaller in the subsample of exclusive bank
relationship rms.
Instead of the size of the bank as proxy for lending technology, the employees of the bank are
set in relation to the bank's turnover (in bio. e) to control for personnel intensity of the bank
(personnel). As soft information has to be processed personally, banks relying on relationship
lending need c.p. more personnel as they do for more intense monitoring, too. The share of
tangible xed assets to total assets in 2013 describes rms' ability to assign collateral to loans. A
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Min Mean Max SD n
Average Interest Rate 0 0.0734 0.1435 0.0449 8,202
Average Interest Rate (RB only) 0 0.0766 0.1435 0.0459 2,185
log(1 + distance) 0 2.635 8.788 1.8592 2,185
long term loans
all loans 0 0.7007 1 0.3443 8,202
Financial liabilities
Total liabilities 0 0.3863 0.9968 0.2766 8,202
Ncomm -392.8 2.35 76.9 46.5916 8,202
Banks25 0 266 829 189.9704 8,202
Turnover in thsd. e
Employees 1.39 721.85 69142.42 2602.454 8,202
Tangible fixed assets
1+fixed assets 0 0.7692 1 0.2901 8,202
Provisions2013
Total Assets2013
0 0.1199 0.9649 0.1186 8,202
log(Total Assets) 5.584 10.747 19.677 1.5436 8,202
Solvency Ratio2013 -15.82 37.11 98.22 22.5755 8,202
log(Age) 0.6931 2.9526 29.9336 1.399 2,185
personnel 0 0.0116 0.0901 0.0078 2,185
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of sample and subsample
higher share of tangibles in total assets thus should increase rms' ability to conduct transaction
based banking on the one hand, but also decrease rms' overall interest rates due to lower risk
premia banks will demand. For similar reasons, the solvency ratio (in %) of the preceding year is
included to describe rms' endowment with equity. The provisions relative to total assets in 2013
might explain loan rates in the investigated period, as banks might consult last year's results to
estimate the future development of the rm. Turnover per employee describes rms' personnel
eciency.
Firm age is logarithmized, as the advantages of rm age w.r.t. lower information asymmetry
between borrower and lender decline with increasing age of the rm (Jackson and Thomas 1995,
p. 342). Firm age on the one hand is regarded as a proxy variable for the duration of the rm
bank relationship (s. Berger et al. 2014, Berger et al. 2015). On the other hand, it can be
employed to control for hold-up costs, as elder rms are unlikely to maintain only one banking
relationship except when there is either no rm growth and/or hold-up costs. Net commuters
NComm should to grasp the centrality of rms' locations,25 with the dierence between incoming
and outgoing workers related to all employees at a location and multiplied with 100.
The relation of long-term loans to all loans indicates the maturity of debt. Therefore, it could
indicate either rms' likelihood to form close banking relationships or the impact of nancial
debts' term structure on interests paid. As especially (German) small rms depend on long-term
loans, there could be dierent eects of a higher share of long-term debt on behalf of the bank
25NComm is dened by the BBSR as incoming−outgoing
all local employees
× 100
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(Agarwal and Hauswald 2010, p. 2), (Prantl et al. 2008, 4f). There could be a higher ability
of gathering rm specic information on the one hand and higher risk of the loan on the other
hand.
Finally, nancial liabilities (i.e. the sum of long and short term nancial debt) in relation to all
liabilities could assess rms' dependency on external bank based nance, similar to the measure
used in Ongena et al. 2012, p. 835. Note, that the variable is not set in relation to rms' equity
or total assets, to avoid gauging rms' indebtedness twice, as it is already grasped by solvency
ratio.
As can be seen from gure 4.2a, borrower-lender-distance in the sample is on average higher
in the federal states of (north)east Germany, which can possibly be explained by lower bank
branch density in those areas (s. gure 4.1). Thus, the coincidence of lower loan rates and
higher borrower-lender-distances, as suggested by gure 4.2, might stem from those dierences
and varying regional economic performance. This graphical insight might not point to a negative
relationship between distance and loan rate per se, but rather to some relationship due to local
economic conditions impacting both variables. Therefore, dummy variables for German regions
will be included in the subsequent analysis, where an impact on the coecient of Banks25 is
expected.
As can be gauged from table 4.1, there is a high degree of heterogeneity among rms. K-
Means cluster analyses most frequently revealed clusters of outliers and additionally did not
yield valuable insights regarding bank-rm-distance or interest rate payments.26
4.4.2 Econometric analysis
At a rst stage, one must control for the potential sample selection biases which might arise
when only rms with exclusive banking relationships are regarded. E.g., Petersen and Rajan
2002, p. 2540 and Berger et al. 2005, p. 254 nd empirical evidence that spatial distance between
borrowing rms and their lenders increases when the enterprise does not have deposits at their
lending bank, possibly because of the resulting less frequent transactions between bank and bor-
rower. Thus, due to arising endogeneity concerns, a Heckman two-stage procedure is employed,
where the rst stage is a probit estimation on whether rms engage in relationship banking. As
the application of relationship banking cannot be observed directly, I follow Berger and Black
2011 and use the exclusiveness of the banking relationship as proxy. This furthermore suits the
26According to several criteria, the optimal number of clusters in most cases, varying rm level variables, was
three, with the cluster sizes pointing to outlier clusters and a separation between large rms and SMEs.
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problem of unknown banking relation type mentioned above. The following OLS estimation tries
to capture the determinants of the average interest rate on rm's nancial debt in relationship
banking, where special attention is paid to the eects of the included distance variable.
As the variables employed in selection and outcome equation dier, error terms were checked
separately for correlations with the right hand side variables and no correlation could be de-
tected. Logarithmized total assets and rms' dependency on bank-based nance were used in
the selection equation as exclusionary variable, as those variables might rather aect the choice
on relationship versus transaction banking directly than on interest rates. Large rms might
rely on more banking relations in order to satisfy their need for external funding ( s. Cosci
and Meliciani 2002, Neuberger et al. 2008, p. 103). Furthermore, it is commonly assumed that
small rms strongly depend on soft information and thus have a higher incentive to form a close
relationship with their lender (Jiménez et al. 2009, p. 237).
As small rms are expected to have on average more concentrated borrowing (s. Harho and
Körting 1998, p. 1331), a signicant negative impact of the variable on the probability of exclusive
banking relationships is expected. As can be seen from table 4.2, the coecient of the Inverse
Mill's Ratio is signicant in both estimations, indicating the presence of sample selectivity bias.
Before turning to other coecients, the results on borrower-lender-distance in the outcome equa-
tion are discussed. In both estimations, the coecients prove to be positive, of similar magnitude
and highly signicant. If borrower-lender-distance increases by one percentage, rms have to pay
on average c.p. 0.22 bp (0.2 bp) higher interest rates. The result thus is in line with the ndings
of Bellucci et al. 2013 and Knyazeva and Knyazeva 2012, indicating that German rms engaged
in relationship lending have to bear higher costs of screening and monitoring. Thus, there is no
evidence for banks' use or relevance of local market power as found by Agarwal and Hauswald
2010, using US-data.
A conrming result can be found in the outcome equation of estimation (2), where the signicant
negative coecient on bank's personnel intensity indicates lower interest rates if information can
be processed more from person to person. Yet, as this coecient is not signicant in estimation
(1) and, due to missing additional information, those results must be interpreted with care.
The number of bank branches in a 25 km circumference increases rms' probability of engaging
in relationship banking, which contradicts expectations at a rst glance.27 One would assume
to increase matching probabilities between rms and banks with more banking branches in the
27Following Degryse et al. 2009, distance of competing banks is not interacted with their size as the latter does
have little explanatory power on the lending technique used by the bank.
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Table 4.2: Estimation results of Heckman-2-stage models
Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. Due to heteroscedasticity problems in outcome estimations,
robust standard errors were used. Levels of signicance are indicated by *** (99%), ** (95%) and * (90%).
(1) (2)
Selection Outcome Selection Outcome
Intercept -0.4495∗∗∗ 0.43403∗∗∗ 0.4071∗ 0.119∗∗∗








∗∗∗ -0.000119∗∗∗ 0.000276∗∗∗ -0.000022∗∗





log (Distance) 0.002197∗∗∗ 0.002242∗∗∗
(0.000468) (0.000484)
Turnover
Employees 0.000003 -0.000001*** 0.000005 0*
(0.000006) (0) (0.000006) (0)
Long term loans
All loans 0.3626*** -0.080852*** 0.2625*** -0.024612***
(0.04556) (0.004868) (0.04835) (0.003152)
Tangible fixed assets
1+Fixed assets -0.1755*** 0.009499** -0.1072* -0.011797***
(0.05358) (0.003703) (0.05684) (0.003247)
Provisions2013
Total assets2013
0.2393* 0.061146*** 0.147 0.10943***
(0.145) (0.008527) (0.1506) (0.00736)
log (Total assets) -0.0344*** -0.05289***
(0.0101) (0.01077)
Solvency Ratio2013 -0.00238*** 0.000486*** -0.003663*** 0.000288***
(0.000703) (0.000051) (0.000755) (0.000048)
personnel 0.13195 0.005734
(0.10854) (0.10636)
log (Age) 0.001729*** 0.001369**
(0.000645) (0.000579)
Inverse Mill′s Ratio -0.25352∗∗∗ -0.063838∗∗∗
(0.017543) (0.007707)
Industry dummies - - 18 18
n (total) 8,202 8,202
censored obs. 6,017 6,017
adj.R2 0.2882 0.2654
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vicinity of the rm. The result might in part stem from location of rms and banks: With banks'
headquarters located in Central Places, providing quantitative and qualitative above average ser-
vices to rms, there might be a lower necessity to engage in multiple banking relationships.
Additionally, as distance in lending relationships might matter, due to lower distances (Petersen
and Rajan 2002) rms located in urban environments might have an advantage in relationship
lending, including the transfer of qualitative or non-codiable information. As banks have higher
incentives to build up long lasting relationships with their borrowers in competitive markets, the
result could indeed indicate a higher prevalence of relationship lending in urban environments.
This is also indicated by the coecient of the dummy variable for rms located in large cities
(COM1), which is even larger in magnitude than its rural counterpart (COM5), indicating a
c.p. smaller probability for rms located in small rural communities to engage in relationship
lending compared to urban enterprises. The higher likelihood of rural rms to keep close ties
with their lending bank as exclusive banking relationship might stem from lower availability of
dierent banking services in such locations or dierent characteristics of rms in rural areas,
such as smaller sizes, higher opacity or higher volatility.
Furthermore, banks in rural environments could have advantages in operating in a 'familiar'
environment and have better connections to their borrowers as well as to the local economy
(Deyoung et al. 2012).
In unreported additional regressions, dummy variables for the community types between COM1
and COM5 were included in the probit estimation with varying specications of the equation.
All of them proved to be signicant and negative. Thus, there seems to be some quadratic im-
pact of the community type on a rm's probability to engage in relationship lending. Similar
to COM1, locations with higher net commuters, indicating higher centrality within interaction
with other locations, have a higher probability to dedicate themselves to one bank. Overall, the
results of the locational variables in the selection equation are highly statistically and econom-
ically signicant, thus pointing to the relevance of considering enterprises' environment when
investigating its choice of external funding. The negative coecient of Banks25 in the outcome
equation might reect lower interest rates due to higher banking competition within an area (s.
e.g. Degryse and Ongena 2004, p. 577) and a resulting higher cost eciency in assigning loans.
An increase of one banking branch in the rm's vicinity lowers rms' interest rate on average
c.p. by 0.0119% (0.0034%). As the number of bank branches in a 25km circumference of the
rm is up to 829, a distinct impact of banking competition on loan rates must be considered.
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The result thus is in line with the ndings of Degryse et al. 2009; Bellucci et al. 2013, that
banks demand higher loan rates when rms are located in their proximity and competing banks
are relatively distant from the rm. This result at a rst glance contradicts the visual evidence
of Figure 4.2, but must be interpreted under the consideration of absolute rm location. The
regional dummy variables indicate rms' locations in southwest Germany (Baden-Württemberg,
Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse, and Saarland), in one of the states of the former GDR (including
Berlin) and northwest of Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Bremen, Hamburg,
and Schleswig-Holstein).28 The mode of separating the federal states as stated above is moti-
vated by the pattern shown in gure 4.2, yielding an on average 0.6% higher average rate in
southwestern Germany and 0.9% lower average interest rate in eastern Germany, relative to
Bavaria (i.e. southeastern Germany). The eects of rms' absolute location w.r.t. region seem
to be oset by including the variable on banking competition. Excluding either the former or
the regional dummy variables, results in insignicant coecients for the dummy variables or
a weaker impact of banking competition. Therefore, the graphical evidence and econometric
results can be reconciled. In line with theoretical expectations, rm size has a negative impact
on the probability of engaging in relationship banking with an average marginal eect of -1,12%
in estimation (1) (-1,69 % in estimation (2)). This is in line with theoretical expectations and
empirical ndings of other studies (s. Farinha and Santos 2002, Neuberger et al. 2006, Neu-
berger et al. 2008, Ongena and Smith 2000). The share of rms' nancial debt was included
in the selection equation. A higher dependency of rms on nancial debt could decrease the
probability of single bank lending, due to a higher potential for credit crunches and transfer of
nancial problems of the bank to the rm (Detragiache et al. 2000). As banks with a high share
of loans are prone to such problems, the negative coecient in both estimations is in line with
theoretical predictions. The term structure of nancial debt has an expected positive impact on
the probability of relationship lending, whereas a negative impact on interest rates is observed,
contradicting a normal term structure of interest rates. The result might arise because of closer
ties in exclusive banking relationships, or as long-term debt usually is used to nance assets
that can be used as collateral in case of default. Furthermore, banks can reduce average costs
of screening when nancing multiple or long-term projects of (opaque) rms (Cenni et al. 2015,
p. 251), thus on average decreasing interest rates for long term borrowers.
28To test for the application of spatial error models, Moran's-I-Tests with varying k-nearest-neighbor matrices
were conducted, which clearly failed to reject the null of no spatial correlation. Spatial autoregressive or spatial
expansion models furthermore were not considered, as the sample selection might have led to geographical biases.
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The share of rms' tangible xed assets has, as expected, a negative impact on the probability
of relationship lending similar to Knyazeva and Knyazeva 2012, p. 1200. Firms having a higher
share of realizable assets that can be employed as securities are rather able to engage in transac-
tion based banking. Furthermore, rms with a higher share of tangible assets could rather be in
need of credit (Cenni, et al., 2015). With the coecients in the outcome equations contradict-
ing, the eect on interest rates is not clear. With exclusive banking relationships, subordination
problems in case of default are not reected in the coecient, as liquid collateral might be of a
higher relevance in exclusive banking relationships, with deposits and securities of rms stored
by the lender.
While the eect of rms' provisions of the preceding year is not stable in the selection equation
and hardly or not signicant, its eect on interest rates is positive as expected. A higher solvency
ratio decreases rms' probability to engage in relationship lending, possibly because rms with
higher endowment of equity are able to conduct transaction based banking. Although one would
expect rms with higher solvency to be charged on average lower interest rates, higher solvency
ratios in the preceding year increase interest rates on average in both outcome equations. Firm
age has a positive impact on average interest rates paid. This contradicts a higher transparency
due to longer rm history and higher probability to survive. Contrarily, with the sample in the
outcome equation consisting out of rms with single bank relationships, the coecient might
rather reect hold-up costs arising for elder rms, which remain with only one banking relation-
ship. To control for bank-type specic loan rate policies, dummy variables were included for
savings, cooperative and state-level central banks. The dummy variables indicate that savings
and cooperative banks charge on average lower loan rates than commercial banks. The results
on the dummy variables must be handled with care; as commercial and savings bank branches
certainly are more ubiquitous than commercial bank branches, lower distances must be expected
per se when the lender belongs to one of the former bank types. Therefore, lower loan rates also
might not only stem from the bank type itself, but also from higher borrower-lender-proximity.
4.5 Conclusions
With many rms keeping close ties with their banks, relationship banking has a high relevance for
external funding of German rms. Analyses investigating its impact on lending come to dierent
results, depending on the employed method of research as well as on the investigated international
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rm location (e.g. Ongena et al. 2012, Farinha and Santos 2002, Neuberger et al. 2008, Bolton
and Scharfstein 1996, Guiso and Minetti 2010). As technical progress modies methods of
communication and collecting information, the proclaimed `death of distance' in lending seems
to be more immanent (e.g. Petersen and Rajan 2002, p. 2537). Furthermore, the use of credit
scoring models weakened the importance of soft information and so average distances were able
to grow (Berger et al. 2015). Yet, as there is non-codiable information or information that
cannot be transferred or quantied, spatial proximity to asses a borrower's economic situation
could further play a major role in lending (s. Agarwal and Hauswald 2010). Therefore, as SMEs
make up a large portion of German rms, the impact of distance in relationship lending still has
a high economic relevance.
Using a dataset, that allows for the rst time to measure spatial borrower-lender-distance for
German rms, there is evidence that higher costs of screening and monitoring due to higher
distance have to be borne by borrowers. Thus, banks do not seem to have or at least exert local
market power, i.e. pricing loans of nearby borrowers dierently. Higher banking competition has
a negative impact on interest rates, possibly indicating higher eciency in competitive banking
markets. Further research should focus on the question whether the distance related costs arise
due to higher transportation costs of surveillance of opaque rms or because of risk premia for
distant rms.
Another result are the locational eects of rm location on its probability to engage in relationship
lending. There is strong evidence for quadratic relationship between location types and the
likelihood to commit oneself to a single bank. With bank branch density varying widely, this in
turn might result in c.p. higher loan costs due to rms' location. Thus, banks' interest pricing
policies w.r.t. distance and competition might aect the overall spatial location of economic
activity in Germany. Especially the importance of small local lenders for SMEs, as discussed in
section two, and the disappearance of the former in rural areas might reinforce spatial economic
growth patterns.
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Chapter 5
Real estate markets and lending: Does
growth fuel risk?
29
29The author gratefully acknowledges nancial support by Wissenschaftsförderung der Sparkassen- Finanz-
gruppe e.V. and free provision of real estate data by empirica AG.
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5.1 Introduction
Investments in real estate and real estate markets have gained increased interest in the wake of
the nancial crisis, although progresses in real estate markets were a major driver of the latter.
Afterwards, especially in Europe because of the European sovereign debt crisis, the constant low-
ering of interest rates has put real estate investments, considered as `safe', into a focus. This has
increased real estate prices also in Germany, especially in a number of German cities (Siemsen
and Vilsmeier 2017, p. 3).
Banking and real estate price growth have a strong common relationship. Because of their high
prices compared to other assets, their ubiquity, and their high relevance for living and produc-
tion, real estate markets cannot work without proper loan markets. At its most negative, this
relationship can lead to assigning more loans to riskier borrowers, which increases house prices,
before massive defaults result in credit rationing, decreasing house prices strongly.
As empirically evidenced, lending decisions are often made under the consideration of collateral
and as real estate crises often precede banking crises, collateral-based lending is susceptible for
banking crises (Niinimäki 2009, p. 515). Hence, research has overwhelmingly considered real
estate to have two major functions in lending: Serving as collateral and/or being the object
ultimately nanced by the assigned loan. While the direction of the causality between the in-
uence of credit assignment/loan volumes and real estate prices has been questioned in several
publications (e.g. Cvijanovic 2014, p. 2704, Gerlach and Peng 2005), micro-evidence on real
estate's impact on risk taking in lending has been scarce.
The topic is highly relevant, as real estate is the most commonly used collateral device in lending.
(Niinimäki 2009, p. 515) and demanded collateral has a strong impact on borrowers' behavior
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, 393f). Empirical research has shown that contrarily, low risk borrowers
oer collateral, which can be explained by private information not known to the lender (Berger
and Udell 1990, p. 21).
In fact, pledging more collateral could be used as signal for lower borrower risk (Agarwal et al.
2015, p. 637), while demanding it can be an indicator for `lazy banks' in the spirit of Manove
et al. 2001. Collateral thus has a high potential of making banks issue loans to risky borrowers:
On the one hand, banks assume collateral pledging borrowers to be less risky per se, on the other
hand they might exert less monitoring eort when loans are secured.
When loans are collateralized with real estate, banks could avoid losses when property prices
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rise. But if they drop on the other hand, loan losses are more severe with recovery decreasing
(Niinimäki 2009, p. 514). Less capital held by banks which are heavily engaged in real estate
business (Blasko and Sinkey 2006) could reinforce arising problems. Furthermore, borrowers
whose loans were overcollateralized in the beginning could have an incentive to default, if the
price of the real estate drops below the credit amount outstanding (Herring and Wachter 1999,
p. 22).
Additionally, beyond serving as collateral, banks can be suborned to use current or past real
estate prices as indicators for current and future economic development or future real estate
prices. Banks expecting high price growth rates of real estate in a near future might be willing
to accept more risky borrowers whose loans are secured with real estate.
Combining both of these arguments, banks could expect increasing real estate values when ob-
serving current prices. Therefore, they might be willing to lend to risky borrowers while expecting
them to be wealthier in future, decreasing their default risk and their loss given default.
These issues could even be more pronounced for banks that are regionally constrained and de-
pend on the economic well-being of their surrounding business area. If banks additionally face
limitations of their investment policies, an even stronger dependency on real estate price devel-
opment could result. As this is the case for German savings banks, who are heavily engaged in
real estate related lending (s. gure 5.1), their chance to exhibit some interrelation of their risk
taking on local real estate prices is high and the consequences of that could be severe.
Analyzing aggregate and micro level data of German savings banks, I do not nd that savings
banks' loan portfolio risk is robustly driven by real estate price growth or expectations on real
estate prices. Results rather suggest that savings banks' loan portfolio risk is aected by overall
regional and national economic environment. Thus, there is rather a direct link between loan
portfolio and local economy than an indirect channel via housing prices.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section two, I review literature on the topic and outline the
hypotheses tested. Here, we dierentiate between potential eects of real estate price growth on
lending and risk taking behavior of banks. Data are introduced in section three. Additionally,
characteristics of German savings banks are discussed. Section four presents the results of the
empirical investigation, which is split into a short analysis on aggregate causal eects between
real estate and lending and a second part analyzing the impact of real estate on the risk of
banks' loan portfolio. In the latter part, I analyze micro data from German savings banks using
dynamic panel data methods. Section ve concludes.
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Figure 5.1: Shares of housing loans made to German rms and households across bank types
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank.
5.2 Theory
The heavy interdependence of real estate price growth and lending can complicate rst of all the
determination of causality between real estate price growth, loan growth, and loan risk. There-
fore, we attempt to disentangle the eects between bank risk taking and real estate price growth
and nd four major possibilities for how the latter aect lending behavior.
First, as already pointed out, growth in real estate prices might increase loan volumes: On the
one hand, higher house prices require higher loan nominal and real estate owners' properties
increase in value, thus enabling them to obtain higher loan amounts on the other hand.
Second, high real estate prices might additionally reduce banks' monitoring eort and perceived
riskiness of a loan when a property is used as collateral. Collateral can oer insights into bor-
rowers' risk; e.g. Bester 1985, p. 854 argues that borrowers with high risk prefer loans with low
collateral requirements and therefore are willing to accept higher loan rates. Thus, real estate,
which per se reduces risk compared to uncollateralized loans, can act as a signal for high quality
borrowers. This is where the separation between ex ante and ex post risk (s. Berger and Udell
1990) comes into, with the former describing loan's risk conditional on the information at un-
derwriting and the latter the realized risk of the loan.
Third, the possibility to realize securities reduces agency costs and information asymmetries and
alleviates funding of borrowers (Cvijanovic 2014, p. 2696), thus higher collateral values reduce
losses given default (LGD), i.e. ex post risk. Anticipating lower LGDs, lenders could be induced
to lend to riskier borrowers, which leads to on average ex ante constant risk but ex post higher
risk.
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Fourth, this risk forecast is based on expectations on real estate price growth. Real estate prices
are directly observable, which is not the case for several measures of economic performance such
as GDP or gures on unemployment. Therefore, banks might base their expectations on future
economic and real estate price growth on current and past property prices. Suspecting economic
growth, banks might be willing to assign risky loans as they can expect borrowers' solvency on
average to increase. If banks conclude from recent to future property price growth, they might
expect real estate prices to rise in future, even decreasing expected losses given defaults. There-
fore, there might even be a higher increase in risky lending and, if gambling was too strong, there
should be a large gap between ex post and ex ante risk measures.
5.2.1 Real estate prices, loan volumes, and causality
As Gerlach and Peng 2005, 461f point out, the relationship between loans and real estate can
have several dimensions. Real estate can serve as collateral in loan demand; higher housing prices
thus could enable borrowers to apply for higher credit. In fact, a number of studies nds that
nancially constrained rms increase their borrowing when the value of their securities increases,
i.e. lending volume and covenants can vary with the value of the underlying collateral (Agarwal
et al. 2015, p. 637, Cvijanovic 2014, 2705f; s.a. Dougal et al. 2015, p. 167). Cvijanovic 2014 nds
that it is not only rms' debt which is increasing with real estate prices, but also the composition
of debt changes with rms switching to more long term debt. Cvijanovic 2014, 2694f proposes
that on the one hand the costs of external capital for rms decrease and the ability to engage in
long term borrowing increases as the liquidation value of collateral augments, because the costs
of realization decline. On the other hand, with the liquidiation value of securities increasing, the
collateralized part of rms' debt increases as well.
Furthermore, banks' own real estate assets increase in value as well as charge-os on loans could
decrease with increasing property prices (s. a. Herring and Wachter 1999, p. 12). Leaving other
aspects constant, this increases a bank's wealth and thus its possibilities of extending credit.
Contrarily, lower credit constraints could fuel demand for mortgage or other real estate related
loans.
This is reinforced by existing contracts: Prots for borrowers will be generated if real estate
prices increase, enabling them to repay their loans (Zhang et al. 2018, 1388f). Banks who try to
have a constant level of risk taking will therefore incorporate these new abilities of repayment
and increase either loan volumes and/or the number of loans.
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Empirical evidence is rather in favor of real estate prices aecting lending than the other way
round:
E.g., according to Gerlach and Peng 2005, p. 463, banks increased their mortgage lending in
Hong Kong after increased competition due to deregulation of the banking industry. In turn,
banks were struck harder by sinking property prices. Results point to an impact of property
prices on lending volumes. Gerlach and Peng 2005, p. 473 nd a long-term equilibrium between
real estate prices and lending. Furthermore, the authors nd evidence that extended lending
does not have an impact on property prices, but the causality ran the other way round in Hong
Kong. Feedback eects were mitigated when lending was restricted.
Contrarily, Favara and Imbs 2015 nd that banking branch deregulation led to a higher number
and higher amounts of loans which caused real estate prices to rise.
Landvoigt 2017 nds that if it becomes easier for households to increase their leverage than to
adapt their housing demand, households will increase their leverage if real estate prices have
increased. Cvijanovic 2014, p. 2724 does not nd evidence that real estate prices increase due to
more demand for credit by large rms.
Defusco 2018 suggests that households will try to smooth their consumption if the values of their
homes increase, thus allowing them to post more collateral (s. a. Koetter and Poghosyan 2010).
Applying these arguments and the results of previous studies on a local level suggests that:
H1: Savings banks' loan volumes grow with local real estate prices
Yet, banks might be suspicious, assuming that property price increases are deviations from fun-
damental values. As a result of such deviations, risky borrowers cannot be distinguished from
good borrowers, such that loan loss provisions can hardly be correctly determined.
The extension of credit might only take place when there is an increase of real estate prices
and a simultaneous reduction of risks (instead of maintaining a constant risk level) (Koetter and
Poghosyan 2010, p. 1130). Considering this, they might refrain from extending loans or increase
eort in monitoring with the latter decreasing the quantity of loans due to xed input factors
in the short term. As borrowers will apply for loans due to higher house prices or to invest,
banks must check more applications and it might be more tedious for them to distinguish `good'
borrowers from speculative and/or risky borrowers. This is especially true as property prices
during high demand phases have a tendency to overestimate collateral values due to bargaining
power eects: real estate buyers are willing to pay a price above the value of the property if their
utility is higher than the price (Bian and Liu 2018). Yet, a quick adjustment to fundamental
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values is not as simple in real estate markets as investors mostly do not have the possibility of
going short. Thus, real estate markets are rather driven by optimists (Herring and Wachter 1999,
p. 65).
The impact of a strong `correction' of house prices in the sense of a drop can have huge eects for
the German nancial sector, as analyzed by Siemsen and Vilsmeier 2017: A drop of house prices
can lead to losses of several billion Euros, considering only less signicant institutes, which are
susceptible to house price movements. Similarly, Koetter and Poghosyan 2010 nd that banks
located in areas with high deviations of house prices from their fundamental value have a higher
probability of being distressed.But as savings banks have a strong knowledge of local markets,
they are likely to recognize exaggerated prices and thus reject more loan applications in which
collateral is oered.
Following Inderst and Mueller 2006 and assuming savings banks to be local lenders, they are likely
to demand higher collateral and lower interest rates for loans than transaction based lenders.
Thus, real estate markets have an even higher relevance for those institutions.30 The dependency
of savings banks on local real estate markets can increase banks' risks additionally as loans to
the real estate and construction sector must be considered riskier than industrial loans (Salas
and Saurina 2002, p. 210). As disaster myopia is often shared by banks because of herding eects
(Herring and Wachter 1999, p. 16), savings banks might be especially susceptible for encounter-
ing problems rooted in exuberance as they cooperate within an coordinated group.
To detect some exuberance of real estate prices that could threaten nancial stability, the de-
viation from real estates' fundamental value, determined by per capita income and population
growth could be considered rather than observed prices as in Koetter and Poghosyan 2010. De-
viations from fundamental values could thus be easier to notify in smaller entities where this
information is rather observable on a population than a sample level. As a consequence of per-
ceived deviations from fundamental values, screening processes are prolonged, thus:
H2: If house price increases are not fundamentally driven, banks will decrease their lending.
Considerations must also be made about the nature of the deviation: one possibility is that the
deviation is the expected increase of real estate prices due to a change of a factor determining
the fundamental value. This expectation on factors in the future might then be too high and
represent exuberance.
30The nding of Christians and Gärtner 2014 that savings banks in rural areas demand higher collateral from
their borrowers, could conrm theoretical predictions of Inderst and Mueller 2006.
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5.2.2 Ex ante risk: Economic expectations, oering collateral, and monitor-
ing eort
Loan's risk when granting it is termed ex ante risk, which is mostly determined by bank's esti-
mates of the borrower's risk properties and the conditions of the loan. We argue that real estate
prices have an impact on these estimates of borrower's risk by economic expectations gained from
property price changes and by the willingness to accept property as collateral and substituting
monitoring.
Expectations on the future economic condition of a household represent a highly important part
of the estimation of a loan's risk. Gerlach and Peng 2005, p. 475 empirically nd that prop-
erty price growth can be described by past prices, current changes of unemployment rates and
the construction of new housing two periods before. Following these results, real estate price
increases might include other economic factors, which are not or hardly observable. Thus, prop-
erty prices could be used as indicators for overall economic growth.
A theoretical outline of the eects of increased income on real estate prices and lending can
be found in Hott 2011: In his model, banks grant mortgage loans to households, who demand
housing and consumption. In a rst expansion, banks can be optimistic or pessimistic about the
equity of a household, consisting of the house value and their dierent incomes. Banks' mood
depends on realized earning in earlier periods. Positive shocks increase households' incomes,
decrease defaults and increase banks' prots, thus rendering the latter more optimistic. This
optimism has positive eects on real estate prices and as real estate constitutes a part of house-
hold wealth, defaults decrease and the process starts over. A strong increase in house prices
with resulting smaller growth rates reduces banks' optimism, default rates increase (households
lose part of their wealth) and banks' losses will exceed their initial gains as their exposure in the
beginning of the downswing is higher than in the onset of an upswing.
In order to keep up business during downswings, banks are supposed to build up anti-cyclical
capital stocks, i.e. put money aside in good times to be able to cope in bad times. Thus, we
should expect that loan loss provisions (LLPs) increase with GDP or real estate prices. Balasub-
ramanyan et al. 2017 on the contrary nd that US banks on average had a negative correlation
between provisions and GDP growth between 1997 and 2011. Thus, they built up too little
capital to maintain sucient risk capital in economically weaker times. Yet, there seems to be
some learning eect by banks as the authors nd a positive impact of loan demand on provisions
after the nancial crisis. Furthermore, higher interest income before nancial crisis indicates
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that loans made before the crisis were riskier. Thus, if projecting recent price growth of real
estate markets to future prices is not sustainable (Herring and Wachter 1999, p. 19), worrisome
overvaluation could be a consequence and ex ante risk should be considered higher.
Furthermore, real estate is frequently used as security. Pledging collateral enables to separate
the borrower's risk from the loan's risk: a risky borrower could obtain credit if pledging a se-
curity whose value of recourse exceeds the loan amount (Berger and Udell 1990, 21f). Yet, as
risky borrowers themselves know their lending quality, they will tend to avoid pledging collateral,
although from a lender's point of view, their collateral makes the highest dierence (s.a. Berger
and Udell 1995 who nd that collateralized loans are riskier than unsecured, with the overall risk
of the former being reduced by their collateral.). Thus, collateral is not ecient in markets with
full information (Bester 1985, p. 854).
Besanko and Thakor 1987 use a model where a bank can lend to two types of borrowers and
therefore oer two dierent (w.r.t. collateral requirement and interest rate) contracts. The type
of borrower is ex ante not known by the bank. Banks must chose the collateral requirements,
the interest rate and the probability with which they oer a contract (type one or two) to a
borrower in order to maximize its expected prots. Under imperfect information, an increase
in collateral and decrease in interest rate in a loan contract will attract borrowers of a safer
type, as it is no or a little problem for them to pledge collateral. Under additional consideration
of perfect banking competition, if collateral requirements are too low to scare risky borrowers
o, banks will decrease the probability of assigning low-risk contracts. Therefore, the risk of
rationed borrowers can vary.31. Hence, the marginal rate of substitution between interest and
collateral is higher (i.e. has a smaller absolute amount) for low risk borrowers than for risky
borrowers (Bester 1985, p. 853). In fact, Landvoigt 2017 nds that credit rationed home buyers
have stronger reactions towards a change of loan conditions.
As an alternative to demanding collateral, banks could thoroughly screen and monitor their bor-
rowers, with the latter usually being more time-consuming and costly. Considerations of Manove
et al. 2001 suggest that banks acting in perfect competition will rather use collateral in lending
than screening with the former being less costly.32 Concluding, if the collateral requirement of a
bank equals the sum of loan amount and interest, there will be no credit rationing (Bester 1985,
p. 852). The cost eciency of substituting screening with collateral is even higher for low quality
31Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, 394f dene credit rationing as situation where some borrowers do not obtain credit,
although they do not dier from other borrowers whose loan applications are approved.
32In monopolistic markets, banks will try to extract all rents from borrowers, thus rather screen them than
demand collateral
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borrowers, as screening costs the loan agent time and eort (Keys et al. 2010, 309f, 321).
Further analysis of substitution of monitoring by collateral can be found in Niinimäki 2009: In
the model, monitoring banks are risk-free, with monitoring raising equal costs per unit, and do
not incur positive earnings due to perfect competition, whereas non-monitoring banks demand
some high level of collateral to drive risky borrowers away. Each borrower is endowed with one
unit of real estate collateral before applying for credit. Collateral only has an impact on interest
rates, but not on loan amounts. The value of real estate can increase or decrease within the
period under consideration, while the bank cannot earn more than repayment and interest of
the loan33. As borrowers' wealth consists of collateralized real estate and is uctuating, banks'
return can become more volatile when relying strongly on collateral. As a consequence of perfect
competition, a monitoring bank does not achieve prots, Hence, there exists a minimum level of
collateral for which banks' prots will be zero. If this level of collateral is exceeded and require-
ments are below the level to deter risky borrowers from loan applications, banks will rather rely
on collateral value with high potential of increasing in value. Thus moral hazard in the form of
reliance on high collateral value increases and neglect of monitoring results. The moral hazard
scenario becomes even more probably with inside collateral.
Empirical evidence w.r.t. banking competition comes from Zhang et al. 2018 who nd Chinese
banks to have higher benets from real estate investment growth in more competitive locations.
In line with theoretical evidence of e.g. Besanko and Thakor 1987 and Niinimäki 2009, Agarwal
et al. 2015, p. 642 nd, interpreting upfront payments of mortgage loans as collateral, that it is
especially younger borrowers having a lower scoring and lower income who make on average lower
upfront payments. Yet, Keys et al. 2010 nd that borrowers in the US in the beginning of the
2000's whose credit score was considered as risky were screened more thoroughly which would be
an explanation why loans to borrowers with better scores have a weaker performance. A result
of an increase of property prices, the wealth of risky borrowers increases and former collateral
barriers that previously deterred the latter will hold no more. Banks might either consider risky
loans as safe due to their higher collateral or adapt their collateral requirements as a response
to increased real estate prices. Thus, ex ante risk of loans will on average decrease.
H3: Real estate price growth decreases ex ante risk
33Higher increases of the value of collateral must be conveyed to the defaulted borrower.
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5.2.3 Ex post risk: Default and realization of real estate collateral
Ex post risk of a loan portfolio can be gauged after repayment of loans and net prots of loans
can be determined. Here, the above mentioned connection between probability of default and
loss given default becomes evident: observably risky borrowers are demanded more collateral.
Therefore, higher collateral demand suggests that the probability of default increases with col-
lateralization (Inderst and Mueller 2006).
Berger and Udell 1990, 34 argue that loans that include some form of realizable collateral and
are therefore regarded as safe, could suer under risky borrowers, leading to non-performing
loans. Hence, the realized value of their securities does on average not outweigh the losses in-
curred by lending to risky borrowers, which is which is why the aforementioned separation of
borrower and loan risk does not always work out well. Berger and Udell 1990, 36f nd that
loans with xed interest rate34 and collateral had below average performance, which the authors
take as evidence that realization of the security is not sucient to remove a loan's risk. Fur-
thermore, the nding of on average higher risk premia and higher charge-os for banks holding
more collateralized loans and for real estate collateralized loans, seems to conrm that loan risk
cannot be fully covered by collateral and collateralized loans on average bear some high risk.
This might lead to even higher risk-taking by banks if ocials pose extra-regulation and controls
on collateralized loans, as banks then have an incentive to assign those loans without collateral,
rendering them even riskier than before (Berger and Udell 1990, p. 41).
Contrarily, Agarwal et al. 2015, p. 646 nd that mortgage defaults decrease with upfront pay-
ments, which can be seen as evidence for ex post low risk borrowers pledging more collateral.
Again, we should stress the prevalence of provision of collateral by highly creditworthy lenders:
As collateral commonly has a higher value for borrowers than for banks and as borrowers could
be limited in their use of the pledged asset, pledging collateral can be regarded as costly for the
borrower (Coco 2000, 192f; s.a. Agarwal et al. 2015, p. 637).
Here, a distinction must be made between outside and inside collateral, with the former including
collateral not nanced by the actual loan and the latter referencing to some investment nanced
by the loan, e.g. mortgage loans35. Thus, there are dierent costs that may arise with the use
of collateral; e.g. pledging (outside) collateral is costly for the borrower in Bester 1985, p. 851,
whereas in Besanko and Thakor 1987, p. 673 the lender incurs costs for collateral, while inside
34Variable interest rates might rather be in use for high quality borrowers, as they are able to bear changes in
rates (Berger and Udell 1990, p. 30)
35s. e.g. Niinimäki 2009 for an analysis distinguishing between the two collateral types.
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collateral is explicitly without costs for the borrower in Niinimäki 2009, p. 591.
Ex post risk additionally does not rely on banks' current assumptions and estimates, but on all
available information before underwriting. Considering long term trends of property price growth
allows for a more sophisticated analysis of risk: Zhang et al. 2018 nd a negative relationship
between local growth of real estate investments and NPLs on average, while if one considers a
threshold, there is a twofold eect of real estate investment growth on NPLs: growth per se
reduces NPLs, but growth levels below a threshold of about 20% have an increasing eect on
NPLs. Thus, if growth of real estate investment slows down, this can aect the stability of the
nancial system (Zhang et al. 2018, 1399f).
Therefore, it might be better suited to reect banks' risk taking in the face of changing house
prices. As e.g. Hott 2011, p. 2430 nds lending to tighten in response to defaults rather than
anticipating them, ex ante risk measures could be erroneous and a strong reliance on them rep-
resent a higher threat to banks.
Another dierentiation between ex ante and ex post risk can be made by borrowers' rating alter-
ations within the maturity of the loan in line with overall economic conditions, as e.g. interest
rates. Delis and Kouretas 2011 analyze risk-taking behavior of banks in 16 Euro-zone countries
from 2001-2008. They nd that banks in a setting of low interest rates shift their business to
more risky investments, as well for ex ante risk (captured by riskassetstotalassets) as ex post risk (
NPL
grossloans).
Furthermore, banks redistribute their assets to more risky and non-standard banking assets in
the presence of low interest rates. Similarly, Salas and Saurina 2002 nd ineciencies, market
power, the share of loans without collateral and decreasing net interest margins to increase prob-
lem loans for savings banks. The latter eect can be reasoned with higher pressure to assign
riskier loans.
Local economic trends must be considered to have a high stake in determining banks' loan port-
folio risk: Salas and Saurina 2002 nd that GDP growth aects Spanish savings banks' ratio of
problem loans negatively, with the eect being stronger for commercial banks. The authors argue
that this dierence could occur as the latter have more costumers who are submitted to business
cycles. Thus, savings banks' lending success might rather be described by local economic factors
that are less dependent on (national) business cycles.
Interest rate risk of course also plays an important role in real estate lending. Blasko and Sinkey
2006 nd that banks which are highly engaged in real estate lending over several years have lower
net loan losses. Furthermore, such banks in general can be struck hard by realized interest rate
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risk. Yet, the authors nd that most US commercial banks between 1989 and 1996 did not use
interest rate collateralization of loans, except for the largest banks.
Concluding, we should observe at least some eect in either direction of past real estate prices
or expectations on real estate price growth on ex post risk. This could happen either by a col-
lateralization eect, i.e. by a reduction of losses given default or by an incentive eect, i.e. by
increasing borrowers' incentives not to default as losses would increase with real estate prices:
H4: (Previous) real estate prices aect ex post risk
5.2.4 Default forecasts and (over-optimistic expectations) on real estate prices
As real estate investments are commonly regarded as having only little risk and local lending
could be perceived the same, due to spatial proximity (as some kind of `home bias' in lending),
the risk of lending with real estate collateral in a local setting could easily be underestimated.
Therefore, expectations on risk and hence, real estate price growth as determinant of LGDs
should get some additional attention.
A more direct impact of real estate prices on lending behavior is the expectation of development
of future property prices themselves. Hott 2011, 2426f argues that banks might rather stick to
Momentum forecasts than fundamental real estate values as they are well diversied, thus having
only minimal risk exposure towards fundamental factors. The author additionally cites banks'
myopic strategies that do not take real estate cycles into account. Positive income shocks might
then have an impact on price expectations, therefore increasing current prices. As banks base
their expectations on current prices, expected prices then increase and continue the feedback
process.
Recent experiences in house price development might not only inuence lenders' expectations of
future prices, but also those of borrowers, who therefore could make higher upfront payments for
mortgage loans (Agarwal et al. 2015, p. 647) or rather apply for loans, even not being able to
signal low risk and receive a favorable contract. Thus, there might not only be a higher oering
of credit but also demand from risky borrowers.
Due to low LGDs, banks have a high willingness to lend secured real estate loans (Zhang et al.
2018, p. 1392), and expecting future growth in property prices, this will also hold for risky bor-
rowers: Assuming real estate price growth, the net present value (NPV) of the loan increases as
well and if banks attempt to maintain a NPV level for loans, they would be able to grant loans
to borrowers with higher probabilities of default. Therefore, banks' risk could increase with real
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estate prices as book values of loans dier from banks own internal calculations.
Unconsciously engaging in riskier lending would especially be meaningful, as unprepared losses
of banks might have considerable impacts. If house prices grow, on average lower ex post risk can
be expected than suggested by ex ante risk measures if banks have not anticipated real estate
price growth. If they did but real estate price growth was weaker than expected, ex post risk
will be lower than suggested by ex ante risk. As a result of both scenarios, the gap between the
two measures should widen with recent real estate price growth.
H5: Higher recent real estate price growth weakens banks' risk forecasting ability
Indeed, banks should certainly be concerned about new loans being riskier when collateral values
have had a recent increase: Defusco 2018 nds, analyzing data on US homeowners, that loans
that were obtained by `extracting equity', i.e. using the increases of property value to get addi-
tional loans, are riskier than comparable loans, with the risk being measured using foreclosures.
The author concludes that the increase in house prices is not used to decrease existing debt, but
rather for other purposes.
Furthermore, this eect might vary throughout the location of savings banks. Christians and
Gärtner 2014 nd German savings banks to demand more collateral when located in rural areas.
An explanation for this nding might be that savings banks base their collateral demand not
only on current values of securities, but also include future price developments: Expected de-
creasing values in real estate might further shift banks' attention to future incomes of borrowers
as indicator of future solvency.
Banks located in areas with high average income might thus be less cautious as their counter-
parts in areas with on average lower income. Therefore, the former might be rather willing to
`gamble' as they not only can use property as collateral, but also future income or other assets
as security. Additionally, diversied savings banks in terms of business lines might be prone to
engage in riskier loans, with the performance of the bank being determined only partly by lending.
5.3 Data
5.3.1 Real estate and economic data
One of the key information of this paper are real estate data, hence a careful choice and thorough
investigation of the data in use is obligatory. Using micro-level data of regions with varying real
5.3. DATA 109
estate growth allows to infer whether the relationship between property investment and non-
performing loans is sensitive to property cycles (Zhang et al. 2018, p. 1393).
Cvijanovic 2014, p. 2700, uses land prices for real estate prices rather than prices of buildings,
as the former do not demand additional consideration of depreciation costs. Furthermore, using
indices for house prices would possibly describe characteristics that cannot be found at oces
or other buildings of commercial use. Yet, the availability of data on land prices is limited: as
land prices mostly only can be determined by observed transactions, the number of transactions,
the size and location of the area sold and prices may vary considerably throughout years and
between spatial entities. As observed land prices do not include oers, a relevant fraction of
information is furthermore skipped.
Hedonic house price indices use data from actual transactions and oers and therefore oer
a variety of information sources, covering a large fraction of local real estate markets. Their
correction for individual property characteristics overcomes dierences of house characteristics,
such as age, size, and location.
Real estate data on a county level were obtained from empirica AG as quarterly database, using
oered buy and rent prices with hedonical adjustment. This overcomes on the one hand biases
that might have been caused by low transaction volumes and on the other hand those due to
dierent qualities of real estate transactions. To have a higher comparability and ability to
calculate price-rent ratios, we use prices and rents for condominiums of all ages.
Information on the spatial entities that are included in savings banks' (ocial) business areas
was collected from their annual accounting reports, the addresses of their branches, their statues
or other reports published on their homepages. This information was matched with the data on
counties' real estate price growth and brought to a single value by calculating averages.
Information on unemployment within business areas was collected from the German Federal
Employment Agency.
The results must be interpreted with care w.r.t. applicability for all kinds of banks. Performance
dierences of loans might occur even when controlling for hard facts due to dierent use of soft
information (e.g. Keys et al. 2010, p. 330). This kind of information is often used by small
local banks when granting loans, so it might aect savings banks, which exhibit some dierences
compared to privately managed banks.
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5.3.2 German savings banks
The main part of the empirical investigation uses micro-level data on German savings banks,
obtained by Orbis Bank Focus. Bank-level data include data from balance sheets and prot
and loss statements, including information on non-performing loans, loan loss reserves, and loan
net charge-os on portfolio level, which can be used as ex ante or ex post risk measures. The
unbalanced panel dataset comprises 390 savings banks with observations spanning from 2011 to
2018.
The analysis on aggregate levels uses data provided by Deutsche Bundesbank.
Savings banks are one of three pillars of the German banking system and have a high relevance
in rm nancing and for retail costumers, with a focus of their business on traditional banking:
Loan volumes to non-MFIs of German savings banks have grown by almost 24% from the begin-
ning of 2011 to the end of 2017, leading to a loan volume towards non-MFIs of 951 bn. Euro.36
Savings banks possess some properties that make them especially suitable for the subsequent
analyses: Their business areas are geographically limited and they are ubiquitous throughout
the whole country. Conducting business outside their business areas would take place in their
neighbor savings bank business areas and thus is not stipulated. Those business areas further-
more are often congruent with counties or county-free cities, which makes them very convenient
for analyses including business areas and local factors (Conrad 2008, p. 13).
Due to their limitations w.r.t. business areas and practices, economic variables highly impact
savings banks; e.g. Reichling and Schulze 2018, p. 459 nd that up to 70% of ineciencies of
Eastern German savings banks are made up by local economic environment. Thus, dierences
between results of analyses on an aggregate and individual level could be based on the sensi-
tivity of locally operating banks towards their (economic) environment as analyses on aggregate
levels cannot reect the large variety of outcomes of micro perspectives. Additionally, Salas and
Saurina 2002, p. 221 nd that individual bank level characteristics, such as market power and
local indebtedness of borrowers have a high explanatory power for Spanish savings banks' growth
of problem loans. Such non-bank specic economic data is available and can be matched with
banks' business areas.
An additional advantage is that savings banks' business policies are similar throughout areas
and banks' sizes, thus there should not be systematic variations of risk-taking (Conrad et al.
2014, p. 536). E.g. Koetter and Poghosyan 2010, p. 1134 nd that savings banks even have
36Aggregate data on savings banks was obtained by Deutsche Bundesbank.
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a lower probability of becoming distressed than small-sized and regionally based cooperative
banks, which could reect savings banks' risk averse business.
Considering the legal reliance of savings banks on public entities, such as counties or towns and
furthermore the interaction between savings banks and state backed Landesbanken, one could
suppose that savings banks have some tendency for risk taking within their codied types of
business as they can expect governmental support on the one hand. On the other hand, as
publicly held banks might not be under high pressure to achieve high returns, they could have
less incentives to engage in risky businesses (Mohsni and Otchere 2014)37.
As their public reliance includes a mandate to guarantee a supply of funding within their business
areas, savings banks might be confronted with on average riskier borrowers than transaction-
based-lenders.38 In turn, they might on the one hand demand higher collateral values and on
the other hand have a stronger link to mortgages due to their limited investment opportunities,
rendering them especially prone to changes in local real estate markets.
5.4 Empirical investigation
In her empirical investigation, Cvijanovic 2014, p. 2699 makes use of the assumption that rms'
real estate is in the same MSA as its headquarter. Similarly, and in accord with savings banks'
ocial policy, I assume that mortgage lending and collateralization only take place in the savings
banks' business areas and their supporting agency's area. That is, the real estate prices from the
counties the bank has either branches in or which inherit cities that act as the banks' supporting
agency are taken into account unweighted, as the exact spatial origins of loans and deposits are
not documented.
An additional assumption is that all branches within a savings bank have the same business
strategy in terms of collateralization. This assumption is not very strong, as branches are sub-
ordinated to their headquarters, they are spatially close, often exchange input factors and are
co-working, not competing.
Before turning to the micro analysis using local data, I check the causality of real estate prices
and loan growth and risk using aggregate national data.
37Mohsni and Otchere 2014, p. 137 nd evidence that risk taking decreases for banks after they are privatized,
implying higher risk taking before.
38Salas and Saurina 2002, p. 209 mention the possibility that savings banks could have higher ex post risks due
to nancing riskier projects in favor of local economy. Also Illueca et al. 2014, p. 1219 consider that banks under
public guidance could have a bad performance due to political inuences.
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5.4.1 Causality
In line with previous research, I rst try to determine the causality between loan volume and
real estate price growth and additionally take overall economic development into account.
An extension of credit could lead to higher values of collateral, leading in turn again to higher
borrowing opportunities. Feedback eects might thus enable high risk borrowers to get access
to credit.
Several constellations on the risk taking and granting credit are possible. First, banks could
increase the level of risk when increasing the amount of granted funds. This might be based
on two dierent scenarios; On the one hand, banks might have to switch to risky borrowers in
saturated markets. For example, a rapid growth of loan volumes including a high increase of
problem loans is likely when banks try to gain market shares: The incumbent banks will try to
keep their good costumers, thus their lost market shares mainly consist of risky clients (Salas
and Saurina 2002, p. 210). But with increasing value of collateral, their LGD decreases and
banks' expected prots might allow them to grant access to credit in the presence of sucient
collateral and increasing prices. Yet, this situation arises especially for outside collateral. Inside
collateral requires higher loan amounts for low-risk borrowers. Whether this extension of credit
means engaging in higher risks, depends on the creditworthiness of prior low-risk borrowers; if
their ability to repay the loan and interest has increased with house prices, their creditworthiness
is not aected, but if house prices increase stronger than income, creditworthiness deteriorates.
Therefore, to check whether overall income has increased, it is important to keep the loan to
assets ratio in mind. If loan volume has increased drastically compared to banks' overall total
assets, whereas e.g. deposits remained on a constant level, as well as other assets, there has been
a lot of investment, but only little savings.
Gerlach and Peng 2005 use Johansen cointegration as well as VECM models to entangle the
simultaneity of loan and house price increases. Furthermore, the authors employ Hausman tests
rather than Granger causality to investigate the relationship between lending and real estate
prices, as the latter neglects current correlations. Similarly, Favara and Imbs 2015, p. 979 use
instrumental variables to nd causality between increasing loan volumes and house prices. As
GMMmethods, incorporating current eects, are used in the following estimations, I use Granger
causality tests for the aggregate analysis.Here, I use aggregate data from the German Federal
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Oce of Statistics and Deutsche Bundesbank. Data for savings banks are provided quarterly39,
including value adjustments and provisions. The time span ranges between the second quarter
of 2003 and second quarter of 2018, i.e. 61 periods. Due to problems with stationarity, besides
growth relative to preceding year's quarter, rst dierences were partly used. As GDP is a
commonly used indicator for economic conditions and their eects on credit risk (e.g. Salas and
Saurina 2002), we check whether GDP tends to be a better predictor for past loan standards in
terms of securities, future credit standards, and risk behavior of savings banks (expressed via
provisions and value adjustments) than growth of land and housing prices. A summary of the
results can be found in table 5.1.
As can be seen, there is no unidirectional explanation of GDP of any of the credit variables,
whereas there seem to be feedback eects with loan conditions. House price growth is granger
causal to all four of the credit indicators, whereas the rst dierence of land price growth is only
causal to value adjustments of savings banks and the rst dierence of the increasing demand
for securities indicator
Paying special attention to savings banks specic data, there is neither eect of house price
or GDP growth on provisions or value adjustments. This could either be due to independence
of savings banks towards those indicators or as nationally aggregated data misses out a lot of
information that could be found on a local level. Thus, an empirical investigation on a micro-
level is necessary not only to investigate the impact of property prices on loan risk, but also to
add insights to savings banks' interference with local vs. national economy.
Additionally, yearly data on an aggregate (national) banking level has been plotted in gure 5.2,
spanning from 2001 to 2015. The growth of NPLs as percentage of gross loans and credit risk
provisioning of German banks as a percentage of net loans was plotted against growth of land
and house prices. As can be seen, there are notable dierences between house price and land
price growth but none of them clearly moves in line with loan risk measures, possibly due to
lagged relationships.
Overall, the results of these short investigations suggest that there could be a relationship between
real estate price growth and loan portfolio risk, although this cannot be conrmed on an aggregate
level for savings banks. Thus, micro data could provide additional insights.
39`Value Adjustments SVB' and `Provisions SVB' were provided for each month. Therefore, three month
arithmetic means were calculated to get quarters.
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5.4.2 Dynamic panel estimation
As stated above, the major part of the empirical investigation is conducted on a micro-basis to
obtain evidence from individual eects of real estate price growth on lending.
I use dynamic panel data estimation as risk-taking might have some persistence, due to long-
term relationships with borrowers, competition, and other external circumstances that might
take some time to change their relevance for risk taking: Delis and Kouretas 2011, 846f using a
Blundell-Bond estimator nd that risk-taking is highly persistent for the rst lag. Furthermore,
savings banks often assign long-term loans, whose risk transfers from the preceding period Also,
there could be autocorrelation in NPL ratios as found e.g. by Zhang et al. 2018.
As dynamic panel data estimation is confronted with endogeneity via construction, OLS pro-
cedures would produce biased results. Endogeneity can potentially also be found in several
explanatory variables, such as eciency (s. Conrad et al. 2014), real estate prices and others. As
only building rst dierences would result in a short panel bias, the chosen method to overcome
this problem is the use of GMM estimators (Behr 2003, Flannery and Hankins 2013). To model
persistence of ex ante and ex post loan risks and the impact of real estate prices, Arellano-Bond-
Estimators as in Salas and Saurina 2002 as well as Blundell-Bond System-GMM are commonly
used (e.g. Delis and Kouretas 2011 and Zhang et al. 2018). The use of the latter can be reasoned
by persistence of the explained variable. In such cases, the rst dierences as employed by the
Arellano-Bond estimator are rather weak instruments (Baltagi 2008, 160f). As rst estimations
yielded some high persistence of our measures of ex ante and ex post risk, we stick to system
GMM estimator in what follows. In order to guarantee for robustness of the estimation results,
Windmeijer's nite-sample correction was employed (s.a. Olszak et al. 2018).
There are several ways how endogeneity can aect results. For rm acquisitions of real estate40,
Cvijanovic 2014, 2700f uses an interaction term of real estate supply on MSA level and national
real estate price index. Also, banks themselves are sometimes said to ave an impact on national
macroeconomic outcomes. But as it not likely that risk-taking of single saving banks aects
macroeconomic inuences (s.a. Delis and Kouretas 2011, p. 846), this potential source of endo-
geneity is not considered further.
40Positive macroeconomic shocks might increase demand for land and, as a consequence, land prices. Firms in
response must produce more output, therefore demanding more loans to nance higher production (Cvijanovic
2014, p. 2701).
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(a) NPL and land price growth
(b) Loan risk provisions and land price growth
(c) NPL and house price growth
(d) Loan risk provisions and house price growth
Figure 5.2: NPL/Loan risk provision and land/house price growth
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Estimation and variables
In what follows, I shortly present the variables used in the following estimations. Loosely follow-
ing Salas and Saurina 2002 and Olszak et al. 2018, the baseline estimation I use for the following
estimations is
Problem Loansit = α1Problem Loansit−1 +
3∑
k=1











βj+1Real Estate Price Growtht−j + ηi + εit
(5.1)
Considering dierent points of time of ex ante and ex post risk, I vary the lags of the explanatory
variables.
Several variables are employed as bank specic controls as suggested by Delis and Kouretas
2011, 845: Banks' equity ratios could capture the deliberations between an increase in risk
when lending and hence augmenting necessary capital requirements; Furthermore, equity ratio is
found to have an impact on banks' risk taking. To take account of this, I include banks' capital
ratios (TCARit), similarly to Olszak et al. 2018.
As e.g. Reichling and Schulze 2018, p. 457 nd German savings banks located in wealthier
regions to be more ecient, we will include the cost income ratio (CIRit). Higher real estate
price growth could incur with higher income growth, thus results might rather be attributable
to banks' eciency than real estate markets.
I use net interest margins (NIMit) to account for banks' ability to generate earnings by assigning
new loans.
As Hott 2011 pointed out, past prots aect banks' expectations on whether they are optimistic
or pessimistic. Lagged prots may impact not only lending volumes, but also riskiness of loans
in several ways. On the one hand, preceding low prots might either force banks to engage in
more/riskier lending or on the other hand reduce risky loans to prevent further losses. Here,
profitsit is dened as
profits and losses before taxesit
total assetsit
.41
I include branch growth as explanatory variable for loan volume growth ( ̂branchesit, s. e.g.
Illueca et al. 2014). As business areas of savings banks are dened and rather small (commonly
41As current earnings are potentially related to the risk level of bank lending, lagged values are used (Delis and
Kouretas 2011, p. 845).
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equal to one or two counties), I do not include branch growth in the further risk estimations
to grasp some winner's curse eects (in fact, in unreported regressions, the coecient was not
signicant).
Furthermore, changes in asset compositions of savings banks is considered. Banks with a high
portion of real estate lending must be expected to have higher loan to asset ratios, which could
also aect their provisions for loan losses (Blasko and Sinkey 2006). Thus, this ratio is included




Banks higher risk taking or higher losses could be consequences of less monitoring intensity.
Thus, monitoring intensity, proxied by monitoring costs as Number of employeesitGross loans to costumersit will be in-
cluded, similarly to Kick and Prieto 2015, p. 11. A further issue worth noting is a potential
deterioration of monitoring activity (s. Manove et al. 2001). Thus monitoring must be consid-
ered endogenous as well, with real estate price growth having a strong impact on it.42
Another common explanation of bank risk taking is competition between nancial intermedi-
aries (e.g. `winner's curse'. s. Forssbaeck and Shehzad 2015, p. 1998). For locally based savings
banks, measures of competition that take into account several dimensions of local lending and
borrowing, as e.g. local wealth, share of county deposits, number of branches within an area,
interest income per branch, etc. would come into mind. Yet, most of those gures are either not
available at all or have low explanatory power due to a variety of factors as dierent hierarchies
of branches of commercial banks. Furthermore, `classical' measures of market concentration, e.g.
HHI on deposits on a county level, are often not bank-specic variables, but locally dependent
and its eects can be proxied by e.g. county-dummies. Thus, as a common index on a bank-level,
I employ a Lerner-Index based on the procedure described in Berger et al. 2009, p. 106 (Lernerit,
s. also Appendix).
Similarly, the growth rate of gross costumer loan volume (ĜCLit) could indicate whether higher
loan losses were due to a unequal growth of loan quality and quantity regarding ex post risk on
the one hand. On the other hand, higher ex ante risk with higher loan growth might indicate
a market expansion or condence in future returns, possibly induced by growing real estate prices.
Ex post risk is gauged using the banks' impaired loans, divided by gross costumer loans (impairedit).
This wider denition of ex post risk captures most of the credit that should be considered `prob-
lem loans' in the spirit of Salas and Saurina 2002.
I use three dierent measures for real estate price growth: Two of them are growth of house
42Note that a mere substitution of monitoring by increasing real estate prices should not alter risk taking, thus
a separation between eects is to be expected.
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics for Micro-Data used for dynamic panel estimation
Number Mean SD Min Max
̂Gross Loans 1,729 0.0383 0.0758 -0.2446 1.9493
Loan Loss Reserves
Gross Loans 1,997 0.0136 0.0093 0.0001 0.0897
Impaired Loans
Gross Loans 1,937 0.0263 0.0186 0.0001 0.171
̂House Prices 2,723 0.0463 0.052 -0.1483 0.3145
̂Condo Prices 2,730 0.0617 0.0766 -0.379 0.657
Price− to− rent− ratio 3,120 20.0995 4.1881 6.4313 51.6336
Growth variables are denoted by circumex.
prices within counties, matched together with savings banks' business areas ( ̂HousePit) and well
as growth of condo prices ( ̂CondoPit)43.
Summary statistics for the dependent and real estate variables can be found in table 5.2. The
data were not trimmed or corrected for outliers, and means are in line with those found in other
studies (e.g. Balasubramanyan et al. 2017, using US-based data from 1997-2011 nd that all
loan loss reserves sum up to 1% of total assets on average, while here it is 0.844%). Sinkey and
Greenawalt 1991 nd regional economic factors, proxied by dummy variables to explain only a
very small fraction of loan loss variation of banks. The authors conclude that loan loss rates are
rather driven by managerial abilities. This stresses the relevance of managers' perception of real
estate markets and their estimates.44 In order to take this into account, I use price-to-rent-ratios
on county level matched with business areas (PRRit). Note that price-to-rent-ratios not only
capture potential deviance from fundamental values, but also future expectations considering
real estate prices. Price-to-rent-ratios therefore could serve as observation of local market's ex-
pectations whereas past price developments are input data for individual expectations. Thus,
PRRit could rather grasp eects of the incentive channel (i.e. a borrower's incentive to repay
her loan in order not to loose her collateral with expected price growth).
In order to check to what extend real estate prices capture local economic development, I employ
growth of unemployment rate in the banks' business areas ( ̂UNEMPit). It should be stressed
43For the sake of simplicity, banks' variables as well as banks' business areas' variables are denoted by i.
44Contrarily, Cyree and Morris 2018, p. 182 nd that banks in high income and low population counties mostly
outperform those located in low income counties. Thus local economic factors seem to matter or at least attract
more/less talented managers.
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again, that the dynamic panel analysis focuses on local real estate price development, not on na-
tional levels. That is, overall national real estate price growth/decline is only considered within
year dummies, which should control for eects of low interest rates, and higher stock market
turnover, as well as general technical process in risk management (Delis and Kouretas 2011,
p. 845).
I do not use house prices in levels due to several shortcomings. Most importantly, changes can
dier strongly from absolute changes, which would be an argument in favor of continuous returns.
But also, the high variation in local real estate prices reects dierent hierarchies of entities in
terms of Central Places. Dierences of banks located in central areas might thus not stem from
real estate prices, but be caused by other factors, like stronger competition, a larger costumer
base, etc., that would have the same origin as real estate prices. Thus, it is likely that explana-
tory power of location itself might be falsely attributed to real estate prices.
Loan Growth
The rst of the subsequent estimations is conducted as additional micro evidence to previous
studies made on aggregate levels in order to detect causal relationships between loan and house
price growth. With regard to the following estimations, higher loan volumes or extension of credit
could forego higher loan risks if good borrowers already have obtained credit without extension
of loans.
Note, that I include current real estate price growth in order to nd current correlations (s.
Gerlach and Peng 2005) that may be caused by the stated current observability of real estate
price growth compared to e.g. GDP growth and the time interval in years allows for an impact
of current values.45 As additional explanatory variable, I use ex post risk of two previous periods
to check whether past negative experiences concerning credits have a negative eect on current
loan growth. The results can be found in table 5.3. As can be seen from the results, the major
drivers of loan growth are - as could be expected - losses and impaired loans of the previous
period (i.e. recently made experiences in lending), monitoring eort, the relevance of lending for
the bank's business, and branch growth. Neither one of our real estate price growth variables,
nor unemployment growth as other proxy for regional economic development is statistically sig-
nicant in any of the estimations.
45Inclusion of additional lags did not produce additional signicant coecients.
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(a) Loan Growth
(b) Loan loss reservations / gross costumer loans
(c) Impaired loans / gross costumer loans
Figure 5.3: Loan Growth, Loan loss reservations, and impaired loans of German savings banks
Graphic representation of variables of Micro-Dataset together with house and condo price growth;
Values represent sample averages.
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Table 5.3: Results of Blundell-Bond-Estimation of loan growth
The estimation was conducted using dierent lag lengths for level and dierence instruments and
employing Windmeijer's robust standard errors. Growth variables are denoted by circumex.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ĜCLit ĜCLit ĜCLit ĜCLit
̂GCLit−1 0.152 0.109 0.153 0.108
(1.05) (0.71) (1.02) (0.78)
impairedit−1 -0.00717
∗∗ -0.00561∗ -0.00512 -0.00638
(-2.11) (-1.67) (-1.43) (-1.58)
impairedit−2 0.00110 0.000137 0.0000667 -0.000434
(0.70) (0.08) (0.03) (-0.23)
loans/TAit−1 -0.474
∗∗∗ -0.459∗∗∗ -0.475∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗
(-3.03) (-3.44) (-3.68) (-3.16)
loans/TAit−2 0.0467 0.0291 0.0850 0.0145
(0.38) (0.24) (0.65) (0.13)
TCARit -0.00439 -0.00241 -0.00253 -0.00258
(-1.39) (-0.70) (-0.69) (-0.97)
TCARit−1 0.00286 0.000992 0.00141 0.00148
(1.02) (0.33) (0.43) (0.64)
Lernerit -0.224 -0.118 -0.131 -0.237
(-0.96) (-0.42) (-0.52) (-1.11)
monitoringit -0.314
∗∗ -0.337∗∗ -0.289∗∗ -0.368∗∗
(-2.12) (-2.02) (-2.19) (-2.31)
CIRit -0.000549 -0.000162 -0.000351 -0.000421
(-0.39) (-0.10) (-0.25) (-0.33)
NIM 0.0174 -0.00199 -0.0146 0.0255
(0.50) (-0.05) (-0.42) (0.77)
profitsit−1 5.657
∗ 5.911∗ 6.534∗ 7.478∗∗
(1.80) (1.66) (1.86) (2.17)
profitsit−2 2.437 2.702 2.584 2.878
(0.99) (1.10) (1.08) (1.13)
̂branchesit -0.0472∗∗ -0.0420∗∗ -0.0472∗∗ -0.0492∗∗
(-2.48) (-2.09) (-2.06) (-2.59)
̂branchesit−1 -0.00948 -0.0114 -0.0102 -0.00809

















N 546 546 546 537
Number of instruments 72 72 72 78
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First order Arellano Bond Test -3.03*** -2.82*** -2.98*** -2.82***
Second order Arellano Bond Test -0.10 -0.49 -0.53 0.35
Hansen Statistic 50.55 43.53 44.82 56.39
p-value (0.298) (0.576) (0.522) (0.248)
robust t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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The results suggest a rejection of the rst hypothesis on a local short term (yearly) level. Thus,
we rather would suspect that savings banks' reactions to real estate prices are not notable on an
overall loan volume level, which could be due to a rather inelastic loan supply. The positive cor-
relation on aggregate level as graphically suggested by gure 5.3a therefore cannot be conrmed.
The coecients on price-rent-ratio are not signicant and change signs, indicating that market
expectations on real estate price growth do not impact loan volumes; this could be reasoned as
lenders have an informative advantage concerning future price developments. Note, however,
that I also checked whether the reverse direction of causality would rather apply to the data
and estimated the equation using loan growth as explanatory and house price growth and price-
to-rent-ratio as explained variables (including their lags as right hand side variables). This did
neither produce signicant coecients nor superior overall results. As loan volume is only avail-
able for savings banks, not for the whole county level, results of this estimation could be biased
anyway.
For testing hypothesis two, the change of loan growth and deviance of prices from fundamen-
tal value, I conducted regressions with the same control variables and using price-to-rent-ratio
growth, squared price-to-rent-ratios, a dummy, if the current and lagged price-to-rent-ratio ex-
ceeds the yearly averaged ratio by more than ten percent and interaction terms with this lagged
dummy variable and house price growth.46 None of these was signicant, which does not nec-
essarily indicate that savings banks do not react to exuberance of real estate markets; higher
ratios might be justied by certain locations and thus not represent exaggerations of prices.
Ex ante risk
A clear denition of ex ante risk is hard to nd as e.g. higher loan loss provisions can either
indicate higher expected loan losses or lower underwriting quality (Dou et al. 2018, p. 1196).
Yet, as savings banks should have similar standards and techniques in lending, loan loss reserves
relative to gross costumer loans for each bank and year (LLRit) are used as ex-ante risk measure
to grasp how observed credit risk was priced before actual loss realizations occurred.
As Balasubramanyan et al. 2017, p. 197 point out, estimating NPLs using loan loss provisions
(LLPs) can be biased as LLPs can be based on expectations for NPLs, thus LLPs are not
independent from future loan performance. Hence, endogeneity has another stake in estimating
46Results can be found in the Appendix.
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the equation.47 I additionally include size measured as log of total assets (LTAit). Olszak et al.
2018 argue that large banks are more procyclical and more prone to moral hazard due to too-big-
to-fail thinking. As savings banks are supported publicly and do not have excessive size, those
problems can be considered of low importance compared to analyzing full bank samples.
As can be seen from table 5.4, savings banks' loan loss reserves decrease with current house
price growth and price-rent ratios, i.e. future market expectations. The eects are not highly
signicant, which is statistically reasoned with the robust Windmeijer correction. At a rst
glance, the results might seem puzzling, as one could suspect lagged house prices to have an
impact on loan loss rates. Yet, as stated initially, house prices - in contrast to GDP - can
be observed continuously. Thus current house price growth includes all observations during the
year, technically enabling them to have a `simultaneous' impact on end-of-the-year loan loss rates.
Further lagged house prices do not have a signicant impact, which can in parts be assigned to
the usage of lagged loan loss rates which grasp explanatory power of the lagged house prices.
Although the results of estimation (5) indicate that banks reduce their loan loss provisioning (i.e.
ex ante risk) in the presence of increasing property prices, the eect is not robust; as can be seen
from estimation (8), the coecient of unemployment growth is stronger in terms of statistical
signicance and local house price growth, thus not robustly aects savings banks' ex ante risk
in lending. Rather, it could grasp some share of overall local economic growth eects, which is
supported by the insignicance of condo price growth.
The negative coecient of the price-rent-ratio, indicating lower ex ante risk, is small in economical
signicance an the changing sign for the coecient of the preceding year indicate weak robustness.
Therefore, a closer analysis of the eects of deviations of real estate prices from fundamental value
will be performed in the latter sections.
Additional non-dynamic panel system GMM estimations using L̂LRit as dependent variable did
not produce valuable insights or results dierent concerning real estate variables.
Ex post risk
Turning to hypothesis four, we rst have to nd a denition of ex post risk among available
data and denitions that have already been used in literature: one ex post risk measure is
net charge offsit
net loans+chargeoffsit
as used in Sinkey and Greenawalt 1991. Berger and Udell 1990, 27 use
loan risk premia as ex ante risk measure while ex post risk is gauged among others by loan
47Balasubramanyan et al. 2017 use a 2SLS procedure to overcome this problem by rst estimating LLP using
current NPLs and using the estimates when quantifying NPL.
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Table 5.4: Results of Blundell-Bond-Estimation of ex ante risk
Ex ante risk is measured as loan loss reservesitgross costumer loansit . The estimation was conducted us-
ing dierent lag lengths for level and dierence instruments and employing Wind-
meijer's robust standard errors. Growth variables are denoted by circumex.
(5) (6) (7) (8)
LLRit LLRit LLRit LLRit
LLRit−1 0.809
∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗
(33.19) (29.04) (26.28) (33.02)
ĜCLit -1.032
∗ -0.817 -0.994∗ -0.859
(-1.93) (-1.37) (-1.75) (-1.57)
̂GCLit−1 -0.0801 -0.0586 -0.0733 -0.0496
(-0.97) (-0.63) (-0.87) (-0.57)
LTAit 0.0512
∗ 0.0519∗ 0.0624∗∗ 0.0443∗
(1.93) (1.82) (2.17) (1.90)
TCARit−1 -0.0271 -0.0148 -0.0121 -0.0228
(-1.39) (-0.85) (-0.74) (-1.38)
TCARit−2 0.0378
∗ 0.0254 0.0229 0.0316∗
(1.96) (1.39) (1.33) (1.81)
Lernerit 0.513 0.282 0.838 0.608
(0.50) (0.25) (0.80) (0.67)
monitoringit -0.313 -0.174 -0.310 -0.319
(-1.11) (-0.60) (-1.03) (-1.11)
CIRit -0.00276 -0.00283 -0.000374 -0.00239
(-0.49) (-0.47) (-0.06) (-0.45)
NIM 0.0405 0.0427 -0.0497 0.0568
(0.27) (0.30) (-0.32) (0.45)
profitsit−1 -16.47 -14.64 -12.86 -20.66
(-0.82) (-0.64) (-0.60) (-1.01)
profitsit−2 -8.820 -8.350 -5.458 -10.65


















N 1175 1176 1176 1154
Number of instruments 56 56 56 61
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First order Arellano Bond Test -4.48*** -4.17*** -4.28*** -4.42***
Second order Arellano Bond Test 1.06 0.78 0.79 0.90
Hansen Statistic 28.97 36.59 31.06 23.64
p-value (0.668) (0.275) (0.564) (0.944)
robust t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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charge-os, overdue 30 days or 30-89 days, and renegotiated. These measures are only to be
applied to savings banks' complete loan portfolios here, but not to single loans.
Here, I rather follow Delis and Kouretas 2011, p. 843 who use the ratio of risk assets48 to total
assets and the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross loans as proxies to describe banks'
risk taking. As the authors argue, these measures are better suited to describe banks' risk taking
than z-score, as used e.g. in Mohsni and Otchere 2014 as risk-taking measure: z-score grasps
banks' probability of insolvency rather than risk engagement. Thus, I use impaired loansitgross costumer loansit as
variable to describe problem loans. Following the arguments of Salas and Saurina 2002, p. 212,






Besides eciency, the most obvious nding is the persistence of loan portfolio riskiness (lagged
dependent variable close to 100%). This variable explains a high share of the variation of the
following impaired ratio, rendering at least some of the other lagged variables without explana-
tory power, but rather bundling their eects.
The second clear nding is that there is a robust positive impact of loan growth on loan risk.
Riskier borrowers could be the consequence of the bank already having served good borrowers
and being forced to lend to bad borrowers due to competitive pressure or strategy of the bank
(winner's curse eect).
Banking competition is expected to have a positive impact on NPLs as in Zhang et al. 2018.
This is in line with Herring and Wachter 1999 who argue that disaster myopia can be increased
by competition, as non-myopic banks cannot withstand the pressure that arises if pricing is con-
ducted with too little risk premia. This decreases returns and banks increase their leverage. In
fact, there is some evidence from our estimations that savings banks with higher market power
have lower ex post risk.
Finally, there does not seem to be an inuence of house price growth, respective expectations on
future house price growth, on the ex post risk of savings banks' loans. Unreported regressions,
using Net charge offsitgross costumer loansit as dependent variable, as e.g. in Sinkey and Greenawalt 1991, con-
rmed that real estate price growth (expectations) does not have a signicant eect on savings
banks' loan portfolios' ex post risk.
48Under `risk assets' the authors subsume all assets with volatile values and lead to varying prots (Delis and
Kouretas 2011, p. 843).
5.4. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 127
Table 5.5: Results of Blundell-Bond-Estimation of ex post risk
Ex post risk is measured by impaired loansitgross costumer loansit . The estimation was conducted us-
ing dierent lag lengths for level and dierence instruments and employing Wind-
meijer's robust standard errors. Growth variables are denoted by circumex.
(9) (10) (11) (12)
impairedit impairedit impairedit impairedit
impairedit−1 0.989
∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗∗
(35.92) (32.04) (34.03) (33.67)
̂GCLit−1 0.197∗ 0.193∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.205∗
(1.80) (1.86) (2.06) (1.94)
̂GCLit−2 0.301∗∗ 0.284∗∗ 0.338∗∗ 0.295∗
(2.07) (1.99) (2.16) (1.96)
TCARit−2 -0.00595 -0.00268 -0.00290 -0.00430
(-0.67) (-0.30) (-0.31) (-0.53)
TCARit−3 0.00862 0.0150
∗ 0.0114 0.00927
(1.12) (1.76) (1.47) (1.21)
Lernerit−1 -1.542
∗∗ -1.138 -0.984 -1.470∗∗
(-2.00) (-1.47) (-1.42) (-2.00)
Lernerit−2 -0.0256 -0.0396 -0.0223 -0.0456
(-0.15) (-0.24) (-0.13) (-0.26)
monitoringit−1 -0.487 -0.752 -0.776 -0.479
(-0.88) (-1.51) (-1.39) (-0.94)
monitoringit−2 0.421 0.368 0.534 0.324
(0.96) (1.03) (1.25) (0.85)
CIRit -0.00193 -0.00127 -0.000845 -0.00248
(-0.74) (-0.47) (-0.34) (-1.02)
CIRit−1 -0.00839
∗∗ -0.00635 -0.00578 -0.00809∗∗

















N 793 793 793 781
Number of instruments 54 54 54 61
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First order Arellano Bond Test -2.38** -2.40** -2.38** -2.37**
Second order Arellano Bond Test 0.76 0.85 1.08 0.89
Hansen Statistic 37.79 37.17 39.78 39.56
p-value (0.222) (0.243) (0.162) (0.356)
robust t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Monitoring, ex post loan loss reserves and deviations from fundamental values
The obtained results concerning ex post risks could be the consequence of a multitude of fac-
tors, among them pure coincidence. The term ex post loan loss reserves used in what follows
compares loan loss reserves to realized credit risk, i.e. high/low values indicate bad loan loss
reserves policy which could be due to either speculations on rising values of collateral or overall
economic conditions. This test of hypothesis ve, i.e. how real estate price growth aects sav-




With loan loss reserves and impaired loans being supposedly impacted by dierent lags of the
explanatory variables, I include up to three periods of each variable. Again, I estimate a dynamic
panel model, as the two components of the dependent variable were endogenous - loan loss re-
serves and impaired loans were highly persistent. Here, in order to have a look at the eects of
monitoring eects without including real estate prices, I estimated parsimoniously instrumented
models without considering condo price growth as before, but estimating a baseline model with-
out real estate variables.
The results in table 5.6 suggest that monitoring has an eect on the ratio with varying signs con-
cerning the lags. Current eciency and market power seem to have positive impacts on loan loss
reserves, which would contradict a too-big-to-fail moral hazard problem, which on the contrary,
would not suit savings banks' size, systemical relevance and organization structure anyway.
Most importantly, the regression shows that local real estate prices do not lead banks to be over-
optimistic. Hypothesis 5 thus is rejected. With regard to the previous estimations, this is not
surprising and undermines the nding that savings banks' loan portfolio risk is not determined
directly by real estate prices, but rather by economic factors which in term could determine real
estate growth. E.g. in unreported estimations, I found population growth to have in places even
stronger eects than unemployment rate growth.
As savings banks are backed by public entities and have less pressure than e.g. commercial banks
to achieve high gains in short time, they might be less prone to engaging in riskier lending with-
out being aware of it. Furthermore, savings banks have a strong link to local real estate markets,
which provides them with local knowledge and enables them rather to notice risks stemming
from real estate related lending.
Therefore, I used the aforementioned variables to check real estate price exuberance and checked
whether savings banks increased their ex post loan loss reserves in response to potential bursting
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Table 5.6: Results of Blundell-Bond-Estimation of ex post appropriateness of loan loss reserves
Ex post risk appropriateness of loan loss reserves is measured by loan loss reservesitimpaired loansit . The es-
timation was conducted using dierent lag lengths for level and dierence instruments and em-
ploying Windmeijer's robust standard errors. Growth variables are denoted by circumex.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LLRIMPit LLRIMPit LLRIMPit LLRIMPit
LLRIMPit−1 0.690
∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗
(9.33) (9.00) (7.99) (9.67)
ĜCLit -176.0 -158.8 -138.2 -115.0
(-1.62) (-1.64) (-1.20) (-1.23)
̂GCLit−1 -12.00 -10.26 -8.340 -5.115
(-1.33) (-1.24) (-0.79) (-0.63)
̂GCLit−2 -7.520 -6.735 -5.622 -3.625
(-1.45) (-1.35) (-1.02) (-0.72)
TCARit−1 -0.0202 -0.153 0.421 0.796
(-0.01) (-0.10) (0.23) (0.62)
TCARit−2 -0.352 -0.444 -0.706 -1.106
(-0.30) (-0.38) (-0.54) (-1.05)
TCARit−3 -0.336 -0.385 -0.396 -0.208
(-0.44) (-0.58) (-0.45) (-0.34)
profitsit−2 -460.8 -136.2 -368.5 -502.0
(-0.52) (-0.14) (-0.38) (-0.56)
profitsit−3 870.2 1038.9 780.0 629.9
(0.61) (0.71) (0.46) (0.45)
Lernerit 384.0
∗∗ 375.0∗∗ 304.4 ∗ 212.0
(2.14) (2.11) (1.68) (1.36)
Lernerit−1 -94.05 -93.62 -61.59 -38.21
(-1.28) (-1.33) (-0.78) (-0.59)
Lernerit−2 -14.04 -14.77 -11.52 -5.460
(-1.10) (-1.16) (-0.84) (-0.48)
monitoringit -415.6
∗ -404.2 ∗ -432.7 -456.4∗∗
(-1.79) (-1.75) (-1.55) (-2.08)
monitoringit−1 333.6
∗ 337.5 ∗ 358.8 365.9 ∗
(1.73) (1.72) (1.59) (1.91)
monitoringit−2 44.32 33.31 34.05 37.76
(1.23) (1.06) (1.17) (1.17)
CIRit 2.246
∗∗ 2.219∗∗ 1.802 1.195
(1.99) (2.04) (1.58) (1.27)
CIRit−1 -0.501 -0.508 -0.336 -0.221



















N 774 774 774 758
Number of instruments 33 37 37 41
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First order Arellano Bond Test -2.05** -2.23** -1.89* -1.71*
Second order Arellano Bond Test 0.53 0.52 0.27 0.36
Hansen Statistic 2.31 2.67 2.15 4.11
p-value (0.941) (0.953) (0.976) (0.904)
t statistics in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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of a housing price bubble. Again, these variables are not signicant, what could be due to the
low time period analyzed or simply the lack of notable deviances from fundamental values.
5.5 Conclusions
This paper studies the eect of real estate prices on German savings banks' risk taking. It con-
tributes to existing literature in several ways. First, it analyzes the impact of real estate price
growth on loan risk, uses a micro-level perspective to do so and uses a forward-looking measure
to investigate this question.
Overall, there is no robust evidence that real estate price growth notably aects savings banks'
overall lending risk. There is only some slight evidence that loan loss reserves are aected by
real estate markets, but this eect is rather dominated by overall economic development: unem-
ployment rate as overall economic indicator is a better predictor of ex ante loan risk. Therefore,
the micro-results conrm the impressions from the investigation on causality that house price
growth cannot contribute notably towards an explanation of savings banks' ex ante or ex post
loan portfolio risk.
This result could be due to several reasons. The observed time span could be too short to
represent a real estate cycle. Additionally, since the European sovereign debt crisis, there has
been a steady increase of real estate prices for virtually all German regions. Another issue is
that national economic factors, like overall economic development or interest rates have higher
explanatory power than regional factors. This could be due to higher relevance regarding deposit-
lending in case of interests and determination of the attraction of other business areas like stock
markets. Furthermore national economic development is more present in media and could serve
as predictor for local economic growth. As in many of the equations time dummies were signi-
cant, this seems to be a plausible explanation.
Furthermore, overall there is a high persistence of loan factors, which has already been noticed
as justication for the usage of system GMM. This underlines the relevance of loan maturities
when determining NPLs and the signicance of collateral in lending. Including those data might
thus oer additional valuable insights into the riskiness of loans collateralized by real estate.
Two further aspects probably have a high relevance for the results: From a regulatory point of
view, lending using real estate as collateral has some restrictions, that are often not considered,
but are essential for banks. E.g. estimations of LGD must bear in mind that securities can
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be sold only at some discount (Capital Requirements Regulations (CRR) I, Art. 181 (1) e))49.
Furthermore, CRR I refers to the notion of ex ante and ex post risk in Art. 125 (2) b) and Art.
126 (2) b), pointing to the fact that borrower risk does not depend on the development of the
value of the collateralized real estate.
Additionally, due to their spatially limited business areas, savings banks have a rather low dis-
tance towards their borrowers, allowing them the use of soft information. Although the latter
cannot fully replace collateral, it might help savings banks not only to correctly forecast bor-
rowers' future economic conditions, but also allow them to soften their lending techniques, i.e.
enable them not only to lend based on collateral. Berger and Black 2011 nd comparative ad-
vantages of small banks when it comes to relationship lending, which is relying commonly on
soft information. This advantage, which would also meet savings banks' size, could make them
less susceptible for inappropriate reliance on collateral.
Yet, the results obtained do not exclude loan losses or collectively missing precaution for sav-
ings banks, as due to the short observation period, full business cycles or long-term real estate
developments could not be investigated. Furthermore, as savings banks' lending is not inde-
pendent from local economic aspects, which determine real estate prices, at least some indirect
link between their loan portfolio risk and real estate markets exists. This can be seen from the
high explanatory power of local unemployment rate, which adds information to national levels of
economic development. Further research should thus focus on the drivers of real estate markets
and their eects on loan risk, using ore granular data concerning the value of recoveries and the
fraction and maturities of collateralized loans.
5.6 Appendix A: Lerner Index
In this section, I shortly present choice and calculation of the measure of competition, the Lerner
Index. For locally based savings banks, measures for competition that take into account several
dimensions of local lending and borrowing, as e.g. local wealth, share of county deposits, number
of branches within an area, interest income per branch, etc. would come into mind. Yet, most
of those gures are either not available at all or have low explanatory power due to a variety of
factors as dierent hierarchies of branches of commercial banks. Furthermore, `classical' measures
of market concentration, e.g. Herndahl-Indices on deposits on a county level, are very sensitive
to non-homogeneity of banks (s. Forssbaeck and Shehzad 2015) are often not bank-specic
49s. Besanko and Thakor 1987
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variables, but locally dependent and its eects can be gauged by e.g. county-dummies.
Thus, as a common index on a bank-level, I employ a Lerner-Index based on the procedure
described in Berger et al. 2009, p. 106 and Feldkircher and Sigmund 2017. The Lerner index is
dened as
Lernerit =
Price of Total Assetsit −Marginal Cost of Total Assetsit
Price of Total Assetsit
(5.2)
where marginal costs are derived from
Marginal Cost of Total Assetsit =
Costit
TAit




with the costs stemming from the translog function:

















Total costs are described by TAit, input costs by Fk: F1 is labor costs, described by
staff expenses
TA , F2 are costs of funds (
interest expense
total deposits ) and F3 are cost of xed capital (
operating expenses
TA ).
The dependent variable (total costs) is calculated as the sum of total operating expenses and
total interest expenses. The results of the estimation of the equation above can be found in
table 5.7 As in Berger et al. 2009, I used year xed eects and robust standard errors (clusters
on bank-level basis). At a rst glance, there are two issues that would reject the use of year
dummies; Firstly, F-Tests suggest that the year dummies are jointly insignicant for some spec-
ications. Secondly, they grasp overall economic conditions which are supposed to be of lower
relevance for regionally non-systemic banks. Yet, they are kept in all estimations as otherwise
eects of (national) interest levels and other economic conditions would be falsely assigned to
local house price growth. Many of the coecients' values and signicances are similar to the
results of Feldkircher and Sigmund 2017.50
The obtained coecients are then used together with the input data described above to calculate
marginal costs which ten, nally, are used to calculate each bank' s Lerner-Index.
50The high R2 coecients are similar in magnitude to those found by Feldkircher and Sigmund 2017, p. 65 and
Shaer and Spierdijk 2019, p. 18
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Table 5.7: Results of estimation of translog cost function in order to calculate the Lerner Index
for each bank
Estimations were conducted using year xed eects and clustered standard errors. Dependent variable















log(Total Assets) ·F2 0.0117∗∗∗
(4.27)

















t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5.7 Appendix B: Loan growth and deviation from fundamental
value
5.7. APPENDIX B: LOANGROWTHANDDEVIATION FROM FUNDAMENTAL VALUE135
Table 5.8: Results of Blundell-Bond-Estimation of loan growth with price-to-rent-ratio related
explanatory variables
PRR Dummyit is a dummy variable, indicating whether the price rent ratio in the business
area was at least ten percent higher than the average over all business areas in the respective
year. The estimation was conducted using dierent lag lengths for level and dierence instruments
and employing Windmeijer's robust standard errors. Growth variables are denoted by circumex.
(18 (19) (20) (21)
ĜCLit ĜCLit ĜCLit ĜCLit
̂GCLit−1 0.163 0.116 0.205 0.199
(1.13) (0.74) (1.50) (1.33)
impairedit−1 -0.00687
∗∗ -0.00523 -0.00752∗∗∗ -0.00551
(-2.38) (-1.55) (-2.62) (-1.58)
impairedit−2 0.000371 0.0000857 0.00124 0.000344
(0.24) (0.05) (0.89) (0.19)
loans/TAit−1 -0.444
∗∗∗ -0.469∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.480∗∗∗
(-3.57) (-3.61) (-3.28) (-3.69)
loans/TAit−2 0.0593 0.0342 0.102 0.119
(0.54) (0.29) (0.89) (0.93)
TCARit -0.00259 -0.00293 -0.00534
∗∗ -0.00333
(-0.77) (-0.93) (-2.27) (-0.95)
TCARit−1 0.000673 0.00133 0.00309 0.00229
(0.19) (0.49) (1.28) (0.69)
Lernerit -0.141 -0.170 -0.250 -0.192
(-0.61) (-0.64) (-1.31) (-0.74)
monitoringit -0.289
∗∗ -0.336∗ -0.275∗∗ -0.260∗
(-2.30) (-1.88) (-2.08) (-1.96)
CIRit -0.000472 -0.000416 -0.000999 -0.000663
(-0.35) (-0.28) (-0.87) (-0.45)
NIMit -0.00689 0.0101 0.0189 -0.00868
(-0.22) (0.24) (0.65) (-0.24)
profitsit−1 5.870
∗∗ 6.394∗ 5.579∗ 6.522∗∗
(2.11) (1.79) (1.79) (1.97)
profitsit−2 2.464 2.769 1.961 2.203
(1.20) (1.17) (0.94) (0.92)
̂branchesit -0.0463∗∗ -0.0445∗∗ -0.0471∗∗ -0.0479∗∗
(-2.22) (-2.27) (-2.25) (-2.11)
̂branchesit−1 -0.00767 -0.0108 -0.00390 -0.00937















N 546 546 546 546
Number of instruments 72 72 78 72
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First order Arellano Bond Test -2.96*** -2.84*** -3.18*** -3.11***
Second order Arellano Bond Test -0.69 -0.65 -0.49 -0.36
Hansen Statistic 48.38 45.03 53.04 45.00
p-value (0.498) (0.513) (0.434) (0.514)
robust t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.9: Results of Blundell-Bond-Estimation of ex post appropriateness.
Ex post appropriateness is gauged by estimating Loan Loss ReservesImpaired Loans with price-to-rent-ratio re-
lated explanatory variables. The estimation was conducted using dierent lag lengths
for level and dierence instruments and employing Windmeijer's robust standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LLRIMPit LLRIMPit LLRIMPit LLRIMPit
LLRIMPit−1 0.680
∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗
(8.25) (8.51) (8.97) (6.83)
ĜCLit -99.47 -138.7 -124.8 -202.6
(-1.01) (-1.42) (-1.38) (-1.26)
̂GCLit−1 -5.254 -9.138 -6.701 -15.37
(-0.60) (-1.01) (-1.00) (-1.30)
̂GCLit−2 -4.020 -6.518 -5.143 -7.203
(-0.86) (-1.23) (-1.23) (-1.04)
TCARit−1 0.794 0.483 0.543 -0.799
(0.70) (0.31) (0.52) (-0.42)
TCARit−2 -1.090 -0.717 -0.978 0.294
(-0.99) (-0.66) (-1.02) (0.17)
TCARit−3 -0.431 -0.187 -0.213 -0.809
(-0.52) (-0.23) (-0.35) (-0.97)
profitsit−2 -215.3 -428.4 -354.2 -386.1
(-0.24) (-0.46) (-0.42) (-0.35)
profitsit−3 873.5 805.4 943.2 964.6
(0.64) (0.49) (0.75) (0.52)
Lernerit 230.8 336.9
∗∗ 258.5∗∗ 409.2
(1.55) (1.99) (2.19) (1.73)
Lernerit−1 -42.49 -79.90 -48.96 -97.53
(-0.64) (-1.05) (-0.86) (-0.91)
Lernerit−2 -9.358 -11.34 -10.64 -15.42
(-0.82) (-0.90) (-0.99) (-0.95)
monitoringit -437.4
∗∗ -436.2 ∗ -449.8∗∗ -366.8
(-1.97) (-1.78) (-2.10) (-1.38)
monitoringit−1 371.6
∗ 349.2 ∗ 366.2∗∗ 306.9
(1.90) (1.73) (1.98) (1.32)
monitoringit−2 26.05 36.23 35.56 48.11
(0.71) (1.38) (1.12) (1.24)
CIRit 1.345 1.902
∗ 1.484∗∗ 2.619
(1.49) (1.88) (2.02) (1.77)
CIRit−1 -0.240 -0.428 -0.279 -0.524










̂HousePit ∗ PRR Dummyit−1 -13.85
(-0.49)
̂HousePit−1 ∗ PRR Dummyit−2 18.08
(0.53)








N 774 774 774 774
Number of instruments 37 37 41 37
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First order Arellano Bond Test -1.99** -1.99** -2.08** -1.74*
Second order Arellano Bond Test 0.38 0.55 0.54 -0.10
Hansen Statistic 3.07 2.25 3.86 1.75
p-value (0.930) (0.972) (0.986) (0.988)
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
This thesis analyzes the eects of regional economics on bank relationships and banking policy.
Specically, we investigated potential eects of local industry specialization and competition,
distance and real estate prices on banks. With information asymmetries and advantages being
closely linked to regional economics, potential risks that stem from having less knowledge than
competitors or counterparts could be mitigated by being strongly connected with regional mar-
kets.
In order to lay down the basics of the subsequent analyses, I reviewed regional economic theories
and highlighted the role of information asymmetries in banking in chapter 2. The concepts il-
lustrated not only concerned how knowledge transfers between rms can spur their productivity
but also how the ability to provide credible hard information between rms and banks essentially
determines the relationship types between rms and banks.
The third chapter analyzed the eects of local industrial and corporate competition on bank
relationships. First I investigated which kind of external funding is preferred by rms located
in competitive areas. Special attention was paid to innovative rms and potential eects of lo-
calization and industrial specialization. As a result, local overall industrial specialization seems
to encourage the use of multiple bank relationships, while rms located in diversied areas have
c.p. less bank relationships. This eect is even stronger for innovative rms located in diversied
areas. These results underline the relevance of the availability of bank relationships for industrial
and innovative characteristics of the local economy. Another nding was that rms' opacity as
indicated by the positive coecient for rm age (higher rm age allows for longer track record)
and the negative coecient for the share of intangible assets (lower availability of collateral)
plays a signicant rms' bank relationship type.
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For opaque rms, the exchange of soft information with their lenders can be a relevant fact that
allows them to achieve external funding and/or maintainable loan conditions. This demands
personal contact that reduces information asymmetries. As a result, the lending bank's risk is
decreased on the one hand, as additional information allows for better estimation of borrower's
default risk. On the other hand, frequent exchange aords transport costs and is thus costly.
Therefore, the demanded loan rate either charges higher risk premia or transport costs to distant
opaque borrowers. Whether informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders are ag-
gravated by increasing spatial distance and priced by higher loan rates is analyzed in chapter 4.
From the empirical analysis using German rm-level data I nd that rms relying on relationship
lending have to bear higher loan rates if their nancing banks are located farther away. In line
with the results in chapter 3, I nd that the number of banks in the vicinity of the rm and a
lower share of tangible assets increase the probability to engage in single bank relationships.
Again, these results indicate that being able to oer collateral goes in hand with using mul-
tiple bank relationships. But changing the point of view, we should consider whether banks
benet from replacing thorough monitoring of opaque borrowers by relying on collateral51 and
what risks could arise from real estate as one of the major instruments of loan collateralization.
Being spatially close to real estate markets could allow superior estimation of future prices, as
non-codied information (e.g. rumors about future building developments or economic regional
trends) are stuck in the area. In chapter 5, I analyze whether growth of local real estate prices
aects risk taking of German savings banks. Expecting future price growth from past increases
in real estate prices could induce savings banks to increase the ex ante risks of their loan port-
folios, as lower losses given default could be realized when real estate as collateral increases in
value. On the other hand, higher ex post risks would suggest that savings banks do not estimate
loan risks correctly when confronted with real estate price growth. Analyzing data of German
savings banks, I do not nd local real estate prices to aect risk taking of savings banks to a
notable degree, whereas unemployment rate, i.e. more immediate local economic development
does. Concluding, there is some dependency of savings banks on the local economy as a whole,
but risk taking is not aected notably by local real estate prices.
Considering the results of the empirical analyses and putting them together, there is clearly some
interdependence between banks' policies and the corporate landscape on a local level. While rms
benet from banks oering a variety of specialized nancial services and granting loans to opaque
51see Manove et al. 2001
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enterprises, banks depend on the well-being and growth of their borrowers. The reduction of
information asymmetries by spatial proximity therefore seems to benet economic development.
This is emphasized by the close connection of the aspects discussed here: Externalities of local
industry specialization or diversication only can happen up to some distance. If many rms try
to take advantage of those externalities and try to locate within a certain area, real estate prices
will increase. Consequently, the location of rms could aect their bank relationships not only
via local industrial patterns or competition, but also via the distance towards lenders.
Distance thus aects informational exchange between rms when it comes to externalities related
to industrial specialization and it impedes informational exchange between borrower and lender
as well. While the eect of the spatial distance towards competitors on rms productivity is
not clear, higher distance towards lenders virtually is always aliated with higher information
asymmetries. While rms try to stay informationally opaque to their rivals, they should be
transparent for banks in order to obtain credit.
There has been much progress w.r.t. techniques for sharing information and enabling frequent
communication over distances. These developments have increased distances between borrowers
and lender over time (s. Brevoort and Wolken 2009). The most crucial question concerning the
topics discussed here thus is to what degree technology can replace human personal interaction.
E.g., non-codiable information can be transferred using videos, rumors concerning a potential
costumer can be retrieved using social media and data bases for the evaluation of smallest geo-
graphical entities for real estate valuation can be found online. Hence, the proclaimed death of
distance seems to be close.
Yet, fairs and business trips still seem to matter, as well as personal exchange at workplaces,
which still is a valid explanation for hardly aordable rents and rms locating in spatially close
clusters. Therefore, it could as well be possible that there is no death of distance - only the
type, quantity and quality of information that are exchanged in personal or impersonal ways is
adapted to commercial requirements and existing technologies.
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